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Review of Frank Pasquale’s “A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation” – Article by Adam Alonzi

Review of Frank Pasquale’s “A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation” – Article by Adam Alonzi

Adam Alonzi


From the beginning Frank Pasquale, author of The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information, contends in his new paper “A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation” that software, given its brittleness, is not designed to deal with the complexities of taking a case through court and establishing a verdict. As he understands it, an AI cannot deviate far from the rules laid down by its creator. This assumption, which is not even quite right at the present time, only slightly tinges an otherwise erudite, sincere, and balanced coverage of the topic. He does not show much faith in the use of past cases to create datasets for the next generation of paralegals, automated legal services, and, in the more distant future, lawyers and jurists.

Lawrence Zelanik has noted that when taxes were filed entirely on paper, provisions were limited to avoid unreasonably imposing irksome nuances on the average person. Tax-return software has eliminated this “complexity constraint.” He goes on to state that without this the laws, and the software that interprets it, are akin to a “black box” for those who must abide by them. William Gale has said taxes could be easily computed for “non-itemizers.” In other words, the government could use information it already has to present a “bill” to this class of taxpayers, saving time and money for all parties involved. However, simplification does not always align with everyone’s interests. TurboTax’s business, which is built entirely on helping ordinary people navigate the labyrinth is the American federal income tax, noticed a threat to its business model. This prompted it to put together a grassroots campaign to fight such measures. More than just another example of a business protecting its interests, it is an ominous foreshadowing of an escalation scenario that will transpire in many areas if and when legal AI becomes sufficiently advanced.

Pasquale writes: “Technologists cannot assume that computational solutions to one problem will not affect the scope and nature of that problem. Instead, as technology enters fields, problems change, as various parties seek to either entrench or disrupt aspects of the present situation for their own advantage.”

What he is referring to here, in everything but name, is an arms race. The vastly superior computational powers of robot lawyers may make the already perverse incentive to make ever more Byzantine rules ever more attractive to bureaucracies and lawyers. The concern is that the clauses and dependencies hidden within contracts will quickly explode, making them far too detailed even for professionals to make sense of in a reasonable amount of time. Given that this sort of software may become a necessary accoutrement in most or all legal matters means that the demand for it, or for professionals with access to it, will expand greatly at the expense of those who are unwilling or unable to adopt it. This, though Pasquale only hints at it, may lead to greater imbalances in socioeconomic power. On the other hand, he does not consider the possibility of bottom-up open-source (or state-led) efforts to create synthetic public defenders. While this may seem idealistic, it is fairly clear that the open-source model can compete with and, in some areas, outperform proprietary competitors.

It is not unlikely that within subdomains of law that an array of arms races can and will arise between synthetic intelligences. If a lawyer knows its client is guilty, should it squeal? This will change the way jurisprudence works in many countries, but it would seem unwise to program any robot to knowingly lie about whether a crime, particularly a serious one, has been committed – including by omission. If it is fighting against a punishment it deems overly harsh for a given crime, for trespassing to get a closer look at a rabid raccoon or unintentional jaywalking, should it maintain its client’s innocence as a means to an end? A moral consequentialist, seeing no harm was done (or in some instances, could possibly have been done), may persist in pleading innocent. A synthetic lawyer may be more pragmatic than deontological, but it is not entirely correct, and certainly shortsighted, to (mis)characterize AI as only capable of blindly following a set of instructions, like a Fortran program made to compute the nth member of the Fibonacci series.

Human courts are rife with biases: judges give more lenient sentences after taking a lunch break (65% more likely to grant parole – nothing to spit at), attractive defendants are viewed favorably by unwashed juries and trained jurists alike, and the prejudices of all kinds exist against various “out” groups, which can tip the scales in favor of a guilty verdict or to harsher sentences. Why then would someone have an aversion to the introduction of AI into a system that is clearly ruled, in part, by the quirks of human psychology?

DoNotPay is an an app that helps drivers fight parking tickets. It allows drivers with legitimate medical emergencies to gain exemptions. So, as Pasquale says, not only will traffic management be automated, but so will appeals. However, as he cautions, a flesh-and-blood lawyer takes responsibility for bad advice. The DoNotPay not only fails to take responsibility, but “holds its client responsible for when its proprietor is harmed by the interaction.” There is little reason to think machines would do a worse job of adhering to privacy guidelines than human beings unless, as mentioned in the example of a machine ratting on its client, there is some overriding principle that would compel them to divulge the information to protect several people from harm if their diagnosis in some way makes them as a danger in their personal or professional life. Is the client responsible for the mistakes of the robot it has hired? Should the blame not fall upon the firm who has provided the service?

Making a blockchain that could handle the demands of processing purchases and sales, one that takes into account all the relevant variables to make expert judgements on a matter, is no small task. As the infamous disagreement over the meaning of the word “chicken” in Frigaliment v. B.N.S International Sales Group illustrates, the definitions of what anything is can be a bit puzzling. The need to maintain a decent reputation to maintain sales is a strong incentive against knowingly cheating customers, but although cheating tends to be the exception for this reason, it is still necessary to protect against it. As one official on the  Commodity Futures Trading Commission put it, “where a smart contract’s conditions depend upon real-world data (e.g., the price of a commodity future at a given time), agreed-upon outside systems, called oracles, can be developed to monitor and verify prices, performance, or other real-world events.”

Pasquale cites the SEC’s decision to force providers of asset-backed securities to file “downloadable source code in Python.” AmeriCredit responded by saying it  “should not be forced to predict and therefore program every possible slight iteration of all waterfall payments” because its business is “automobile loans, not software development.” AmeriTrade does not seem to be familiar with machine learning. There is a case for making all financial transactions and agreements explicit on an immutable platform like blockchain. There is also a case for making all such code open source, ready to be scrutinized by those with the talents to do so or, in the near future, by those with access to software that can quickly turn it into plain English, Spanish, Mandarin, Bantu, Etruscan, etc.

During the fallout of the 2008 crisis, some homeowners noticed the entities on their foreclosure paperwork did not match the paperwork they received when their mortgages were sold to a trust. According to Dayen (2010) many banks did not fill out the paperwork at all. This seems to be a rather forceful argument in favor of the incorporation of synthetic agents into law practices. Like many futurists Pasquale foresees an increase in “complementary automation.” The cooperation of chess engines with humans can still trounce the best AI out there. This is a commonly cited example of how two (very different) heads are better than one.  Yet going to a lawyer is not like visiting a tailor. People, including fairly delusional ones, know if their clothes fit. Yet they do not know whether they’ve received expert counsel or not – although, the outcome of the case might give them a hint.

Pasquale concludes his paper by asserting that “the rule of law entails a system of social relationships and legitimate governance, not simply the transfer and evaluation of information about behavior.” This is closely related to the doubts expressed at the beginning of the piece about the usefulness of data sets in training legal AI. He then states that those in the legal profession must handle “intractable conflicts of values that repeatedly require thoughtful discretion and negotiation.” This appears to be the legal equivalent of epistemological mysterianism. It stands on still shakier ground than its analogue because it is clear that laws are, or should be, rooted in some set of criteria agreed upon by the members of a given jurisdiction. Shouldn’t the rulings of law makers and the values that inform them be at least partially quantifiable? There are efforts, like EthicsNet, which are trying to prepare datasets and criteria to feed machines in the future (because they will certainly have to be fed by someone!).  There is no doubt that the human touch in law will not be supplanted soon, but the question is whether our intuition should be exalted as guarantee of fairness or a hindrance to moving beyond a legal system bogged down by the baggage of human foibles.

Adam Alonzi is a writer, biotechnologist, documentary maker, futurist, inventor, programmer, and author of the novels A Plank in Reason and Praying for Death: A Zombie Apocalypse. He is an analyst for the Millennium Project, the Head Media Director for BioViva Sciences, and Editor-in-Chief of Radical Science News. Listen to his podcasts here. Read his blog here.

