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Morphological Changes for Neural Plasticity

The finished physical-functionalist units would need the ability to change their emergent morphology not only for active modification of single-neuron functionality but even for basic functional replication of normative neuron behavior, by virtue of needing to take into account neural plasticity and the way that morphological changes facilitate learning and memory. My original approach involved the use of retractable, telescopic dendrites and axons (with corresponding internal retractable and telescopic dendritic spines and axonal spines, respectively) activated electromechanically by the unit-CPU. For morphological changes, by providing the edges of each membrane section with an electromechanical hinged connection (i.e., a means of changing the angle of inclination between immediately adjacent sections), the emergent morphology can be controllably varied. This eventually developed to consist of an internal compartment designed so as to detach a given membrane section, move it down into the internal compartment of the neuronal soma or terminal, transport it along a track that stores alternative membrane sections stacked face-to-face (to compensate for limited space), and subsequently replaces it with a membrane section containing an alternate functional component (e.g., ion pump, ion channel, [voltage-gated or ligand-gated], etc.) embedded therein. Note that this approach was also conceived of as an alternative to retractable axons/dendrites and axonal/dendritic spines, by attaching additional membrane sections with a very steep angle of inclination (or a lesser inclination with a greater quantity of segments) and thereby creating an emergent section of artificial membrane that extends out from the biological membrane in the same way as axons and dendrites.

However, this approach was eventually supplemented by one that necessitates less technological infrastructure (i.e., that was simpler and thus more economical and realizable). If the size of the integral-membrane components is small enough (preferably smaller than their biological analogues), then differential activation of components or membrane sections would achieve the same effect as changing the organization or type of integral-membrane components, effectively eliminating the need at actually interchange membrane sections at all.

Active Neuronal Modulation and Modification

The technological and methodological infrastructure used to facilitate neural plasticity can also be used for active modification and modulation of neural behavior (and the emergent functionality determined by local neuronal behavior) towards the aim of mental augmentation and modification. Potential uses already discussed include mental amplification (increasing or augmenting existing functional modalities—i.e., intelligence, emotion, morality), or mental augmentation (the creation of categorically new functional and experiential modalities). While the distinction between modification and modulation isn’t definitive, a useful way of differentiating them is to consider modification as morphological changes creating new functional modalities, and to consider modulation as actively varying the operation of existing structures/processes through not morphological change but rather changes to the operation of integral-membrane components or the properties of the local environment (e.g., increasing local ionic concentrations).

Modulation: A Less Discontinuous Alternative to Morphological Modification

The use of modulation to achieve the effective results of morphological changes seemed like a hypothetically less discontinuous alternative to morphological changes (and thus as having a hypothetically greater probability of achieving subjective-continuity). I’m more dubious in regards to the validity of this approach now, because the emergent functionality (normatively determined by morphological features) is still changed in an effectively equivalent manner.

The Eventual Replacement of Neural Ionic Solutions with Direct Electric Fields

Upon full gradual replacement of the CNS with physical-functionalist equivalents, the preferred embodiment consisted of replacing the ionic solutions with electric fields that preserve the electric potential instantiated by the difference in ionic concentrations on the respective sides of the membrane. Such electric fields can be generated directly, without recourse to electrochemicals for manifesting them. In such a case the integral-membrane components would be replaced by a means of generating and maintaining a static and/or dynamic electric field on either side of the membrane, or even merely of generating an electrical potential (i.e., voltage—a broader category encompassing electric fields) with solid-state electronics.

This procedure would allow a fraction of the speedups (that is, increased rate of subjective perception of time, which extends to speed of thought) resulting from emulatory (i.e., strictly computational) replication-methods by no longer being limited to the rate of passive ionic diffusion—now instead being limited to the propagation velocity of electric or electromagnetic fields.

Wireless Synapses

If we replace the physical synaptic connections the NRU uses to communicate (with both existing biological neurons and with other NRUs) with a wireless means of synaptic-transmission, we can preserve the same functionality (insofar as it is determined by synaptic connectivity) while allowing any NRU to communicate with any other NRU or biological neuron in the brain at potentially equal speed. First we need a way of converting the output of an NRU or biological neuron into information that can be transmitted wirelessly. For cyber-physicalist-functionalist NRUs, regardless of their sub-class, this requires no new technological infrastructure because they already deal with 2^nd-order (i.e., not structurally or directly embodied) information; informational-functional NRU deals solely in terms of this type of information, and the cyber-physical-systems sub-class of the physicalist-functionalist NRUs deal with this kind of information in the intermediary stage between sensors and actuators—and consequently, converting what would have been a sequence of electromechanical actuations into information isn’t a problem. Only the passive-physicalist-functionalist NRU class requires additional technological infrastructure to accomplish this, because they don’t already use computational operational-modalities for their normative operation, whereas the other NRU classes do.

We dispose receivers within the range of every neuron (or alternatively NRU) in the brain, connected to actuators – the precise composition of which depends on the operational modality of the receiving biological neuron or NRU. The receiver translates incoming information into physical actuations (e.g., the release of chemical stores), thereby instantiating that informational output in physical terms. For biological neurons, the receiver’s actuators would consist of a means of electrically stimulating the neuron and releasable chemical stores of neurotransmitters (or ionic concentrations as an alternate means of electrical stimulation via the manipulation of local ionic concentrations). For informational-functionalist NRUs, the information is already in a form it can accept; it can simply integrate that information into its extant model. For cyber-physicalist-NRUs, the unit’s CPU merely needs to be able to translate that information into the sequence in which it must electromechanically actuate its artificial ion-channels. For the passive-physicalist (i.e., having no computational hardware devoted to operating individual components at all, operating according to physical feedback between components alone) NRUs, our only option appears to be translating received information into the manipulation of the local environment to vicariously affect the operation of the NRU (e.g., increasing electric potential through manipulations of local ionic concentrations, or increasing the rate of diffusion via applied electric fields to attract ions and thus achieve the same effect as a steeper electrochemical gradient or potential-difference).

The technological and methodological infrastructure for this is very similar to that used for the “integrational NRUs”, which allows a given NRU-class to communicate with either existing biological neurons or NRUs of an alternate class.

Integrating New Neural Nets Without Functional Distortion of Existing Regions

The use of artificial neural networks (which here will designate NRU-networks that do not replicate any existing biological neurons, rather than the normative Artificial Neuron Networks mentioned in the first and second parts of this essay), rather than normative neural prosthetics and BCI, was the preferred method of cognitive augmentation (creation of categorically new functional/experiential modalities) and cognitive amplification (the extension of existing functional/experiential modalities). Due to functioning according to the same operational modality as existing neurons (whether biological or artificial-replacements), they can become a continuous part of our “selves”, whereas normative neural prosthetics and BCI are comparatively less likely to be capable of becoming an integral part of our experiential continuum (or subjective sense of self) due to their significant operational dissimilarity in relation to biological neural networks.

