{"id":1420,"date":"2013-08-11T00:19:55","date_gmt":"2013-08-11T00:19:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/?p=1420"},"modified":"2014-02-09T04:04:51","modified_gmt":"2014-02-09T04:04:51","slug":"heidegger-cooney-cortese","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/blog\/2013\/08\/heidegger-cooney-cortese\/","title":{"rendered":"Heidegger, Cooney, and The Death-Gives-Meaning-To-Life Hypothesis – Article by Franco Cortese"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\"The<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Franco Cortese
\n<\/big><\/big><\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
August 10, 2013<\/big><\/span><\/div>\n
Recommend this page<\/a>.<\/strong><\/div>\n
******************************<\/div>\n
One common argument against indefinite lifespans is that a definitive limit to one\u2019s life \u2013 that is, death \u2013 provides some essential baseline reference, and that it is only in contrast to this limiting factor that life has any meaning at all. In this article I refute the argument\u2019s underlying premises, and then argue that even if such premises were taken as true, the argument’s conclusion \u2013 that eradicating death would negate the \u201climiting factor\u201d that legitimizes life – is also invalid, because the ever-changing nature of self and society – and the fact that opportunities once here are now gone –\u00a0\u00a0can constitute such a scarcitizing factor just as well as death can.<\/div>\n
***<\/span><\/div>\n
Death gives meaning to life? No! Death is <\/em>meaninglessness!<\/strong><\/div>\n
***<\/span><\/div>\n
\n

One version of the argument is given in Brian Cooney<\/a>\u2019s Posthumanity: Thinking Philosophically about the Future<\/em><\/a>, an introductory philosophical text that uses various futurist scenarios and concepts to illustrate the broad currents of Western philosophy. Towards the end of the book, Cooney makes his argument against immortality, claiming that if we had all the time in the universe to do what we wanted, then we wouldn\u2019t do anything at all. Essentially, his argument boils down to “if there is no possibility of not being able to do something in the future, then why would we ever do it?”<\/p>\n

Each chapter of Cooney\u2019s book ends with a dialogue between a fictional human and posthuman, meant to better exemplify the arguments laid out in the chapter and their various interpretations. In the final chapter, \u201cPosthumanity\u201d, Cooney-as-posthuman writes:<\/p>\n

\n
\u201cOur ancestors realized that immortality would be a curse, and we have never been tempted to bestow it on ourselves\u2026 We didn\u2019t want to be like Homer\u2019s gods and goddesses. The Odyssey is saturated with the contrast of mortal human life, the immortality of the gods and the shadow life of the dead in Hades\u2026 Aren\u2019t you struck by the way these deities seem to have nothing better to do than be an active audience for the lives and deeds of humans\u2026 These gods are going to live forever and there is no scarcity of whatever resources they need for their divine way of life. So (to borrow a phrase from your economists) there is no opportunity cost to their choosing to do one thing rather than another or spend time with one person rather than another. They have endless time and resources to pursue other alternatives and relationships later. Consequently, they can\u2019t take anyone or anything seriously\u2026 Moreover, their lives lack meaning because they are condemned to living an unending story, one that can never have narrative unity\u2026 That is the fate we avoid by fixing a standard limit to our lives. Immortals cannot have what Kierkegaard called \u2018passion\u2019\u2026 A mind is aware of limitless possibilities \u2013 it can think of itself as doing anything conceivable \u2013 and it can think of a limitless time in which to do it all. To choose a life \u2013 one that will progress like a story from its beginning to its end \u2013 is to give up the infinite for the finite\u2026 We consider ourselves free because we were liberated from the possibility of irrationality and selfishness<\/em>.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0\u00a0 (Cooney, 2004, 183-186).<\/div>\n
***<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Thus we see that Cooney\u2019s argument rests upon the thesis that death gives meaning to life because it incurs finitude, and finitude forces us to choose certain actions over others. This assumes that we make actions on the basis of not being able to do them again. But people don\u2019t make most of their decisions this way. We didn\u2019t go out to dinner because the restaurant was closing down; we went out for dinner because we wanted to go out for dinner. I think that Cooney\u2019s version of the argument is na\u00efve. We don\u2019t make the majority of our decisions by contrasting an action to the possibility of not being able to do it in future.<\/p>\n

Cooney\u2019s argument seems to be that if we had a list of all possible actions set before us, and time were limitless, we might accomplish all the small, negligible things first, because they are easier and all the hard things can wait. If we had all the time in the world, we would have no reference point with which to judge how important a given action or objective is. If we really can do every single thing on that \u2018listless list\u2019, then why bother, if each is as important as every other? In his line of reasoning, importance requires scarcity. If we can do everything it was possible to do, then there is nothing that determines one thing as being more important than another. Cooney makes an analogy with an economic concept to clarify his position. Economic definitions of value require scarcity; if everything were as abundant as everything else, if nothing were scarce, then we would have no way of ascribing economic value to a given thing, such that one thing has more economic value than another. So too, Cooney argues, with possible choices in life.<\/p>\n