3 Stock-Market Tips from an Economist – Article by Robert P. Murphy

3 Stock-Market Tips from an Economist – Article by Robert P. Murphy

The New Renaissance Hat
Robert P. Murphy
September 11, 2015
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Recent volatility has Americans talking about the stock market — and getting a lot of things wrong in the process. Let’s discuss some general principles to help clear things up.

(Let me say up front that I won’t be disclosing which stocks are going to go up next month. Even if I knew, it would ruin my advantage to tell everybody.)

1. Money doesn’t go “into” or “out of” the stock market in the way most people think.

On NPR’s Marketplace, after the recent big selloff, host Kai Ryssdal said, “That money has to go somewhere, right?”

This language is misleading. Let me illustrate with a simple example.

Suppose there are 100 people who each own 1,000 shares of ABC stock. Currently, ABC has a share price of $5. Thus, the community collectively owns $500,000 worth of ABC stock. Further, suppose that each person has $200 in a checking account at the local bank. Thus, the community owns $20,000 worth of checking account balances at the bank.

Now, Alice decides she wants to increase her holdings of cash and reduce her holdings of ABC stock. So she sells a single share to Bob, who buys it for $4. There is no other market action.

In this scenario, when the share price drops from $5 to $4, the community suddenly owns only $400,000 worth of ABC stock. And yet, there is no flow of $100,000 someplace else — certainly not into the local bank. It still has exactly $20,000 in various checking accounts. All that happened is Alice’s account went up by $4 while Bob’s went down by $4.

2. Simple strategies can’t be guaranteed to make money.

Suppose your brother-in-law says: “I’ve got a great stock tip! I found this company, Acme, that makes fireworks. Let’s wait until the end of June, and then load up on as many shares as we can. Once the company reports its sales for July, we’ll make a fortune because of the holiday numbers.”

Clearly, your brother-in-law would be speaking foolishness. Just about everybody knows that fireworks companies do a lot of business around July 4, and so the price of Acme stock in late June would already reflect that obvious information.

More generally, the different versions of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) claim — with varying degrees of strength — that an investor can’t “beat the market” without access to private information. The reason is that any publicly available information is already incorporated into the current stock price.

Not all economists agree with the EMH, especially the stronger versions of it. If two investors have different theories of how the economy works, then to them, the same “information” regarding Federal Reserve intentions may imply different forecasts, leading one to feel bullish while the other is bearish. Yet, even this discussion shows that it can’t be obvious that a stock price will move in a certain direction. If it were, then the first traders to notice the mispricing would pounce, arbitraging the discrepancy into oblivion.

3. An investor’s “track record” can be misleading because of risk and luck.

Suppose hedge fund A earns 10 percent three years in a row, while hedge fund Bearns only 4 percent those same three years in a row. Can we conclude that fundA’s management is more competent?

No, not unless we get more information. It could be that fund A is highly leveraged (meaning that it borrowed money and used it to buy assets), while fund B invests only the owners’ equity. Even if A and B have the same portfolios, A will outperform so long as the portfolio has a positive return.

However, in this scenario, fund A has taken on more risk. If the assets in the portfolio happen to go down in market value, then fund A loses a bigger proportion of its capital than fund B.

More generally, a fund manager could have a great year simply because of (what we consider to be) dumb luck. For example, suppose there are 500 different fund managers, and each picks a single stock from the S&P 500 to exclude from their portfolio; they own appropriately weighted amounts of the remaining 499 stocks. Further, suppose that each manager picks his pariah company by throwing a dart at the stock listing taped to his conference room wall.

If the dart throws are random over the possible stocks, then we expect one manager to exclude the worst-performing stock, another to exclude the second worst-performing stock, and so on. In any event, we can be very confident that of the 500 fund managers, at least many dozens of them will beat the S&P 500 with their own truncated version of it, and the same number will underperform it.

Would we conclude that the managers with excess returns were more skilled at analyzing companies, or had better money-management protocols in place at their firms? Of course not. In this example, they just got lucky. What relevance our hypothetical scenario has for the real world of investments is not as clear, but the tale at least demonstrates that past performance alone does not necessarily indicate skill or predict future performance.

Studying economics won’t show you how to become rich, but it will spare you from making a fool of yourself at the next cocktail party.

Robert P. Murphy has a PhD in economics from NYU. He is the author of The Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism, The Politically Incorrect Guide to The Great Depression and the New Deal, and  Choice: Cooperation, Enterprise, and Human Action (Independent Institute, 2015).

This article was originally published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

Fragile Reasoning in Nassim Taleb’s “Antifragile”: An Enlightenment Transhumanist Critique – Article by G. Stolyarov II

Fragile Reasoning in Nassim Taleb’s “Antifragile”: An Enlightenment Transhumanist Critique – Article by G. Stolyarov II

The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
January 10, 2013
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Never before have I set out to read a book with such high expectations, only to encounter such severe disappointment. As an admirer of Nassim Taleb’s earlier books, Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan, I expected to find insight and wisdom along similar lines in Antifragile. While Taleb’s latest book does contain some valid observations and a few intriguing general strategies for living, the overwhelming thrust of the book is one of bitter distaste for modernity (and, to a significant extent, technological progress), as well as an abundance of insults for anyone who would disagree with not just with Taleb’s ideas, but with his personal esthetic preferences. While sensible in the realms of finance and (mostly) economics, Taleb’s prescriptions in other fields venture outside of his realms of mastery and, if embraced, would result in a relapse of the barbarisms of premodernity. Perhaps as the outcome of his own phenomenal success, Taleb has become set in his ways and has transitioned from offering some controversial, revolutionary, and genuinely insightful ideas to constructing a static, intolerant, totalistic worldview that rejects deviations in any field of life – and the persons who so deviate.

I am saddened to write this, but I am convinced that Nassim Taleb would find me to be personally repulsive. Not only am I a technology-embracing transhumanist ( a “neomaniac” per Taleb’s vocabulary), and a person who embraces the “nerdification” of society – but I am also an explicit representative and promoter of the legacies of the 18th-century Enlightenment – and a proud suit-and-tie wearer besides. Taleb seethes with contempt for the very trappings of modernity – even for modern formal wear – and repeatedly asserts that nothing valuable can be gleaned from those who wear neckties. As in many other areas, his conclusion-jumping pronouncements exclude the possibility of the world not fitting into his invented categories (with their associated normative spin). On the necktie question, he seems to rule out the very existence of persons like me, who wear neckties not out of any compulsion (my office dress code does not require them), but rather as an esthetic statement arising from sheer personal choice – including, not infrequently, on weekends.

After reading Antifragile, and finding so much of the content in need of a thorough refutation, I have vacillated between writing a book review and a more comprehensive treatise. A short review, I realized, would not do this book justice – but I also did not wish to run the risk of writing a refutation as long as the book itself. The result is this – one of my longest book reviews to date, but written as concisely as the subject matter allows. Here, I seek to comment on many of Taleb’s areas of focus in Antifragile, highlighting both the book’s strengths and its egregious errors.