A given artificial neural network can be integrated with existing biological networks in a few ways. One is interior integration, wherein the new neural network is integrated so as to be “inter-threaded”, in which a given artificial-neuron is placed among one or multiple existing networks. The networks are integrated and connected on a very local level. In “anterior” integration, the new network would be integrated in a way comparable to the connection between separate cortical columns, with the majority of integration happening at the peripherals of each respective network or cluster.

If the interior integration approach is used then the functionality of the region may be distorted or negated by virtue of the fact that neurons that once took a certain amount of time to communicate now take comparatively longer due to the distance between them having been increased to compensate for the extra space necessitated by the integration of the new artificial neurons. Thus in order to negate these problematizing aspects, a means of increasing the speed of communication (determined by the rate of diffusion across the synaptic junction, which in most cases is synonymous with the propagation velocity in the membrane) must be employed.

My original solution was the use of an artificial membrane morphologically modeled on a myelinated axon that possesses very high capacitance (and thus high propagation velocity), combined with increasing the capacitance of the existing axon or dendrite of the biological neuron. The cumulative capacitance of both is increased in proportion to how far apart they are moved. In this way, the propagation velocity of the existing neuron and the connector-terminal are increased to allow the existing biological neurons to communicate as fast as they would have prior to the addition of the artificial neural network. This solution was eventually supplemented by the wireless means of synaptic transmission described above, which allows any neuron to communicate with any other neuron at equal speed.

Gradually Assigning Operational Control of a Physical NRU to a Virtual NRU

This approach allows us to apply the single-neuron gradual replacement facilitated by the physical-functionalist NRU to the informational-functionalist (physically embodied) NRU. A given section of artificial membrane and its integral membrane components are modeled. When this model is functioning in parallel (i.e., synchronization of operative states) with its corresponding membrane section, the normative operational routines of that artificial membrane section (usually controlled by the unit’s CPU and its programming) are subsequently taken over by the computational model—i.e., the physical operation of the artificial membrane section is implemented according to and in correspondence with the operative states of the model. This is done iteratively, with the informationalist-functionalist NRU progressively controlling more and more sections of the membrane until the physical operation of the whole physical-functionalist NRU is controlled by the informational operative states of the informationalist-functionalist NRU. While this concept sprang originally from the approach of using multiple gradual-replacement phases (with a class of model assigned to each phase, wherein each is more dissimilar to the original than the preceding phase, thereby increasing the cumulative degree of graduality), I now see it as a way of facilitating sub-neuron gradual replacement in computational NRUs. Also note that this approach can be used to go from existing biological membrane-sections to a computational NRU, without a physical-functionalist intermediary stage. This, however, is comparatively more complex because the physical-functionalist NRU already has a means of modulating its operative states, whereas the biological neuron does not. In such a case the section of lipid bilayer membrane would presumably have to be operationally isolated from adjacent sections of membrane, using a system of chemical inventories (of either highly concentrated ionic solution or neurotransmitters, depending on the area of membrane) to produce electrochemical output and chemical sensors to accept the electrochemical input from adjacent sections (i.e., a means of detecting depolarization and hyperpolarization). Thus to facilitate an action potential, for example, the chemical sensors would detect depolarization, the computational NRU would then model the influx of ions through the section of membrane it is replacing and subsequently translate the effective results impinging upon the opposite side to that opposite edge via either the release of neurotransmitters or the manipulation of local ionic concentrations so as to generate the required depolarization at the adjacent section of biological membrane.

Integrational NRU

This consisted of a unit facilitating connection between emulatory (i.e., informational-functionalist) units and existing biological neurons. The output of the emulatory units is converted into chemical and electrical output at the locations where the emulatory NRU makes synaptic connection with other biological neurons, facilitated through electric stimulation or the release of chemical inventories for the increase of ionic concentrations and the release of neurotransmitters, respectively. The input of existing biological neurons making synaptic connections with the emulatory NRU is read, likewise, by chemical and electrical sensors and is converted into informational input that corresponds to the operational modality of the informationalist-functionalist NRU classes.

Solutions to Scale

If we needed NEMS or something below the scale of the present state of MEMS for the technological infrastructure of either (a) the electromechanical systems replicating a given section of neuronal membrane, or (b) the systems used to construct and/or integrate the sections, or those used to remove or otherwise operationally isolate the existing section of lipid bilayer membrane being replaced from adjacent sections, a postulated solution consisted of taking the difference in length between the artificial membrane section and the existing bilipid section (which difference is determined by how small we can construct functionally operative artificial ion-channels) and incorporating this as added curvature in the artificial membrane-section such that its edges converge upon or superpose with the edges of the space left by the removal the lipid bilayer membrane-section. We would also need to increase the propagation velocity (typically determined by the rate of ionic influx, which in turn is typically determined by the concentration gradient or difference in the ionic concentrations on the respective sides of the membrane) such that the action potential reaches the opposite end of the replacement section at the same time that it would normally have via the lipid bilayer membrane. This could be accomplished directly by the application of electric fields with a charge opposite that of the ions (which would attract them, thus increasing the rate of diffusion), by increasing the number of open channels or the diameter of existing channels, or simply by increasing the concentration gradient through local manipulation of extracellular and/or intracellular ionic concentration—e.g., through concentrated electrolyte stores of the relevant ion that can be released to increase the local ionic concentration.

If the degree of miniaturization is so low as to make this approach untenable (e.g., increasing curvature still doesn’t allow successful integration) then a hypothesized alternative approach was to increase the overall space between adjacent neurons, integrate the NRU, and replace normative connection with chemical inventories (of either ionic compound or neurotransmitter) released at the site of existing connection, and having the NRU (or NRU sub-section—i.e., artificial membrane section) wirelessly control the release of such chemical inventories according to its operative states.

The next chapter describes (a) possible physical bases for subjective-continuity through a gradual-uploading procedure and (b) possible design requirements for in vivo brain-scanning and for systems to construct and integrate the prosthetic neurons with the existing biological brain.

Franco Cortese is an editor for Transhumanity.net, as well as one of its most frequent contributors.  He has also published articles and essays on Immortal Life and The Rational Argumentator. He contributed 4 essays and 7 debate responses to the digital anthology Human Destiny is to Eliminate Death: Essays, Rants and Arguments About Immortality.

Franco is an Advisor for Lifeboat Foundation (on its Futurists Board and its Life Extension Board) and contributes regularly to its blog.

Bibliography

Project Avatar (2011). Retrieved February 28, 2013 from http://2045.com/tech2/

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“What do you expect when you target the President?” This is what an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent allegedly said to the head of a conservative organization that was being audited after calling for the impeachment of then-President Clinton. Recent revelations that IRS agents gave “special scrutiny” to organizations opposed to the current administration’s policies suggest that many in the IRS still believe harassing the President’s opponents is part of their job.