But what we sometimes forget is that ecologies aren\u2019t always like economies.<\/p>\n

The Grave Dig|nitty of Death<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the essay collection \u201cTranshumanism and its Critics<\/a>\u201d, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson<\/a> writes:<\/p>\n

\n
\u201cFinally, since death is part of the cycle of life characteristic of finite creatures, we will need to concern ourselves with a dignified death\u2026 the dying process need not be humiliating or dehumanizing; if done properly, as the hospice movement has shown us, the dying process itself can be dignified by remembering that we are dealing with persons whose life narratives in community are imbued with meaning, and that meaning does not disappear when bodily functions decline or finally cease<\/em>.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0\u00a0(Tirosh-Samuelson, 2011).<\/div>\n
***<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

She may have provided a line of reasoning for arguing that death need not be indignifying or humiliating (convinced me that death has any dignity whatsoever), but I would say that she\u2019s digging her claim\u2019s own grave by focusing on the nitty-gritty details of humiliation and dignity. It is not the circumstances of death that make death problematic and wholly unsatisfactory; it is the fact that death negates life. Only in life can an individual exhibit dignity or fail by misemphasis. Sure, people can remember you after you have gone, and contributing to larger projects that continue after one\u2019s own death can provide some meaning\u2026 but only for those still alive – not for the dead. The meaning held or beheld by the living could pertain to the dead, but that doesn\u2019t constitute meaning to <\/em>or for<\/em> the dead, who forfeited the capability to experience, or behold meaning when they lost the ability to experience, or behold anything at all.<\/p>\n

Tirosh-Samuelson’s last claim, that death need not be dehumanizing, appears to be founded upon her personal belief in an afterlife more than the claim that meaning doesn\u2019t necessarily have to cease when we die, because we are part of \u201ca community imbued with meaning\u201d and this community will continue after our own death, thus providing continuity of meaning.\u00a0 Tirosh-Samuelson’s belief in the afterlife also largely invalidates the claims she makes, since death means two completely different things to an atheist and a theist. As I have argued elsewhere<\/a> (Cortese, 2013, 160-172), only the atheist speaks of death; the theist speaks merely of another kind of life. For a theist, death would not be dehumanizing, humiliating, or indignifying if all the human mental attributes a person possessed in the physical world would be preserved in an afterlife.<\/p>\n

Another version of the \u201climiting factor\u201d argument comes from Martin Heidegger, in his massive philosophical work Being and Time<\/a><\/em>. In the section on being-toward-death, Heidegger claims, on one level, that Being must be a totality, and in order to be a totality (in the sense of being absolute or not containing anything outside of itself) it must also be that which it is not. Being can only become what it is not through death, and so in order for Being to become a totality (which he argues it must in order to achieve authenticity \u2013 which is the goal all along, after all), it must become what it is not – that is, death – for completion (Heidegger, 1962). This reinforces some interpretations made in linking truth with completion and completion with staticity.<\/p>\n

Another line of reasoning taken by Heidegger seems to reinforce the interpretation made by Cooney, which was probably influenced heavily by Heidegger\u2019s concept of being-toward-death. The \u201cfact\u201d that we will one day die causes Being to reevaluate itself, realize that it is time and time is finite, and that its finitude requires it to take charge of its own life – to find authenticity. Finitude for Heidegger legitimizes our freedom. If we had all the time in the world to become authentic, then what\u2019s the point? It could always be deferred. But if our time is finite, then the choice of whether to achieve authenticity or not falls in our own hands. Since we must make choices on how to spend our time, failing to become authentic by spending one\u2019s time on actions that don\u2019t help achieve authenticity becomes our fault.Can Limitless Life Still Have a \u201cFilling Stillness\u201d and \u201cLegitimizing Limit\u201d?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/strong>Perhaps more importantly, even if their premises were correct (i.e., that the \u201cchange\u201d of death adds some baseline limiting factor, causing you to do what you would not have done if you had all the time in the world, and thereby constituting our main motivator for motion and metric for meaning), Cooney and Heidegger are still wrong in the conclusion that indefinitely extended life would destroy or jeopardize this \u201cessential limitation\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The crux of the \u201cdeath-gives-meaning-to-life\u201d argument is that life needs scarcity, finitude, or some other factor restricting the possible choices that could be made, in order to find meaning. But final death need not be the sole candidate for such a restricting factor.
\n***<\/span>
\nSelf: La Petite Mort<\/em><\/strong>
\n***<\/span>
\nAll changed, changed utterly\u2026 A terrible beauty is born. The self sways by the second. We are creatures of change, and in order to live we die by the moment. I am not the same as I once was, and may never be the same again. The choices we prefer and the decisions we are most likely to make go through massive upheaval.The changing self could constitute this \u201cscarcitizing\u201d or limiting factor just as well as death could. We can be compelled to prioritize certain choices and actions over others because we might be compelled to choose differently in another year, month, or day. We never know what we will become, and this is a blessing. Life itself can act as the limiting factor that, for some, legitimizes life.<\/p>\n