Antifragile was one of the very few books I ever pre-ordered, as Taleb, until about a month ago, held a place among my most admired contemporary thinkers – along with such luminaries as Steven Pinker, Ray Kurzweil, Aubrey de Grey, Max More, and Ron Paul. Taleb’s writings on the fragility of the contemporary financial system were simply brilliant and highlighted the systemic weaknesses of a “house of cards” built upon highly sophisticated but over-optimized models that relied on the unrealistic stability of the status quo and the absence of extremely disruptive “black swan” events. I expected that Antifragile would discuss ways to survive and prosper in a black-swan-dominated world – a question that has been at the forefront of my mind since at least 2006, when I personally observed some “six-sigma” events on the stock market and – after reducing my losses to manageable levels – have refused to participate in that particular economy-wide casino since.  While Antifragile does provide skeletal discussions of some valuable approaches (such as the “barbell” strategy, on which I will comment more below), the majority of the book’s focus is negative: a harsh criticism of the institutions, ideas, and people whom Taleb considers insufficiently antifragile or “fragilizing”. One of Taleb’s favorite terms throughout the book is “fragilista” – used to describe financial modelers, politicians, and intellectuals of a rationalist frame of mind. The term – aside from creating vague and completely irrelevant associations with left-wing Nicaraguan terrorists – also poisons the metaphorical well with regard to the people and approaches criticized by Taleb.

More generally, the book is pervaded by an undercurrent of anti-intellectualism, mocking those who use structured, explicit knowledge to interpret the world. This is rather odd, because Taleb himself is clearly an intellectual and a “nerd” of the sort he derides; his philosophical and historical allusions – and his expertise in mathematical finance (despite his criticisms thereof) – give away that fact. Fat Tony of Brooklyn, Taleb’s fictional representative of the non-intellectual person who relies on “empirical” heuristics and is able to become rich by occasionally betting against “suckers,” would not have kept the company of people like Taleb. No matter how much rhetorical contempt Taleb shows for those who engage in abstract reasoning, he cannot escape being one of them – and no amount of insults directed at his own kind will get him an iota of respect from those whose character traits he glorifies.

An antifragile system or entity, per Taleb’s definition, is one that benefits from volatility instead of succumbing to it. Beyond mere robustness, which withstands volatility intact, antifragility is the derivation of advantage from volatility. The concept itself is an intriguing one, but Taleb makes a crucial error in assuming that most antifragility is normatively preferable. He does make an exception for “antifragility at others’ expense” – but only in a limited context. For instance, he is outraged at career intellectuals who do not have “skin in the game” and do not suffer for making wrong predictions or recommendations (more on this later) – but he explicitly praises the antifragility of biological evolution, a process that has resulted in the brutal deaths of most organisms and the extinction of about 99.9% of all species in history. Even within his premise that modernity contains “fragilizing” elements, Taleb presupposes that fragility is necessarily undesirable. Yet a beautiful vase is fragile – as is, for that matter, an individual organism. Fragility is no justification for dismissing or opposing an area of existence that has other intrinsic merits. Perhaps the proper response to certain kinds of fragility is extra care in the preservation of the fragile – as shown, for example, in the raising of children and small animals.

When Taleb argues that post-Enlightenment civilization is fragile, he may be partly right – at least in the sense that such civilization requires the steady, conscious application of human intellect to maintain. Every generation must master the scientific, technological, and ethical accomplishments of the generations before it and amplify these accomplishments; this is the essence of progress. This mastery of civilization entails precisely the “nerdification” (i.e., sophisticated, refined, self-aware intellectualism) that Taleb scorns in favor of “empirical” heuristics that may have arisen out of premodern superstition in as great (or greater) a proportion as out of practical wisdom passed down throughout the ages. Steven Pinker, whose magnum opus The Better Angels of Our Nature I would glowingly recommend (and whose work Taleb has unfairly maligned, though Pinker’s response to Taleb is worth reading), illustrates convincingly that not only peacefulness but virtually every other characteristic of civilized human beings has improved dramatically over the past several centuries – and most remarkably over the past several decades. Nothing suggests that this improvement is an inexorable law of history, however; it is possible for anti-civilizing influences to take hold and for humanity to degenerate into the barbarism that characterized much of its past. In that sense, civilization may be considered fragile – but so eminently worth preserving and expanding, for it makes possible the good life for good individuals.

Unfortunately, Taleb has included himself among the influences that would undo many of the essential gains that humanity has achieved since the 18th-century Enlightenment. Taleb repeatedly references the “wisdom of the ancients” (the stoic Seneca is his favorite) and conflates the “natural” (a term from which he excludes human design and technology) with the desirable. Taleb praises the heuristics he sees in traditional religious systems (e.g., elaborate Greek Orthodox fasting rituals) while completely overlooking the massive horrors many traditional (i.e., premodern) religious systems perpetrated when persecuting dissenters, inspiring bloody wars of conquest, and establishing totalitarian regimes when combined with secular authority. The Enlightenment brought about a conscious questioning of religious (and all authority-based) traditions and commandments and resulted in the adoption of rigorous scientific inquiry in the pursuit of discovery and innovation. Taleb is wary of modern medicine because of possible “iatrogenic” effects (where the treatment itself causes most of the harm), and he even questions the genuineness and desirability of massive rises in life expectancy during the 20th and early 21st centuries. While there is some merit to balancing the anticipated benefits and possible side effects of medical treatments – and while Taleb may be right that certain fields may take treatment too far, especially as regards overprescription of psychotropic drugs to children – Taleb’s discussion of “iatrogenics” is mostly anecdotal and reliant on studies from much earlier periods in medicine (e.g., the death of George Washington in 1799 and a study on children in 1930).  The virtual eradication of smallpox, polio, tuberculosis, cholera, and the bubonic plague from the Western world by scientific medicine are utterly ignored by Taleb – as are the substantial declines in cancer death rates over the past 50 years, and the accomplishments of the Green Agricultural Revolution in averting the starvation of billions, which would have occurred if only “natural” agricultural techniques (i.e., techniques employed before some arbitrary historical cutoff date) had been utilized.

There may be some merit to Taleb’s advice of avoiding medical treatment for minor conditions (where the iatrogenic effects of treatment allegedly predominate) and letting the body heal itself, while being willing to undertake radical treatments for extreme, life-threatening conditions. However, context in medical care matters too greatly to make sweeping generalizations. A fairly small skin lesion, which does not interfere with day-to-day functioning, may, after all, be the beginning of a deadly cancer, for which no self-healing mechanism exists. In medicine especially, the “empirical” heuristics championed by Taleb must give way to careful and systematic scientific study. After all, most premodern cultures relied on “traditional” heuristics for millennia, with disastrous results; such reliance can be called folk medicine. One only needs to consider the “traditional” Eastern “remedies” based on the superstition that one will become like the creature one eats – or “traditional” Western Medieval bleeding and surgical practices – to realize how much progress modern scientific medicine has actually made.

While a reader of Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan might have inferred libertarian and individualist tendencies in Taleb’s writing, Antifragile, unfortunately, sets the record straight: Taleb opposes “too much” individual flourishing and freedom. He reserves his bitterest venom for transhumanism, which is the logical outcome of a libertarian society in which technological progress is given free rein. Taleb’s reverence for “nature” and “the ancients” trumps his skepticism of centralized regimentation – as his ideas on life extension and freedom of speech illustrate. He writes, “I felt some deep disgust – as would any ancient – at the efforts of ‘singularity’ thinkers (such as Ray Kurzweil) who believe in humans’ potential to live forever. Note that if I had to find the anti-me, the person with diametrically opposite ideas and lifestyle on the planet, it would be that Ray Kurzweil fellow. It is not just neomania. While I propose removing offensive elements from people’s diets (and lives), he works by adding, popping close to two hundred pills daily. Beyond that, these attempts at immortality leave me with deep moral revulsion.” Taleb says little of substance to support this “deep moral revulsion” – beyond repeating the same tired, hackneyed old arguments about “making room for others” by dying – as if the life of the individual had no inherent value and could be justifiably expended for an alleged greater good. Taleb does not address Kurzweil’s arguments about the exponential progress of computing and other technologies, and the logical extrapolation of such progress within the coming decades. In short, he says nothing about why he would consider Kurzweil to be mistaken, or what about Kurzweil’s lifestyle and ambitions he considers destructive. Taleb’s rudely expressed opposition to transhumanism seems to be primarily driven by emotional revulsion or, to be more charitable, a conflict of values. Additionally, Taleb does not seem to understand the movement that he criticizes. He assumes that extended longevity would be accompanied by extended frailty and senescence, whereas true radical life extension would only be possible if biological youth could be prolonged through periodic rejuvenation of the organism. Moreover, Taleb is, at heart, a collectivist who embraces the sacrifice of the individual to the tribe. He writes, “I am not here to live forever, as a sick animal. Recall that the antifragility of a system comes from the mortality of its components – and I am part of that larger population called humans. I am here to die a heroic death for the sake of the collective, to produce offspring (and prepare them for life and provide for them), or eventually, books – my information, that is, my genes, the antifragile in me, should be the ones seeking immortality, not me.”