As troubling as these recent reports are, it would be a grave mistake to think that IRS harassment of opponents of the incumbent President is a modern, or a partisan, phenomenon. As scholar Burton Folsom pointed out in his book New Deal or Raw Deal, IRS agents in the 1930s where essentially “hit squads” against opponents of the New Deal. It is well-known that the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson used the IRS to silence their critics. One of the articles of impeachment drawn up against Richard Nixon dealt with his use of the IRS to harass his political enemies. Allegations of IRS abuses were common during the Clinton administration, and just this week some of the current administration’s defenders recalled that antiwar and progressive groups alleged harassment by the IRS during the Bush presidency.

The bipartisan tradition of using the IRS as a tool to harass political opponents suggests that the problem is deeper than just a few “rogue” IRS agents—or even corruption within one, two, three, or many administrations. Instead, the problem lies in the extraordinary power the tax system grants the IRS.

The IRS routinely obtains information about how we earn a living, what investments we make, what we spend on ourselves and our families, and even what charitable and religious organizations we support. Starting next year, the IRS will be collecting personally identifiable health insurance information in order to ensure we are complying with Obamacare’s mandates.

The current tax laws even give the IRS power to marginalize any educational, political, or even religious organizations whose goals, beliefs, and values are not favored by the current regime by denying those organizations “tax-free” status. This is the root of the latest scandal involving the IRS.

Considering the type of power the IRS excises over the American people, and the propensity of those who hold power to violate liberty, it is surprising we do not hear about more cases of politically motivated IRS harassment. As the third US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall said, “The power to tax is the power to destroy” — and whom better to destroy than one’s political enemies?

The US flourished for over 120 years without an income tax, and our liberty and prosperity will only benefit from getting rid of the current tax system. The federal government will get along just fine without its immoral claim on the fruits of our labor, particularly if the elimination of federal income taxes is accompanied by serious reduction in all areas of spending, starting with the military spending beloved by so many who claim to be opponents of high taxes and big government.

While it is important for Congress to investigate the most recent scandal and ensure all involved are held accountable, we cannot pretend that the problem is a few bad actors. The very purpose of the IRS is to transfer wealth from one group to another while violating our liberties in the process. Thus, the only way Congress can protect our freedoms is to repeal the income tax and shutter the doors of the IRS once and for all.

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Gradual Uploading Applied to Single Neurons (2008)

In early 2008 I was trying to conceptualize a means of applying the logic of gradual replacement to single neurons under the premise that extending the scale of gradual replacement to individual sections of the neuronal membrane and its integral membrane proteins—thus increasing the degree of graduality between replacement sections—would increase the likelihood of subjective-continuity through substrate transfer. I also started moving away from the use of normative nanotechnology as the technological and methodological infrastructure for the NRUs, as it would delay the date at which these systems could be developed and experimentally verified. Instead I started focusing on conceptualizing systems that electromechanically replicate the functional modalities of the small-scale integral-membrane-components of the neuron. I was calling this approach the “active mechanical membrane” to differentiate it from the electro-chemical-mechanical modalities of the nanotech approach. I also started using MEMS rather than NEMS for the underlying technological infrastructure (because MEMS are less restrictive) while identifying NEMS as preferred.

I felt that trying to replicate the metabolic replacement rate in biological neurons should be the ideal to strive for, since we know that subjective-continuity is preserved through the gradual metabolic replacement (a.k.a. molecular-turnover) that occurs in the existing biological brain. My approach was to measure the normal rate of metabolic replacement in existing biological neurons and the scale at which such replacement occurs (i.e., are the sections being replaced metabolically with single molecules, molecular complexes, or whole molecular clusters?). Then, when replacing sections of the membrane with electromechanical functional equivalents, the same ratio of replacement-section size to replacement-time factor would be applied—that is, the time between sectional replacement would be increased in proportion to how much larger the sectional-replacement section/scale is compared to the existing scale of metabolic replacement-sections/scale. Replacement size/scale is defined as the size of the section being replaced—and so would be molecular complexes in the case of normative metabolic replacement. Replacement time is defined as the interval of time between a given section being replaced and a section that it has causal connection with is replaced; in metabolic replacement it is the time interval between a given molecular complex being replaced and an adjacent (or directly-causally-connected) molecular complex being replaced.

I therefore posited the following formula:

 Ta = (Sa/Sb)*Tb,

where Sa is the size of the artificial-membrane-replacement sections, Sb is the size of the metabolic replacement sections, Tb is the time interval between the metabolic replacement of two successive metabolic replacement sections, and Ta is the time interval needing to be applied to the comparatively larger artificial-membrane-replacement sections so as to preserve the same replacement-rate factor (and correspondingly the same degree of graduality) that exists in normative metabolic replacement through the process of gradual replacement on the comparatively larger scale of the artificial-membrane sections.

The use of the time-to-scale factor corresponding with normative molecular turnover or “metabolic replacement” follows from the fact that we know subjective-continuity through substrate replacement is successful at this time-to-scale ratio. However, the lack of a non-arbitrarily quantifiable measure of time and the fact that that time is infinitely divisible (i.e., it can be broken down into smaller intervals to an arbitrarily large degree) logically necessitates that the salient variable is not time, but rather causal interaction between co-affective or “causally coupled” components. Interaction between components and the state transitions each component or procedural step undergo are the only viable quantifiable measures of time. Thus, while time is the relevant variable in the above equation, a better (i.e., more methodologically rigorous) variable would be a measure of either (a) the number of causal interactions occurring between co-affective or “adjacent” components within the interval of replacement time Ta, which is synonymous with the frequency of causal interaction; or (b) the number of state-transitions a given component undergoes within the interval of time Ta. While they should be generally correlative, in that state-transitions are facilitated via causal interaction among components, state-transitions may be a better metric because they allow us to quantitatively compare categorically dissimilar types of causal interaction that otherwise couldn’t be summed into a single variable or measure. For example, if one type of molecular interaction has a greater effect on the state-transitions of either component involved (i.e., facilitates a comparatively greater state-transition) than does another type of molecular interaction, then quantifying a measure of causal interactions may be less accurate than quantifying a measure of the magnitude of state-transitions.

In this way the rate of gradual replacement, despite being on a scale larger than normative metabolic replacement, would hypothetically follow the same degree of graduality with which biological metabolic replacement occurs. This was meant to increase the likelihood of subjective-continuity through a substrate-replacement procedure (both because it is necessarily more gradual than gradual replacement of whole individual neurons at a time, and because it preserves the degree of graduality that exists through the normative metabolic replacement that we already undergo).

Replicating Neuronal Membrane and Integral Membrane Components

Thus far there have been 2 main classes of neuron-replication approach identified: informational-functionalist and physical-functionalist, the former corresponding to computational and simulation/emulation approaches and the latter to physically embodied, “prosthetic” approaches.