Society: La Petite Fin du Monde<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Society is ever on an s-curve swerve of consistent change as well. Culture is in constant upheaval, with new opportunities opening up(ward) all the time. Thus the changing state of culture and humanity\u2019s upheaved hump through time could act as this \u201climiting factor\u201d just as well as death or the changing self could. What is available today may be gone tomorrow. We\u2019ve missed our chance to see the Roman Empire at its highest point, to witness the first Moon landing, to pioneer a new idea now old. Opportunities appear and vanish all the time.<\/p>\n

Indeed, these last two points \u2013 that the changing state of self and society, together or singly, could constitute such a limiting factor just as effectively as death could \u2013 serve to undermine another common argument against the desirability of limitless life (boredom) \u2013 thereby killing two inverted phoenixes with one stoning. Too often is this rather baseless claim bandied about as a reason to forestall indefinitely extended lifespans \u2013 that longer life will lead to increased boredom. The fact that self and society are in a constant state of change means that boredom should become increasingly harder to maintain. We are on the verge of our umpteenth rebirth, and the modalities of being that are set to become available to us, as selves and as societies, will ensure that the only way to entertain the notion of increased boredom\u00a0\u00a0will be to personally hard-wire it into ourselves.<\/p>\n

Life<\/em> gives meaning to life, dummy!<\/strong><\/p>\n

Death is nothing but misplaced waste, and I think it\u2019s time to take out the trash, with haste. We don\u2019t need death to make certain opportunities more pressing than others, or to allow us to assign higher priorities to one action than we do to another. The Becoming underlying life\u2019s self-overcoming will do just fine.<\/p>\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n

Cooney, B. (2004). Posthumanity: Thinking Philosophically about the Future. <\/em>Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN-10: 0742532933<\/p>\n

Cortese, F. (2013). \u201cReligion vs. Radical Longevity: Belief in Heaven is the Biggest Barrier to Eternal Life?!\u201d. Human Destiny is to Eliminate Death: Essays, Arguments and Rants about Immortalism.<\/em> Ed. Pellissier, H. 1st<\/sup> ed. Niagara Falls: Center for Transhumanity. 160-172.<\/p>\n

Heidegger, M., Macquarrie, J., & Robinson, E. (1962). Being and time.<\/em> Malden, MA: Blackwell.<\/p>\n

Tirosh-Samuelson, H. (2011). \u201cEngaging Transhumanism\u201d. Transhumanism and its Critics.<\/em> Ed. Grassie<\/a>, W., Hansell<\/a>, G. Philadelphia, PA: Metanexus Institute.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Franco Cortese<\/b> is an editor for Transhumanity.net<\/a>, as well as one of its most frequent contributors.\u00a0 He has also published articles and essays on Immortal Life<\/a> and The Rational Argumentator<\/a>. He contributed 4 essays and 7 debate responses to the digital anthology Human Destiny is to Eliminate Death: Essays, Rants and Arguments About Immortality<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Franco is an Advisor<\/a> for Lifeboat Foundation<\/a> (on its Futurists Board<\/a> and its Life Extension Board<\/a>) and contributes<\/a> regularly to its blog<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Franco Cortese August 10, 2013 Recommend this page. ****************************** One common argument against indefinite lifespans is that a definitive limit to one\u2019s life \u2013 that is, death \u2013 provides some essential baseline reference, and that it is only in contrast to this limiting factor that life has any meaning at all. In this article I refute the argument\u2019s underlying premises, and then argue that even if such premises were taken as true, the argument’s conclusion \u2013 that eradicating death would…<\/p>\n

Read More Read More<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[41,104],"tags":[2306,1745,2302,135,106,2304,1976,2301,2308,317,316,2305,112,103,521,308,2303,1061,949,935,46,2309,440,529,643,2307,1583,429],"class_list":["post-1420","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-philosophy","category-transhumanism","tag-being-and-time","tag-boredom","tag-brian-cooney","tag-change","tag-death","tag-finitude","tag-franco-cortese","tag-hava-tirosh-samuelson","tag-human","tag-immortal","tag-immortality","tag-indefinite","tag-indefinite-life-extension","tag-life","tag-life-extension","tag-longevity","tag-martin-heidegger","tag-meaning","tag-motivation","tag-opportunity","tag-philosophy-2","tag-posthuman","tag-purpose","tag-scarcity","tag-society","tag-time","tag-transhumanist","tag-value"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1420","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1420"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1420\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2005,"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1420\/revisions\/2005"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1420"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1420"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rationalargumentator.com\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1420"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}