The biggest disappointment I experienced when reading Antifragile was the realization I came to upon reading the above-quoted passage. This book was never about helping make the individual antifragile. The preservation of a human being in a volatile and uncertain world – and the attempt to equip a human being to flourish in the face of such volatility and uncertainty – were never Taleb’s key aims. Taleb’s views on antifragility are, indeed, not particularly helpful to me in my goal to discover strategies that would preserve, fortify, and enrich the individual in an often hostile, and, in many ways, fundamentally unpredictable world which lacks any manner of built-in justice outside of what humans, through their ingenuity and will, can implement. Taleb would have both of us (and everyone else) be sacrificed for the sake of an unspecified “collective” – as if some abstraction, be it “nature”, evolution, or “the whole”, has value in and of itself, apart from its constituent individuals. Yet it is precisely this sort of collectivism that enables inhuman atrocities, from mass executions of “the other” to suicide bombings for a “greater cause”. Taleb does not intend to advocate armed violence, but his rhetoric on heroism, “dying heroically”, and self-sacrifice eerily resembles the pronouncements of many a totalitarian regime, inquisitorial sect, or band of nationalistic or religious terrorists. The good life – the comfortable life of peace, productive work, and self-fulfillment – does not seem to be his objective.

In several sections devoted to having “doxastic commitment” or “soul in the game”, Taleb glorifies the idea of leaving no way out in the event of one’s failure – forgetting that much true learning is iterative and often occurs through a trial-and-error process. If one is not allowed to recover from failure and change one’s approach (without crippling personal cost), then this learning will be preempted, and the individual will be destroyed instead. Taleb glorifies, for instance, the poet Almutanabbi, who died senselessly in the attempt to realize the ideals about which he wrote. But it is far more impressive to live in furtherance of one’s ideals than to die for them – particularly since living requires one to reevaluate one’s views in light of emerging evidence and continual reflection.

Taleb is no more a friend of individual liberty than of technological progress. As a consequence of his view that intellectuals should have “skin in the game”, he insists that they should personally suffer the adverse consequences of their recommendations. Indeed, he would implement his scheme of penalties to the detriment of legal protections for freedom of speech. While criticizing the financial rating agencies’ misclassification of toxic assets as “AAA” securities, he remarks that “they benefit from the protection of free speech – the ‘First Amendment’ so ingrained in American habits. My humble proposal: one should say whatever he wants, but one’s portfolio needs to line up with it.” Elsewhere, Taleb proposes that individuals be held legally liable for the damage that their predictions and recommendations result in if followed by others. He ignores that not all individuals have the assets to even invest in a portfolio. Are the poor and middle class to be deprived of the ability to express their opinions or speculate about the economic future (even if such speculation is without much basis), simply because they do not have much “skin” to put into the “game”? Furthermore, establishing any legal liability for expression of opinion would have a chilling effect on legitimate and valuable ideas – since the very threat or prospect of a lawsuit may serve as a deterrent to publishing or even verbal expression in front of someone who disagrees. For someone so insistent on individual moral responsibility, Taleb ignores the responsibility of the recipient of ideas to actively judge and interpret them. Just as there exist sleazy marketers, so there exist peddlers of philosophical falsehoods, and sometimes those falsehoods result in personal gains for their advocates. Yet the responsibility of the sensible, rational individual is to filter out truth from falsehood using his own mind. No prohibition, no regime of penalties, no prior restraint can protect people from themselves. Such restrictions can only prevent people from cultivating the habits of autonomous thought which are the surest safeguards against charlatans and demagogues of every stripe. Taleb is too concerned about punishing the false prophets, and insufficiently concerned about elevating the general level of reasoning and discourse by means of positive persuasion, dissemination of true information, and technological innovation that alters people’s incentives and the balance of power.

Taleb even departs from the libertarian advocacy of free trade and (genuine) globalization. While he acknowledges the theoretical validity of some specialization and the law of comparative advantage, he sees the global division of labor as vulnerable to volatility in the system. He argues that a change in conditions in one part of the world now has a far greater ability to adversely impact all other parts of the world – because the division of labor is so finely tuned. This is a fair argument for redundancy in economic systems – e.g., having “backup” institutions which could supply a good or service if the original supplier is unavailable due to an unexpected disruption. However, Taleb errs when assuming that businesses pursuing their rational self-interests under a truly free arrangement of global commerce would not already attempt to implement such redundancies. Supply-chain risk, for instance, is commonly discussed by representatives of multinational businesses and their insurers, who have a stake in preventing supply disruptions. Overreliance on any one economic partnership may indeed be imprudent – but does Taleb believe that businessmen with true “skin in the game” – billions of their own dollars – would be oblivious to the need for redundancy? Taleb makes no case for why free trade – in essence, the voluntary exchange of goods and services among individuals without regard for national origins or boundaries – would create a systemic lack of redundancy. A stronger argument could be made for how the current politicized environment of trade – a mixture of freedom and elaborate controls achieved by means of treaties and retaliatory protectionism – would produce insufficient redundancy and overdependence on those precious channels of international trade that remain permitted. But the solution to this problem would be more options – more channels for foreign trade – not fewer. Autarky certainly will not do, as it brings about its own massive vulnerabilities. One only need consider the consequences of a famine in a region which is not allowed to import food from abroad. Trade creates redundancy by allowing access to goods and services from all over the world, instead of just one minor segment thereof.

The nonlinear responses to volatility described in Antifragile are valid in principle. A system responds in a concave fashion if the harm to the system from a change in conditions is more than linear relative to that change (i.e., an accelerating harm). A system responds in a convex fashion if it is able to reap benefits from volatility in a more-than-linear accumulation. Taleb proposes that it is possible for certain systems to be concave or convex in both directions – being harmed by or benefiting from a shift in conditions either way. It is also possible for systems to be convex over some regions of inputs, and concave over others – e.g., a human immune system or a body engaging in exercise. Taleb does not, however, provide many tools to actually determine the inflection points within any particular system. Although he praises “empirical” heuristics for doing so – especially heuristics passed down through the ages – he provides absolutely no support to conclude that those heuristics do not overshoot the desirable levels of any given characteristics. To use the example he provides of religious fasting customs, even if one can be generous and suppose some benefit to the fasting (of which I am not altogether convinced), what evidence is there that the specific schedule and duration of fasts is optimal? Could not scientific investigation uncover a better way, and explain its workings in a rational, evidence-based manner, without recourse to superstition or ancestral hand-waving?  Furthermore, Taleb does not consider that the “wisdom of the ancients” may not have developed through the careful evolutionary process he describes – but rather comes to us as a warped reflection of some very recent generation’s interpretation of ancient practices – which themselves were altered by numerous political authorities, ideological movements, and idiosyncratic historical events in order to fulfill some very context-specific (and not necessarily virtuous or life-affirming) aim. To get a sense of how this has happened to distort prevailing conceptions of the past, one needs only to consider the early history of Christianity – where doctrine was often promoted or suppressed based on the temporal interest of Roman and Byzantine emperors and their officials – or the extensive revisionism performed by the 19th-century Romantics with regard to the Middle Ages. Taleb himself romanticizes antiquity (including the ancient Middle East), overlooking the incessant wars, disease, filth, vulgarity, persecution, and ideological totalism that characterized many pre-Enlightenment societies (e.g., the totalitarianism of Ancient Sparta or Calvin’s Geneva – which made even the USSR seem like a paragon of liberty and progress by comparison).