The physicalist-functionalist approach, however, can at this point be further sub-divided into two sub-classes. The first can be called “cyber-physicalist-functionalist”, which involves controlling the artificial ion-channels and receptor-channels via normative computation (i.e., an internal CPU or controller-circuit) operatively connected to sensors and to the electromechanical actuators and components of the ion and receptor channels (i.e., sensing the presence of an electrochemical gradient or difference in electrochemical potential [equivalent to relative ionic concentration] between the respective sides of a neuronal membrane, and activating the actuators of the artificial channels to either open or remain closed, based upon programmed rules). This sub-class is an example of a cyber-physical system, which designates any system with a high level of connection or interaction between its physical and computational components, itself a class of technology that grew out of embedded systems, which designates any system using embedded computational technology and includes many electronic devices and appliances.

This is one further functional step removed from the second approach, which I was then simply calling the “direct” method, but which would be more accurately called the passive-physicalist-functionalist approach. Electronic systems are differentiated from electric systems by being active (i.e., performing computation or more generally signal-processing), whereas electric systems are passive and aren’t meant to transform (i.e., process) incoming signals (though any computational system’s individual components must at some level be comprised of electric, passive components). Whereas the cyber-physicalist-functionalist sub-class has computational technology controlling its processes, the passive-physicalist-functionalist approach has components emergently constituting a computational device. This consisted of providing the artificial ion-channels with a means of opening in the presence of a given electric potential difference (i.e., voltage) and the receptor-channels with a means of opening in response to the unique attributes of the neurotransmitter it corresponds to (such as chemical bonding as in ligand-based receptors, or alternatively in response to its electrical properties in the same manner – i.e., according to the same operational-modality – as the artificial ion channels), without a CPU correlating the presence of an attribute measured by sensors with the corresponding electromechanical behavior of the membrane needing to be replicated in response thereto. Such passive systems differ from computation in that they only require feedback between components, wherein a system of mechanical, electrical, or electromechanical components is operatively connected so as to produce specific system-states or processes in response to the presence of specific sensed system-states of its environment or itself. An example of this in regards to the present case would be constructing an ionic channel from piezoelectric materials, such that the presence of a certain electrochemical potential induces internal mechanical strain in the material; the spacing, dimensions and quantity of segments would be designed so as to either close or open, respectively, as a single unit when eliciting internal mechanical strain in response to one electrochemical potential while remaining unresponsive (or insufficiently responsive—i.e., not opening all the way) to another electrochemical potential. Biological neurons work in a similarly passive way, in which systems are organized to exhibit specific responses to specific stimuli in basic stimulus-response causal sequences by virtue of their own properties rather than by external control of individual components via CPU.

However, I found the cyber-physicalist approach preferable if it proved to be sufficient due to the ability to reprogram computational systems, which isn’t possible in passive systems without necessitating a reorganization of the component—which itself necessitates an increase in the required technological infrastructure, thereby increasing cost and design-requirements. This limit on reprogramming also imposes a limit on our ability to modify and modulate the operation of the NRUs (which will be necessary to retain the function of neural plasticity—presumably a prerequisite for experiential subjectivity and memory). The cyber-physicalist approach also seemed preferable due to a larger degree of variability in its operation: it would be easier to operatively connect electromechanical membrane components (e.g., ionic channels, ion pumps) to a CPU, and through the CPU to sensors, programming it to elicit a specific sequence of ionic-channel opening and closing in response to specific sensor-states, than it would be to design artificial ionic channels to respond directly to the presence of an electric potential with sufficient precision and accuracy.

In the cyber-physicalist-functionalist approach the membrane material is constructed so as to be (a) electrically insulative, while (b) remaining thin enough to act as a capacitor via the electric potential differential (which is synonymous with voltage) between the two sides of the membrane.

The ion-channel replacement units consisted of electromechanical pores that open for a fixed amount of time in the presence of an ion gradient (a difference in electric potential between the two sides of the membrane); this was to be accomplished electromechanically via a means of sensing membrane depolarization (such as through the use of reference electrodes) connected to a microcircuit (or nanocircuit, hereafter referred to as a CPU) programmed to open the electromechanical ion-channels for a length of time corresponding to the rate of normative biological repolarization (i.e., the time it takes to restore the membrane polarization to the resting-membrane-potential following an action-potential), thus allowing the influx of ions at a rate equal to the biological ion-channels. Likewise sections of the pre-synaptic membrane were to be replaced by a section of inorganic membrane containing units that sense the presence of the neurotransmitter corresponding to the receptor being replaced, which were to be connected to a microcircuit programmed to elicit specific changes (i.e., increase or decrease in ionic permeability, such as through increasing or decreasing the diameter of ion-channels—e.g., through an increase or decrease in electric stimulation of piezoelectric crystals, as described above—or an increase or decrease in the number of open channels) corresponding to the change in postsynaptic potential in the biological membrane resulting from postsynaptic receptor-binding. This requires a bit more technological infrastructure than I anticipated the ion-channels requiring.

While the accurate and active detection of particular types and relative quantities of neurotransmitters is normally ligand-gated, we have a variety of potential, mutually exclusive approaches. For ligand-based receptors, sensing the presence and steepness of electrochemical gradients may not suffice. However, we don’t necessarily have to use ligand-receptor fitting to replicate the functionality of ligand-based receptors. If there is a difference in the charge (i.e., valence) between the neurotransmitter needing to be detected and other neurotransmitters, and the degree of that difference is detectable given the precision of our sensing technologies, then a means of sensing a specific charge may prove sufficient. I developed an alternate method for ligand-based receptor fitting in the event that sensing-electric charge proved insufficient, however. Different chemicals (e.g., neurotransmitters, but also potentially electrolyte solutions) have different volume-to-weight ratios. We equip the artificial-membrane sections with an empty compartment capable of measuring the weight of its contents. Since the volume of the container is already known, this would allow us to identify specific neurotransmitters (or other relevant molecules and compounds) based on their unique weight-to-volume ratio. By operatively connecting the unit’s CPU to this sensor, we can program specific operations (i.e., receptor opens allowing entry for fixed amount of time, or remains closed) in response to the detection of specific neurotransmitters. Though it is unlikely to be necessitated, this method could also work for the detection of specific ions, and thus could work as the operating mechanism underlying the artificial ion-channels as well—though this would probably require higher-precision volume-to-weight comparison than is required for neurotransmitters.