Taleb’s contempt for wealth, and praise for attitudes that part with wealth lightly, betray the fact that he has never been in danger of losing his material comfort. Growing up in a prosperous , respected, and intellectual Lebanese family, Taleb moved to the United States and made a fortune as a trader, which he later magnified by selling his books. If he expresses contempt for the material well-being he sees around him, and a nostalgic longing for an idealized past, it is because he cannot truly envision what premodernity was actually like. Perhaps, because he greatly underrates the transformative effects of technological progress, Taleb’s image of premodernity is of a slightly rustic incarnation of our present world – except one in which people mostly avoid doctors and editors, walk on rocky landscapes in foot-shaped shoes, eat “paleo” diets, quote from Seneca’s dialogues, and occasionally engage in bloody contests over fine points of poetry, philosophy, and theology – just to show how much “skin in the game” they have with regard to their beliefs. Taleb neglects the possibility that only recently has life become remotely comfortable and quasi-meritocratic, while premodernity was a mostly uninterrupted stretch of miseries, cruelties, superstitions, prejudicial hatreds, and filth (punctuated by a few refined characters like Aristotle – whom Taleb maligns – and Seneca – people who were remarkable for their time and are remembered precisely because they stood out so far above their contemporaries). A small elite has always been super-wealthy (by the standards of their time) in every era and in every society, but it is an all-too-common mistake to imagine oneself in the position of a historical member of the elite (e.g., someone who would have read Seneca, or Seneca himself) rather than a common peasant or slave – which is the far more probable fate for a randomly chosen premodern person. The casual dismissal of wealth as not particularly important would not have been articulated by people toiling from sunrise to sunset in order to grow crops for their feudal overlords and be given a small fraction of the resulting harvest in order not to starve. Nor is this attitude particularly helpful to people who might have been interested in cultivating personal antifragility so as to prevent themselves from becoming poor.

The most useful personal advice in Antifragile concerns the so-called “barbell strategy” for minimizing the downside of volatility while benefiting from the upside. The strategy involves putting most of one’s resources into an ultra-safe, ultra-conservative course of action, while devoting the rest to a diversified speculation, but in such a manner that the entire speculative amount can be lost without significant harm. An example of this approach would be keeping 90% of one’s money as cash or gold, and investing the remaining 10% into five different startup companies; each startup firm could fail – and many do – but it is also possible for a startup company to succeed tremendously and bring orders of magnitude of profit. If all the startup firms fail, then one has had a 10% loss – but this does not have to be ruinous if one is not hyper-leveraged. Taleb is also correct about the highly fragilizing effects of debt and recommends avoidance of indebtedness where possible. This is sound advice, greatly needed in a country where everything from everyday consumption to the purchase of big-ticket items to intangible “investments” such as formal education is often purchased on credit. Debt introduces fragility by amplifying the financial pain of volatility. A marginal drop in income could be endured by a debt-free person with savings, but would result in a leveraged person losing everything. Taleb’s advice here may not always be perfectly realizable – as not every person can afford to invest any percentage of his assets with the ability to continue living well if those assets were lost. Furthermore, mortgage debt is extremely difficult to avoid for a person without sizable initial wealth; other debt, however, is generally avoidable.

While Antifragile has some virtues, Taleb should not have dismissed or derided his editors. If carefully confined to the realms of finance and economics, Antifragile might have been an illuminating and positive book on net. As matters stand, however, Taleb has managed to gratuitously insult practically everybody who might have been sympathetic to his previously articulated views – including the libertarians, transhumanists, and rationalist natural-law thinkers who would have found much to agree with in Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan. Taleb even classifies Friedrich Hayek among the rationalists whom he dismisses: “We may be drawn to think that Friedrich Hayek would be in that antifragile, antirationalist category. […] But Hayek missed the notion of optionality as a substitute for the social planner. In a way, he believed in intelligence, but as a distributed or collective intelligence – not in optionality as a replacement for intelligence. […] Finally, John Gray, the contemporary political philosopher and essayist who stands against human hubris and has been fighting the prevailing ideas that the Enlightenment is a panacea – treating a certain category of thinkers as Enlightenment fundamentalists. […] Gray worked in an office next to Hayek and told me that Hayek was quite a dull fellow, lacking playfulness – hence optionality.” And there was the gratuitous insult again. Very well. We Enlightenment rationalists and technoprogressives will be happy to accept Hayek as one of us – along with Socrates, Aristotle, and Ayn Rand (for whose fan Taleb should not be mistaken, as he tells us in a footnote). Taleb can have Seneca, Almutanabbi, John Gray, and Fat Tony. We remain in good company without them.

Casino Banking – Article by Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr.

Casino Banking – Article by Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr.

The New Renaissance Hat
Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr.
July 15, 2012
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JPMorgan Chase & Co., one of the nation’s leading banks, revealed in May that a London trader racked up losses reportedly amounting to $2.3 billion over a 15-day period. The losses averaged over $150 million per day, sometimes hitting $200 million daily. The bank originally stated the trades were done to hedge possible losses on assets that might suffer due to Europe’s economic woes. There is now doubt whether it was a hedge or just a risky financial bet.

A hedge is a financial transaction designed to offset possible losses in an asset or good already owned. The classic hedge occurs when a farmer sells his crop in a futures market for delivery at a specified date after harvesting. He sells today what he will only produce tomorrow, and locks in the price. If the price at harvest time is lower than today’s price, he makes money on the forward contract, while losing a corresponding amount of money on the crops in the ground. In a perfect hedge the gains and losses should exactly offset each other.

How did JPMorgan suffer such large losses on its hedges, and what are the lessons?

It appears the London trader entered into financial transactions on the basis of observed relationships among various bond indices. The market relationships broke down. The indices moved differently from what historical patterns or financial models predicted. Such a breakdown has been at the heart of a number of spectacular financial collapses, notably that of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and a number of others during the financial meltdown of 2007–08.

LTCM invested the money of rich clients in financial bets based on the expected relationships among the prices of various assets. According to Nicole Gelinas in After the Fall: Saving Capitalism from Wall Street—and Washington, at the time of its collapse LTCM had $2.3 billion of client money. By borrowing, it leveraged that investment 53 to 1. Further, it employed derivatives to further magnify its bets so that its total obligations were a fantastic $1.25 trillion.

A derivative is any security whose price movements depend on (are derived from) movements in an underlying asset. “Puts” and “calls” on equity shares are relatively simple derivatives familiar to many. Asset prices, like various bonds, move in predictable ways with respect to each other, and values of derivatives linked to the assets similarly move in a predictable fashion with respect to the prices of the underlying assets—in normal times.

But the summer of 1998 was not a normal time. There was turmoil in Asian financial markets, then Russia threatened to default on its domestic debt. Global credit and liquidity dried up, and LTCM could not fund itself. It collapsed spectacularly.

A decade later there was turmoil in housing finance. The housing bubble was bursting. Mortgage lenders were under pressure, and some were failing. Many mortgages had been packed together in mortgage-backed securities, which were sold to or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie, allegedly private entities but in reality guaranteed by the government, were failing. Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, was heavily involved in housing finance; it borrowed short-term, even overnight, to finance long-term holdings; it employed heavy leverage; and it made liberal use of derivatives contracts. It declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.

The specifics varied between 1998 and 2008, and between LTCM and Lehman. But the reliance on certain asset prices moving in predictable fashion was one shared element. So, too, was the heavy use of borrowed money (leverage) and the reliance on derivatives contracts. The volatility of complex derivatives contracts led legendary investor Warren Buffett to characterize them as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”

The Usual Suspects

In short there is nothing new in what happened to JPMorgan. It claimed it was not trying to make risky financial bets, but hedge risks already booked on its balance sheet. While details of the trades that led to losses are sketchy at this writing, they apparently employed both leverage and derivatives. As documented here, these are elements present in major financial blowups and collapses going back decades (and further). LTCM, Lehman, and Fannie and Freddie all thought they had at least some of their risks hedged. But hedges have a tendency to unravel just when needed most: in times of financial turmoil. Even so, financial institutions permit their traders to make the same kinds of dangerous bets over and over again. We used to have financial crises every decade or so. Now the cycle seems to be halved.

In the past I have dubbed today’s banking practice of placing dangerous financial bets “casino banking.” It differs little from the activities conducted at gaming tables in Las Vegas and has little or no reference to the fundamentally healthy activity of matching viable businesses with capital and credit.

In a Cato Policy Analysis, “Capital Inadequacies: The Dismal Failure of the Basel Regime of Bank Capital Regulation,” Kevin Dowd and three coauthors examined some of the technical problems with standard risk models used by large banks. It is an exhaustive analysis, and I commend it to those interested. The authors delve into many issues, but concentrate on the many flaws of the complex mathematical models used by banks to control risks.

In August 2007 Goldman Sachs Chief Financial Officer David Viniar puzzled over a series of “25-standard deviation moves” in financial markets affecting Goldman. (Returns deviated from their expected values by 25 standard deviations, a measure of volatility.) Such moves should occur once every 10-to-the-137th-power years if the assumptions of the risk model were correct (a Gaussian, or “normal,” distribution of returns). As Dowd and his coauthors put it, “Such an event is about as likely as Hell freezing over. The occurrence of even a single such event is therefore conclusive proof that financial returns are not Gaussian—or even remotely so.” And yet there were several in a matter of days. In Dowd & Co.’s telling, the models lie, the banks swear to it, and the regulators pretend to believe them. All of this goes to answer how the losses at Morgan might have happened. Traders rely on flawed models to execute their trades.

Now to the Lessons

Major financial institutions continue to take on large risks. Why? Assume the trades made by Morgan really were to hedge the bank’s exposure to events in Europe. That implies, of course, that risky investments had already been put in place (since they then needed to be hedged). Additionally, the risks were so complex that even a highly skilled staff (which Morgan certainly employs) could not successfully execute hedges on them.

Reports indicate that senior management and the board of directors were aware of the trades and exercising oversight. The fact that the losses were incurred anyway confirms what many of us have been arguing. Major financial institutions are at once very large and very complex. They are too large and too complex to manage. That is in part what beset Citigroup in the 2000s and now Morgan, which has until now been recognized as a well-managed institution.

If ordinary market forces were at work, these institutions would shrink to manageable sizes and levels of complexity. Ordinary market forces are not at work, however. Public policy rewards size (and the complexity that accompanies it). Major financial institutions know from experience that they will be bailed out when they incur losses that threaten their survival. Morgan’s losses do not appear to fall into that category, but they illustrate how bad incentives lead to bad outcomes.

Minding Our Business

Some commentators have argued that politicians and the public have no business in Morgan’s losses. Only Morgan’s stockholders, who saw its share price drop over 9 percent in one day, and senior management and traders who lost their jobs should have an interest. But in fact losses incurred at major financial institutions are the business of taxpayers because government policy has made them their business.

Large financial institutions will continue taking on excessive risks so long as they know they can offload the losses onto taxpayers if needed. That is the policy summarized as “too big to fail.” Let us not forget the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), signed into law by President George W. Bush in October 2008. It was a $700 billion boondoggle to transfer taxpayer money to stockholders and creditors of major banks—and to their senior management; don’t forget the bonuses paid out of the funds.

Banks may be too big and complex to close immediately, but no institution is too big to fail. Failure means the stockholders and possibly the bondholders are wiped out. Until that discipline is reintroduced (having once existed), there will be more big financial bets going bad at these banks.

Changing the bailout policy will not be easy because of what is known as the time-inconsistency problem. Having bailed out so many companies so many times, the federal government cannot credibly commit in advance not to do so in the future. It can say no to future bailouts today, but people know that when financial collapse hits tomorrow, government will say yes once again. The promises made today will not match the government’s future actions. There is inconsistency between words and deeds across time.

What to do in the meantime? The Volcker Rule was a modest attempt to rein in risk-taking. Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker wanted to stop banks from making risky trades on their own books (as opposed to executing trades for customers). Industry lobbying has hopelessly complicated the rule and delayed its issuance.

Morgan’s chief executive officer, James Dimon, asserted the London trades would not have violated the rule. If true, it suggests that an even stronger rule needs to be in place. Various suggestions have been made to address excessive risk-taking by financial firms backed by the taxpayers. It is time to take them more seriously.

Gerald O’Driscoll is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. With Mario J. Rizzo, he coauthored The Economics of Time and Ignorance.

This article was published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution United States License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

Creation of an Ethical Business: The Implementation of Virtuous Behavior and Shared Values and Goals – Article by Jessica L. Kuryn

Creation of an Ethical Business: The Implementation of Virtuous Behavior and Shared Values and Goals – Article by Jessica L. Kuryn

The New Renaissance Hat
Jessica L. Kuryn
May 10, 2012
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IN TODAY’S COMPETITIVE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, a growing number of firms will do almost anything to gain sales and customers, as well as to increase profits.  For some of these firms, playing by the rules doesn’t achieve the results they are after.  Firms have the choice to act ethically or unethically.  While misguided managers think that unethical behavior can lead the firm, and ultimately themselves, to greater profits over the long term, it is only for the short term.  It will eventually lead to their downfall in that unethical behavior spirals out of control and can be very difficult to maintain.  Once this occurs, a firm’s reputation becomes tarnished and the company fades into non-existence.  On the contrary, “firms that pursue ethically driven strategies realize a greater profit potential than those firms who currently use profit-driven strategies” (Arjoon 159).

The point is that a firm’s leaders do have a choice in how they conduct business.  Creating an ethical business does not happen overnight.  It takes extensive collaboration and several implementation and evaluation processes, as well as continual reinforcement of and changes to established practices and values.  Perhaps one of the most important aspects to creating an ethical business is that it requires cooperation on multiple organizational levels and the implementation of virtuous behavior and values.

Maintaining ethical practices, once implemented, is an ongoing process.  There are many factors that can affect ethical behavior, such as competition for customers and market share, the need for increased profits, and management incentives.  Some firms, such as BB&T have been able to implement an ethical environment that has led to firm success, while others such as Enron, have succumbed to greed and wrongdoing, and no longer are in existence.  BB&T’s story of success will be discussed later in this paper.

CREATING AN ETHICALLY DRIVEN BUSINESS

Business ethics can be defined as “the applied ethics discipline that addresses the moral features of commercial activity” (Marcoux).  The question we have to ask concerning business ethics is how they can be applied to a business.  One of the most important aspects in creating an ethical business entails the need for new and refined organizationalvalues.  A value, as defined by Ayn Rand in Younkins’s article, is “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” (Younkins 9). Antonio Argandoña suggests a business must first identify its currently existing values and from that develop what values are needed (Argandoña 22).  In identifying these needed values, it is crucial that businesses select values that pertain to both the business’s goals, as well as the employees’ goals.  Congruence between the goals of the business and its employees increase the chances that the valueswill be received well and adhered to.