Sectional Integration with Biological Neurons

Integrating replacement-membrane sections with adjacent sections of the existing lipid bilayer membrane becomes a lot less problematic if the scale at which the membrane sections are handled (determined by the size of the replacement membrane sections) is homogenous, as in the case of biological tissues, rather than molecularly heterogeneous—that is, if we are affixing the edges to a biological tissue, rather than to complexes of individual lipid molecules. Reasons for hypothesizing a higher probability for homogeneity at the replacement scale include (a) the ability of experimenters and medical researchers to puncture the neuronal membrane with a micropipette (so as to measure membrane voltage) without rupturing the membrane beyond functionality, and (b) the fact that sodium and potassium ions do not leak through the gaps between the individual bilipid molecules, which would be present if it were heterogeneous at this scale. If we find homogeneity at the scale of sectional replacement, we can use more normative means of affixing the edges of the replacement membrane section with the existing lipid bilayer membrane, such as micromechanical fasteners, adhesive, or fusing via heating or energizing. However, I also developed an approach applicable if the scale of sectional replacement was found to be molecular and thus heterogeneous. We find an intermediate chemical that stably bonds to both the bilipid molecules constituting the membrane and the molecules or compounds constituting the artificial membrane section. Note that if the molecules or compounds constituting either must be energized so as to put them in an abnormal (i.e., unstable) energy state to make them susceptible to bonding, this is fine so long as the energies don’t reach levels damaging to the biological cell (or if such energies could be absorbed prior to impinging upon or otherwise damaging the biological cell). If such an intermediate molecule or compound cannot be found, a second intermediate chemical that stably bonds with two alternate and secondary intermediate molecules (which themselves bond to either the biological membrane or the non-biological membrane section, respectively) can be used. The chances of finding a sequence of chemicals that stably bond (i.e., a given chemical forms stable bonds with the preceding and succeeding chemicals in the sequence) increases in proportion to the number of intermediate chemicals used. Note that it might be possible to apply constant external energization to certain molecules so as to force them to bond in the case that a stable bond cannot be formed, but this would probably be economically prohibitive and potentially dangerous, depending on the levels of energy and energization-precision.

I also worked on the means of constructing and integrating these components in vivo, using MEMS or NEMS. Most of the developments in this regard are described in the next chapter. However, some specific variations on construction procedure were necessitated by the sectional-integration procedure, which I will comment on here. The integration unit would position itself above the membrane section. Using the data acquired by the neuron data-measurement units, which specify the constituents of a given membrane section and assign it a number corresponding to a type of artificial-membrane section in the integration unit’s section-inventory (essentially a store of stacked artificial-membrane-sections). A means of disconnecting a section of lipid bilayer membrane from the biological neuron is depressed. This could be a hollow rectangular compartment with edges that sever the lipid bilayer membrane via force (e.g., edges terminate in blades), energy (e.g., edges terminate in heat elements), or chemical corrosion (e.g., edges coated with or secrete a corrosive substance). The detached section of lipid bilayer membrane is then lifted out and compacted, to be drawn into a separate compartment for storing waste organic materials. The artificial-membrane section is subsequently transported down through the same compartment. Since it is perpendicular to the face of the container, moving the section down through the compartment should force the intra-cellular fluid (which would have presumably leaked into the constructional container’s internal area when the lipid bilayer membrane-section was removed) back into the cell. Once the artificial-membrane section is in place, the preferred integration method is applied.

Sub-neuronal (i.e., sectional) replacement also necessitates that any dynamic patterns of polarization (e.g., an action potential) are continuated during the interval of time between section removal and artificial-section integration. This was to be achieved by chemical sensors (that detect membrane depolarization) operatively connected to actuators that manipulate ionic concentration on the other side of the membrane gap via the release or uptake of ions from biochemical inventories so as to induce membrane depolarization on the opposite side of the membrane gap at the right time. Such techniques as partially freezing the cell so as to slow the rate of membrane depolarization and/or the propagation velocity of action potentials were also considered.

The next chapter describes my continued work in 2008, focusing on (a) the design requirements for replicating the neural plasticity necessary for memory and subjectivity, (b) the active and conscious modulation and modification of neural operation, (c) wireless synaptic transmission, (d) on ways to integrate new neural networks (i.e., mental amplification and augmentation) without disrupting the operation of existing neural networks and regions, and (e) a gradual transition from or intermediary phase between the physical (i.e., prosthetic) approach and the informational (i.e., computational, or mind-uploading proper) approach.

Franco Cortese is an editor for Transhumanity.net, as well as one of its most frequent contributors.  He has also published articles and essays on Immortal Life and The Rational Argumentator. He contributed 4 essays and 7 debate responses to the digital anthology Human Destiny is to Eliminate Death: Essays, Rants and Arguments About Immortality.

Franco is an Advisor for Lifeboat Foundation (on its Futurists Board and its Life Extension Board) and contributes regularly to its blog.

Bibliography

Churchland, P. S. (1989). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain.  MIT Press, p. 30.

Pribram, K. H. (1971). Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles in Neuropsychology. New York: Prentice Hall/Brandon House.

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Zoltan Istvan’s new novel The Transhumanist Wager has been compared to Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged. (See, for instance, Giulio Prisco’s review.) But to what extent are the books alike, and in what respects? To be sure, the story and the writing style are gripping, the characters are vivid, and the universe created by Istvan gave me an experience highly reminiscent of my reading of Atlas Shrugged more than a decade ago. Even this alone allows me to highly recommend The Transhumanist Wager as a work of literary art – a philosophical thriller. Moreover, the didactic purpose of the novel, its interplay of clearly identified good and evil forces, and its culmination in an extensive speech where the protagonist elaborates on his philosophical principles (as well as its punctuation by multiple smaller speeches throughout) provide clear parallels to Atlas Shrugged.

Giulio Prisco calls the philosophy of The Transhumanist Wager’s protagonist, Jethro Knights, “an extreme, militant version of the radically libertarian formulation of transhumanism”. However, this is the area where I perceive the most significant departure from the parallels to Atlas Shrugged. Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism (which she did not like to be called “libertarian”, though it was in essence) has the principle of individual rights and the rejection of the initiation of force at its ethical core. Galt’s Gulch in Atlas Shrugged was formed by a withdrawal of the great thinkers and creators from the world of those who exploited and enslaved them. However, there was no active conquest of that world by Rand’s heroes; rather, without the men of the mind, the power structures of the world simply fell apart on their own accord.

Jethro Knights creates his own seasteading nation, Transhumania, a fascinating haven for innovation and a refuge for transhumanist scientists oppressed by their governments and targeted by religious fundamentalist terrorism. The concept of an autonomous bastion of innovation is timely and promising; it was echoed by the recent statements from Larry Page of Google in favor of setting aside a part of the world to allow for unbridled experimentation. Transhumania, due to its technological superiority, spectacularly beats back a hostile invasion by the combined navies of the world. It is when the Transhumanians go on the offensive that the parallels to Galt’s Gulch cease. Instead of letting the non-transhumanist world crumble or embrace transhumanism on its own accord, Jethro Knights conquers it, destroys all of its political, religious, and cultural centerpieces, and establishes a worldwide dictatorship – including some highly non-libertarian elements, such as compulsory education, restrictions on reproduction, and an espousal of the view that even some human beings who have not initiated force may not have an inviolate right to their lives, but are rather judged on their “usefulness” – however defined (perhaps, in the case of Transhumania, usefulness in advancing the transhumanist vision as understood by Jethro Knights). Jethro Knights permits a certain degree of freedom – enough to sustain technological progress, high standards of living, and due process in the resolution of everyday disputes – but, ultimately, all of the liberties in Transhumania are contingent on their compatibility with Jethro’s own philosophy; they are not recognized as absolute rights even for those who disagree. John Galt would have been gentler. He would have simply withdrawn his support from those who would not deal with him as honest creators of value, but he would have left them to their own devices otherwise, unless they initiated force against him and against other rational creators of value.