Once the desired values and goals have been determined, it falls in the hands of management to implement and communicate them.  “At the top level of an organization, it takes effective communicators who are clear about what they champion and who establish the company on virtuous behavior” (Younkins 21).Virtues, which are also defined by Ayn Rand in Younkin’s article, are “the act[s] by which one gains and/or keeps an objective value” (Younkins 11).  It is crucial for each employee and manager to establish virtues within themselves in order to pursue individual and organizational values, as well as keep them once they have been successfully implemented.It is the responsibility of management to ensure that these values are clearly communicated and followed, while established virtuous behavior becomes the mean by which these values flourish and exist.“A culture (or climate) of virtue in a business begins with executives who exhibit virtuous leadership through their personal actions and interpersonal relationships” (Younkins 21).

In displaying virtuous behavior throughout an organization, managers are setting an example for employees.   “Employees are influenced by observing visible and legitimate role models who themselves act as virtuous agents.  Not only should leaders openly discuss virtues and values, they should also live the virtues and values that they advocate” (Younkins 21).  I believe that this is one of the most important aspects in creating and sustaining an ethical business environment.  As explained by Kouzes and Posner in Minkes, Small, and Chatterjee’s article, “…leaders who could not personally adhere to a firm set of values, could not convince others of the worthiness of those values” (Minkes, Small, and Chatterjee 330).  People learn through example.  Therefore, managers should be mindful of this and back up their words with consistent virtuous behaviors that champion the organization’s values.

Once organizational values have been implemented, only half of the work has been done.  The remaining half is a continual and never ending process within the business.  In maintaining an ethical business, ongoing promotion and reinforcement is necessary.  Management must continue to display ethical behavior, while continuing to communicate values to employees.  This also includes communicating what actions are and are not acceptable.  Employee evaluations should also frequently be performed, in which employees are evaluated on values implemented by the organization’s managers.  In addition, management also needs to develop systems that reward value-oriented behaviors and reprimand value-destructive behaviors.

In regards to a reward system, “employees should be objectively appraised and compensated based on their contribution toward achieving a firm’s mission, values, and goals” (Younkins 19).  Employees may receive monetary or recognition awards for their display of virtuous and ethical behavior.  In establishing such incentives, there is an encouragement that exists among employees to accept and display the organization’s values and goals.  In addition, such incentives create a pathway in which individuals can fulfill their own self-interests and goals simultaneously.  “The good manager tries to shape employees’ ideas about self-interest by instituting incentives rewarding cooperation and reinforcing the pleasure people take in collaborating with each other” (Koehn 498). When employees act ethically, the business is also handsomely rewarded in that it gains a good reputation as being an ethically driven business.  This can lead to higher profits in that consumers will be more likely to choose that particular business over competitors because of its reputation.  “Many companies are now realizing that ethically driven strategies are resulting in a sustainable competitive advantage” (Arjoon 168).  In addition, “companies that have seriously adopted ethically driven or people-centered strategies have seen clear gains in productivity, sales and profits, customer service, retention rates, reduction in absenteeism, positive impact on employee morale, [and] increased and timely launching of products” (Arjoon 169).

Adversely, a disciplinary system is also necessary in order to maintain organization values and ethically driven behavior that have already been established.  Employees should be aware of the possible repercussions of their actions in advance, and management needs to ensure disciplinary actions are followed through with when dealing with value-destructive behaviors.  This sends a message to employees that unethical behavior will not be tolerated and it should be avoided at all costs.

The acts of Enron and WorldCom have increased consumer demands for ethically driven organizations.  Therefore, the businesses that make ethics a priority will likely obtain a sustainable competitive advantage because more consumers will choose to do business with them.  In today’s economy and business world, businesses must place a large focus on ethics in order to be successful.

FACTORS THAT AFFECT ETHICAL BEHAVIOR

Implementing a form of virtue ethics and values throughout a business can be very challenging, but maintaining it can be just as difficult.  There are many factors that can affect ethical behavior and lead a manager or employee to act unethically.  Competition for customers and increased market share, as well as the need for more profit are common issues that can lead to unethical behavior.  In addition, management incentives, such as bonuses, pay increases, promotions, and stock options can open the gateway for unethical behavior.

With a specific focus on profit, businesses that have an urgency to increase profits are likely to engage in false reporting.  Reporting false financial information makes a business’s financial statements look more appealing to investors and gives a false pretense that the business is in better financial health than it really is.  In addition, management may inflate earnings if they receive bonuses, pay increases, or promotions for increasing profits.  These monetary compensations can prove beneficial for businesses in that management will be more driven to make sales and increase wealth in the business.  Adversely, these monetary compensations can be dangerous if a manager works in his or her own interest and does not act ethically.  It could put the business in a financial position that is difficult to correct.

Stock options are another form of management compensation.  “Stock options allow employees to purchase a particular number of common shares of company stock at a specified price over a specified time period” (Brooks and Dunn 172).  Stock options can be beneficial in that they serve as a motivational devise.  When managers have an interest in the company they work for, they are more willing to strive towards an increase in stock prices.  Shareholders, as well as the managers, enjoy higher returns when stock prices increase.  In addition, stock options enable management to adopt the investor’s perspective in that theyenable both the interests of investors and management to be aligned.

One of the biggest problems with this is that unethical managers can work out of their own self-interest to falsely raise stock prices in order to earn more money.  With the incentive to earn more money comes the high possibility for unethical behavior and false reporting.  Managers that get used to these increasing stock prices are also the ones who will likely forego ethical standards and correct reporting procedures.  The concept of stock options can be extremely dangerous to a firm, especially when stock prices are truly in decline and these types of managers are present.  Reporting false income to increase these prices will eventually catch up to the firm and will result in the company’s non-existence.  Another problem with stock options is that management has the option to exercise their stock options and then sell them immediately.  This does not align with investor interests in that managers are only maintaining a short term perspective.  Making decisions based on the short term only hurts the long term investors.

BB&T – A TRUE ETHICALLY DRIVEN BUSINESS

BB&T is a fine example of a business that has been led to success through the values-driven approach adopted by one its leaders.  John Allison, former CEO of BB&T, now serves as the chairman of the board of directors.  During Allison’s time as CEO, the company has grown from approximately $5 billion in assets to $165 billion in assets.  This substantial growth has placed the company as the eighth largest financial institute in the United States.  Just a few of the issues BB&T has made a bold stand on are a municipality’s right to seize property by eminent domain for the purpose of economic development, and negative amortization loans.  Allison received national attention is his decision to “not provide loans for any economic development projects in which the land for the project had been taken in this manner” (Parnell and Dent 587).  This decision was not initially favored by many mortgage producers.

“When we made the decision not to do these loans, we got beat up in the market.  We also lost a number of mortgage producers who could make more money working for Countrywide – of course a number of these producers would now like to come back to BB&T.  We believe that doing our best to help our clients make the right financial decisions is good for BB&T.  I believe that while there may be short-term trade-offs by sticking to your values, you are never making a sacrifice in the long run, if your values are rational” (Parnell and Dent 589).

“Allison is known for, and attributes BB&T’s success to, operating by a set of principles that are embodied in BB&T’s Values Statement.  These ten values – Reality (Fact-Based), Reason (Objectivity), Independent Thinking, Productivity, Honesty, Integrity, Justice (Fairness), Pride, Self-Esteem (Self-Motivation), and Teamwork/Mutual (Supportiveness) – are not simply platitudes at BB&T but drive the decision-making process of the bank” (Parnell and Dent 588).  These values serve as the foundation that BB&T was built on.  As part of the evaluation process, employees are evaluated on their performance in accordance with the 10 values.  Those employees that perform in accordance with the values are rewarded.