The outcome of The Transhumanist Wager is complicated by the fact that Jethro’s militancy is the direct response to the horrific acts of terrorism committed by religious fundamentalists at the behest of Reverend Belinas, who also has considerable behind-the-scenes influence on the US government in the novel. Clearly, the anti-transhumanists were the initiators of force for the majority of the novel, and, so long as they perpetrated acts of violence against pro-technology scientists and philosophers, they were valid targets for retaliation and neutralization – just like all terrorists and murderers are. For the majority of the book, I was, without question, on Jethro’s side when it came to his practice, though not always his theory – but it was upon reading about the offensive phase of his war that I came to differ in both, especially since Transhumania had the technological capacity to surgically eliminate only those who directly attacked it or masterminded such attacks, thereafter leaving the rest of the world powerless to destroy Transhumania, but also free to come to recognize the merits of radical life extension and general technological progress on its own in a less jarring, perhaps more gradual process. An alternative scenario to the novel’s ending could have been a series of political upheavals in the old nations of the world, where the leaders who had targeted transhumanist scientists were recognized to be thoroughly wasteful and destructive, and were replaced by neutral or techno-progressive politicians who, partly for pragmatic reasons and partly arising out of their own attraction to technology, decided to trade with Transhumania instead of waging war on it.

Jethro’s concept of the “omnipotender” is a vision of the individual seeking as much power as he can get, ultimately aiming to achieve power over the entire universe. It is not clear whether power in this vision means simply the ability to achieve one’s objectives, or control in a hierarchical sense, which necessarily involves the subordination of other intelligent beings. I support power in the sense of the taming of the wilderness and the empowerment of the self for the sake of life’s betterment, but not in the sense of depriving others of a similar prerogative. Ayn Rand’s vision of the proper rationally egoistic outlook is extremely clear on the point that one must neither sacrifice oneself to others nor sacrifice others to oneself. Istvan’s numerous critical references to altruism and collectivism clearly express his agreement with the first half of that maxim – but what about the second? Jethro’s statements that he would be ready to sacrifice the lives of even those closest to him in order to achieve his transhumanist vision certainly suggest that the character of Jethro might not give others the same sphere of inviolate action that he would seek for himself. Of course, Jethro also dismisses as a contrived hypothetical the suggestion that such sacrifice would be necessary (at least, in Jethro’s view, for the time being), and I agree. Yet a more satisfying response would have been not that he is ready to make such a sacrifice, but that the sacrifice itself is absolutely not required for individual advancement by the laws of reality, and therefore it is nonsensical to even acknowledge its possibility. Jethro gave his archenemy, Belinas, far too much of a philosophical concession by even picking sides in the false dichotomy between self-sacrifice to others and the subjugation of others to oneself.

Perhaps the best way to view The Transhumanist Wager is as a cautionary tale of what might happen if the enemies of technological progress and radical life extension begin to forcefully clamp down on the scientists who try to make these breakthroughs happen. A climate of violence and terror, rather than civil discourse and an embrace of life-enhancing progress, will breed societal interactions that follow entirely different rules, and produce entirely different incentives, from those which allow a civilized society to smoothly function and advance. I hope that we, at least in the Western world, can avoid a scenario where those different rules and incentives take hold.

I am a transhumanist, but I am also a humanist, in the sense that I see the advancement of humanity and the improvement of the human condition as the desired aims of technological progress. In this sense, I am fond of the reference to the goal of transhumanists as the achievement of a “humanity plus”. Transhumanism is and ought to be, fundamentally, a continuation of the melioristic drive of the 18^th-century Enlightenment, ridding man of the limitations and terrible sufferings which have historically been considered part of necessary “human nature” but which are, in reality, the outcome of the contingent material shortcomings with which our species happened to be burdened from its inception. Will it be possible to entice and persuade enough people to embrace the transhumanist vision voluntarily? I certainly hope so, since even a sizable minority of individuals would suffice to drive forward the technological advances which the rest of humanity would embrace for other, non-philosophical reasons.

In the absence of a full-fledged embrace of this humanistic vision of transhumanism, at the very least I hope that it would be possible to “sneak around” the common objections and restrictions and achieve a technological fait accompli through the dissemination of philosophically neutral tools, such as the Internet and mobile devices, that enhance individual opportunities and alter the balance of power between individuals and institutions. In this possible future, some of the old “cultural baggage” – as Jethro would refer to it – would most likely remain – including religions, which are among the hardest cultural elements for people to give up. However, this “baggage” itself would gradually evolve in its essential outlook and impact upon the world, much like Western Christianity today is far gentler than the Christianity of the 3^rd, 11^th, or 17^th centuries. Perhaps, instead of fighting transhumanism, some representatives of old cultural labels will attempt to preserve their own relevance amidst transhuman-oriented developments. This will require reinterpreting doctrines, and will certainly engender fierce debate within many religious, political, and societal circles. However, there may yet be hope that the progressive wings of each of these old institutions and ideologies (“progressive” in the sense of being open to progress, not to be mistaken for any current partisan affiliation) will do the equivalent work to that entailed in a transhumanist revolution, except in a gradual, peaceful, seamless manner.

Yet, on the other hand, the immense urgency of achieving life extension is, without question, a sentiment I strongly identify with. Jethro’s experience, early in the novel, of stepping on a defective mine has autobiographical parallels to Istvan’s own experience in Vietnam. A brush with death certainly highlights the fragility of life and the urgency of pursuing its continuation. Pausing to contemplate that, were it not for a stroke of luck at some prior moment, one could be dead now – and all of the vivid and precious experiences one is having could one day be snuffed out, with not even a memory remaining – certainly motivates one to think about what the most direct, the most effective means of averting such a horrific outcome would be. Will a gradual, humane, humanistic transition to a world of indefinite life extension work out in time for us? What can we do to make it happen sooner? Can we do it within the framework of the principles of libertarianism in addition to those of transhumanism? Which approaches are the most promising at present, and which, on the other hand, could be counterproductive? How do we attempt to enlist the help of the “mainstream” world while avoiding or overcoming its opposition? For me, reading The Transhumanist Wager provided further impetus to keep asking these important, open, and as of yet unresolved questions – in the hopes that someday the ambition to achieve indefinite life extension in our lifetimes will give rise to a clear ultra-effective strategy that can put this most precious of all goals in sight.

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Congressional hearings, White House damage control, endless op-eds, accusations, and defensive denials. Controversy over the events in Benghazi last September took center stage in Washington and elsewhere last week. However, the whole discussion is again more of a sideshow. Each side seeks to score political points instead of asking the real questions about the attack on the US facility, which resulted in the death of US Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans.

Republicans smell a political opportunity over evidence that the Administration heavily edited initial intelligence community talking points about the attack to remove or soften anything that might reflect badly on the president or the State Department.

Are we are supposed to be shocked by such behavior? Are we supposed to forget that this kind of whitewashing of facts is standard operating procedure when it comes to the US government?

Democrats in Congress have offered the even less convincing explanation for Benghazi, that somehow the attack occurred due to Republican-sponsored cuts in the security budget at facilities overseas. With a one- trillion-dollar military budget, it is hard to take this seriously.

It appears that the Administration scrubbed initial intelligence reports of references to extremist Islamist involvement in the attacks, preferring to craft a lie that the demonstrations were a spontaneous response to an anti-Islamic video that developed into a full-out attack on the US outpost.

Who can blame the administration for wanting to shift the focus? The Islamic radicals who attacked Benghazi were the same people let loose by the US-led attack on Libya. They were the rebels on whose behalf the US overthrew the Libyan government. Ambassador Stevens was slain by the same Islamic radicals he personally assisted just over one year earlier.

But the Republicans in Congress also want to shift the blame. They supported the Obama Administration’s policy of bombing Libya and overthrowing its government. They also repeated the same manufactured claims that Gaddafi was “killing his own people” and was about to commit mass genocide if he were not stopped. Republicans want to draw attention to the President’s editing of talking points in hopes no one will notice that if the attack on Libya they supported had not taken place, Ambassador Stevens would be alive today.

Neither side wants to talk about the real lesson of Benghazi: interventionism always carries with it unintended consequences. The US attack on Libya led to the unleashing of Islamist radicals in Libya. These radicals have destroyed the country, murdered thousands, and killed the US ambassador. Some of these then turned their attention to Mali, which required another intervention by the US and France.

Previously secure weapons in Libya flooded the region after the US attack, with many of them going to Islamist radicals who make up the majority of those fighting to overthrow the government in Syria. The US government has intervened in the Syrian conflict on behalf of the same rebels it assisted in the Libya conflict, likely helping with the weapons transfers. With word out that these rebels are mostly affiliated with al Qaeda, the US is now intervening to persuade some factions of the Syrian rebels to kill other factions before completing the task of ousting the Syrian government. It is the dizzying cycle of interventionism.

The real lesson of Benghazi will not be learned because neither Republicans nor Democrats want to hear it. But it is our interventionist foreign policy and its unintended consequences that have created these problems, including the attack and murder of Ambassador Stevens. The disputed talking points and White House whitewashing are just a sideshow.

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I know it is sacrilege, but that is all the more reason to say it, and say it loud: Democracy is not the be-all, end-all, Holy Grail of politics that many imagine it to be. It is one, but only one, of the ingredients that make for good societies, and it is far from the most important one. Why point this out? If democracy is a good thing, why stir controversy by questioning just how good? Because the widespread, quasi-religious devotion to democracy in evidence today has some very nasty consequences. Democracy means “rule by the people.” The people usually rule by electing representatives, a process which is called, simply enough, representative democracy. Sometimes, as in the case of a referendum on a specific question, the people rule more directly, and this is known as direct democracy. Actually, though, “rule by the people” is a bit misleading, since “the people” are never unanimous on any given question, and neither are their chosen representatives. In practice, democracy is rule by majority (i.e., 50% + 1), or even mere plurality (i.e., more than any one other candidate but less than half) when three or more candidates compete.

Long before any nation had experienced anything even approaching universal suffrage, people concerned with human liberty—thinkers like Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill—expressed concerns that the fading tyranny of kings might merely be replaced by a “tyranny of the majority.” They worried that majorities might vote away minorities’ hard-won rights to property, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement. Majorities with a hate on for certain minorities might even vote away their very right to life.

History has given these worries ample justification. Democracy by itself is no guarantee of peace and freedom. Adolf Hitler’s victory in democratic 1930s Germany is only the most glaring example of popular support for an illiberal, anti-human regime. The people of Latin America have a long and hallowed tradition of rallying behind populist strongmen who repay their fealty by grinding them (or sometimes their neighbours) beneath their boot heels, all the while running their economies into the ground. Their counterparts in post-colonial Africa and certain parts of Asia have shown similarly stellar political acumen.

As writers like Fareed Zakaria (The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad) point out, in those parts of the world that have successfully achieved a respectable degree of freedom and prosperity (basically Europe, the Anglosphere, and Japan and the Asian Tigers), sheer democracy has been supplemented—and preceded—by institutions like the rule of law, including an independent judiciary; secure property rights; the separation of church and state; freedom of the press; and an educated middle class. Indeed, instead of supplementing democracy, it is more accurate to say that these institutions limit the things over which the people can rule. It is enshrined in law and tradition that neither the people nor their representatives shall be above the law, violate the lives or property of others, impose their religious beliefs on others, or censor the freedom of the press. These checks on the power of the people have created, in the most successful parts of the world, not just democracies but liberal democracies.

According to Zakaria, societies that democratize before having built up these liberal institutions and the prosperity they engender are practically doomed to see their situations deteriorate instead of improve, often to the detriment of neighbouring countries, too. Liberty is simply more important than democracy, and must come first. We who are fortunate enough to live in liberal democracies would do well to remember this when judging other nations, like China, and urging them to democratize faster.

We would do well to remember it when thinking about our own societies, too. Thinkers like economist Bryan Caplan, author of The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, argue that even in the most liberal countries, democracy often works against liberty. Economists have been saying for a few decades now that political ignorance is an intractable problem that undermines the beneficial effects of democracy. The argument is that since a single vote has practically no chance of affecting the outcome of an election (or a referendum), the average voter has no incentive to become informed. Defenders of democracy have replied that ignorance doesn’t matter, since the ignorant essentially vote randomly, and random ignorant votes in one direction will be cancelled out by random ignorant votes in the opposite direction, leaving the well-informed in the driver’s seat.

Caplan agrees that if average voters were merely ignorant, their votes would cancel each other out, and the well-informed would be in charge and make good decisions. His central insight, though, is that voters are not merely ignorant, but irrational to boot. Voters have systematically biased beliefs, to which they are deeply attached, and those biases do not cancel each other out. Specifically, the average voter underestimates how well markets work; underestimates the benefits of dealing with foreigners; focuses on the short-term pain of job losses instead of the long-term gain of productivity increases; and tends at any given time to be overly pessimistic about the economy. These biases lead voters to support candidates and policies that undermine their own best interests.

The alternative to democracy, Caplan emphasizes, is not dictatorship, but markets. The market is not perfect, but it works a lot better than politics, because in my daily life as a producer and a consumer, I have an obvious incentive to be rational: my pocketbook. This incentive is lacking when it comes time to go to the polls, because of the aforementioned near-impossibility that my vote will determine the outcome. Given this asymmetry, we should favour markets over politics whenever possible. For those things that must be decided collectively, democracy may be the best we can do, but we should strive to decide as many things as possible privately, resorting to politics only when no other option is feasible. In other words, we should recapture the wisdom of the American Founding Fathers, rediscover the genius of constitutionally limited democracy, and reclaim some of the liberty previous generations fought so valiantly to secure. If we don’t, it might not be too much longer, in the grand scheme of things, before the Western world ceases to be a model worth emulating.

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Everyday life in the United States is still semi-free most of the time, if one goes about one’s own business and avoids flying or crossing the border. Yet, the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings of April 15, 2013, showed all too clearly that totalitarianism does not need decades of incremental legislation and regimentation to come to this country. All it needs is the now-pervasive fear of “terrorism” – a fear which can give one man the power to shut down the economic life of an entire city for a day.

The annual Gross Domestic Product of Boston is approximately $326 billion (based on 2011 figures from the Wall Street Journal). For one day, Boston’s GDP can be roughly estimated as ($326 billion)/365 = $893.15 million. Making the rather conservative assumption that only about half of a city’s economic activity would require people to leave their homes in any way, one can estimate the economic losses due to the Boston lockdown to be around $447 million. By contrast, how much damaged property and medical costs resulted directly from the criminal act committed by the Chechen nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist brothers Tamerlan and Dzokhar Tsarnaev? An NBC News article detailing the economic damages from the bombing estimates total medical costs to be in excess of $9 million, while total losses within the “impact zone” designated by the Boston Police Department are about $10 million. To give us a wide margin of error again, let us double these estimates and assume that the bombers inflicted total economic damage of $38 million. The economic damage done by the lockdown would still exceed this total by a factor of about 11.76 – more than an order of magnitude!

It is true, of course, that the cost in terms of the length and quality of life for the three people killed and the 264 people injured by the bombings cannot be accounted for in monetary terms. But I wonder: how many years of life will $447 million in lost economic gains deprive from the population of Boston put together – especially when one considers that these economic losses affect life-sustaining sectors such as medical care and pharmaceuticals? Furthermore, to what extent would this lost productivity forestall the advent of future advances that could have lengthened people’s lives one day sooner? One will most likely never know, but the reality of opportunity cost is nonetheless always with us, and surely, some massive opportunity costs were incurred during the Boston lockdown.  Moreover, one type of damage does not justify or excuse another. However horrific the Boston bombings were, they were not a reason to further hinder innocent people.

Bad policy is the surest and most powerful ally of malicious, hate-driven miscreants like the Tsarnaev brothers. On April 19, the day of the lockdown, Dzokhar Tsarnaev, the sole surviving Boston Marathon bomber, hid inside a boat in a private backyard, incapacitated and nearly dead from a botched suicide attempt. Dzokhar wanted only to end his own life, and yet he could never have caused more trouble than he did during those hours, because, while the lockdown was in place, bad policy was inflicting more economic damage than the Tsarnaev brothers’ crude and clumsy attack could ever have unleashed on its own.

Only after the lockdown was lifted could a private citizen, David Henneberry, leave his house and notice that his boat had a loose cover. As Thomas Jefferson would have told the Bostonians, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Virtually every time malicious plots against innocent civilians are actually foiled – be it the takedown of United Airlines Flight 93 or the arrests of attempted “shoe bomber” Richard Reid and “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab – it is the vigilance of ordinary but courageous individuals that truly enhances the safety of us all.  Policies that create martial law, prevent people from leading their lives, and result in SWAT-style “sweeps” of people’s homes in search of a single individual not only do nothing to actually help capture the violent wrongdoer, but also subvert the liberty, prosperity, and quality of life for many orders of magnitude more people than any criminal cell could ever hope to undermine on its own.

Would any other dangerous condition, one not thought to be “terrorism,” ever provoke such a wildly disproportionate and oppressive reaction? Consider that Boston had 58 homicides in the year 2012. Many cities’ murder rates are much higher, sometimes reaching an average of one murder per day. Was a lockdown initiated for every third homicide in any American city? Traffic fatalities claim over 30,000 lives in the United States every year – or 10,000 times the death toll of the Boston Marathon bombing, and ten times the death toll of even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Are entire neighborhoods shut down every time there is a deadly car crash? If this were the accepted practice, all economic life – indeed most life in general – in the United States would grind to a halt.  Yet, while the most likely and widespread threats to our lives come from very mundane sources, bad policies and distorted public perceptions of risk are motivated by fear of the unusual, the grotesque, the sensational and sensationalized kinds of death. And yet, in spite of fear-mongering by politicians, the media, special interests, and those who rely exclusively on sound bites, the threat to one’s personal safety from a terrorist act is so minuscule as to safely be ignored. In fact, as Ronald Bailey of Reason Magazine discusses, the odds of being killed by a lightning bolt are about four times greater!

 Ironically enough, the very act that precipitated the Boston lockdown might not even officially be designated a terrorist act after all. If you thought that this was because politicians are suddenly coming to their senses, think again. The real reason is somewhat less intuitive and relates to insurance coverage for the businesses damaged by the attacks. Most commercial property and business-interruption insurance policies will cover losses from criminal acts, but explicitly exclude coverage for acts of terrorism, unless the business purchases special terrorism coverage reinsured by the federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. However, for the terrorism exclusions in many ordinary commercial insurance policies to apply, an act of terrorism has to be formally certified as such by the Secretary of the Treasury (and sometimes other officials, such as the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security). (For more details on this turn of events, read “Business Frets at Terrorism Tag of Marathon Attack” by the Associated Press.) The affected businesses really do not want the bombings to be formally classified as terrorism, as this will impede the businesses’ ability to obtain the insurance proceeds which would be integral to their recovery.

 I have no objection to the federal government refraining from certifying the bombings as a terrorist act in an effort to avoid needless bureaucratic complications that would impede recovery. However, I also detest Orwellian doublethink. If the bombings are not terrorism for one purpose, then they cannot be terrorism in any other sense. If they will not be used to justify depriving businesses of insurance proceeds, then surely they must not be used to deprive the rest of us of our freedom to move about as we wish, to pursue our economic aspirations, to retain the privacy of our homes, and to otherwise lead our lives in peace. If the bombings are not certified as terrorism, then all fear-mongering rhetoric by federal politicians about the need to heighten “security” in response to this “terrorist” act should cease as well. The law of non-contradiction is one type of law that our politicians – and the people of the United States more generally – urgently need to recognize.

I certainly hope that no future bombings of public events occur in the United States, not only out of a desire to preserve the lives of my fellow human beings, but also out of grave concern for the possibly totalitarian reaction that would follow any such heinous act. I enjoy living in peace and relative freedom day to day, but I know that it is only by the grace and perhaps the laziness of America’s political masters that I am able to do so. I continue to hope for an amazing run of good luck with regard to the non-occurrence of any particularly visible instances of mass crime, so that the people of the United States can find the time to gradually become enlightened about the real risks in their lives and the genuinely effective strategies for reducing those risks. There is hope that the American people are gradually regaining their common sense; perhaps they will drag the politicians toward reason with them – however reluctant the politicians might be to pursue sensible policies for a change.