Allison attributes Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism as the framework for these 10 values.  The main aspect of Objectivism is that it relies on truth and blocks out all emotions in the decision making process.  “The purpose of the process is to help you think rationally.  It is about not letting your emotions make decisions that are bad for you.  It is the ability to make logical decisions based on the facts and to pursue our purposes that makes us happy” (Parnell and Dent 591).

In addition, BB&T has also been viewed as being socially responsible.  Milton Friedman, who is referenced to in Parnell and Dent’s article, argues that there are two reasons as to why a firm should act socially responsible.  “First, not doing so can increase the likelihood of more costly government regulation.  A number of regulations over business operations were enacted because some firms refused to be socially responsible” (Parnell and Dent 593).  The second reason as to why a firm should act socially responsible is that “stakeholders affected by a firm’s social responsibility stance – most notably customers – are also those who must choose whether to transact business with the firm” (Parnell and Dent 593).  The point here is that if consumers do not think a firm is socially responsible, they have the option to do business with another company, and they will more than likely do so.  As discussed in Parnell and Dent’s article, studies have shown that consumers will be willing to pay more for products and services that are responsibly produced.  Simply, consumers favor ethically driven and responsible businesses, and will purchase products and services from them considering this factor.  This is why it is crucial for businesses in today’s economy and environment to be ethically driven and socially responsible.  With the events as seen in Enron and WorldCom, it has made consumers extra sensitive to firms and what approach they take in formulating profit.  Consumers want to be valued for their choice to do business with a particular firm, and they take enjoyment in purchasing products from these firms when they display ethically driven strategies.

From a market and environmental perspective, we could argue that BB&T is doing exceptionally well.  “From a market perspective, BB&T has delivered strong growth and financial performance since Allison’s appointment as CEO in 1989.  From a broad environmental perspective, BB&T’s business decisions defending eminent domain rights and eschewing negative amortization loans reflect support for a sustained society that respects personal property rights and responsible mortgage loan practices” (Parnell and Dent 594).  In respect to this, BB&T speaks on behalf of individuals and what they want.  While BB&T suffered somewhat in the short term, they were able to come out on top in the long run.  In my personal opinion, I have much more respect for companies like BB&T because they are willing to forgo potential profits and take a stand, even when it is not the popular decision.  Companies, like BB&T, will be around for years longer than the companies that jump on the popularity bandwagon.  They will also see considerably larger profits because they stand out among their competitors – just as BB&T has come to do

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is easy to see how BB&T has come to be a top competitor in the financial institution sector of business.  BB&T is a classic example of an ethically driven firm that has realized greater profits than the firms that have adopted a profit-driven strategy.  The implementation of ethics throughout an organization is a very difficult thing to do.  It requires substantial acceptance from employees and managers alike to be successful.  Most importantly, managers are the driving forces in implementing such a strategy throughout an organization.  They must be effective in communicating the values of an organization to employees, as well as lead by example.  Management cannot expect to preach values that they do not live by themselves.  After all, people learn through example.  A leader that lives by the values it communicates to employees has the best shot at having an ethically driven business.

In addition to the communication process, managers must provide incentives for desirable behavior.  A rewards system based on monetary or recognition awards are great ways to encourage cooperation and motivate employees.  This also encourages the creation of a pathway in which individuals can fulfill their self-interests.  These same values must also be a part of the evaluation process.  Just as there are rewards systems, management must also design a disciplinary system.  It is important that employees are aware in advance what they could encounter by not behaving in accordance with a firm’s values and policies.  Managers must also follow through with any disciplinary action to reinforce their importance on having a values-based business.

The benefits of implementing an ethically driven business strategy can be great, but it can be a difficult thing to do.  Competition for customers and increased market share, as well as the need for more profit are common issues that can lead to unethical behavior.  In addition, management incentives, such as bonuses, pay increases, promotions, and stock options can open the gateway for unethical behavior. However, if a firm is able to successfully implement an ethics-driven approach, these issues can be minimized and the interests of the firm and employees will be satisfied and aligned.  When a firm is able to align individual self-interests with its own interests, happiness and flourishing are more likely to occur for both.

Jessica Kuryn is a student in Wheeling Jesuit University’s Master of Science in Accountancy (MSA) program.

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Brooks, L. J., and P. Dunn. Business & Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives &

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Koehn, Daryl. (1998).  Virtue ethics, the firm, and moral psychology.  Business Ethics Quarterly

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Wall Street Math – Article by Douglas French

Wall Street Math – Article by Douglas French

The New Renaissance Hat
Douglas French
April 11, 2012
******************************

There’s plenty of blame for the financial crisis being spread around. Those on the left say Wall Street wasn’t regulated enough, while those on the right claim government mandates required lenders to make bad loans. The argument is made that the Federal Reserve was too loose, while the other side says Bernanke wasn’t loose enough. Some blame greed. Others blame Wall Street’s investment products. And then there’s mathematics.

Wall Street has become a numbers game played at high speed by powerful computers trading complex derivatives utilizing even more complex mathematical modeling. Writing for the Huffington Post, Théo Le Bret asks the reader to

Take the Black-Scholes equation, used to estimate the value of a derivative: it is actually no more than a partial differential equation of the financial derivative’s value, as a function of four variables, including time and “volatility” of the underlying asset (the derivative being a ‘bet’ on the future value of the asset). Differential equations are well-known to physicists, since such fundamental properties of nature as the wave equation or Schrodinger’s equation for quantum mechanics are given in the form of differential equations, and in physics their solutions seem to be very reliable: so why is this not always the case in finance?

Mr. Le Bret quotes Albert Einstein for his answer: “as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.”

Murray Rothbard put it another way:

In physics, the facts of nature are given to us. They may be broken down into their simple elements in the laboratory and their movements observed. On the other hand, we do not know the laws explaining the movements of physical particles; they are unmotivated.

Rothbard goes on to make the point that human action is motivated and thus economics is built on the basis of axioms. We can then deduce laws from these axioms, but, as Rothbard explains, “there are no simple elements of ‘facts’ in human action; the events of history are complex phenomena, which cannot ‘test’ anything.”

Using the models that work so well for physicists, mathematicians on Wall Street got it spectacularly wrong in the mortgage and derivatives markets, just as mathematical economists can never predict the future with any accuracy. Motivated human behavior cannot be modeled.

But the mathematicians or “quants” underscore all of Wall Street’s financial engineering, a process that takes a few pieces of paper and folds their attributes together to make new products, most times hoping to avoid taxes and regulation. Author Brendan Moynihan describes this engineering in his book Financial Origami: How the Wall Street Model Broke.

Origami is the traditional Japanese art of paper folding wherein amazing shapes and animals are created with just a few simple folds to a piece of paper. Moynihan cleverly extends the metaphor to the financial arena, pointing out that stocks, bonds, and insurance are pieces of paper simply folded by the Wall Street sales force into swaps, options, futures, derivatives of derivatives, and the like.

The author is adept at describing derivatives in terms a person can understand. Health-insurance premiums are a call option to have the insurance company pay for our medical care. Auto insurance premiums are like put options, allowing the insured to sell (put) his or her car, if it’s totaled, to the insurer at blue-book value.

Nobel Prize winners have played a big hand in the creation of derivatives. Milton Friedman’s paper on the need for futures markets in currencies paved the way for that market in 1971. But as Moynihan points out, it was Nixon’s shutting of the gold window that created the need to mitigate currency and inflation risk.

Nobel Laureate Myron Scholes was cocreator of the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing model. He and cowinner Robert Merton used their model to blow-up Long Term Capital Management.

But it was little-known economist David X. Li’s paper in the Journal of Fixed Income that would provide the intellectual foundation for Wall Street’s flurry into mortgages. “On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach” became “the academic study used to support Wall Street’s turning subprime mortgage pools into AAA-rated securities,” writes Moynihan. “By the time it was over, the Street would create 64,000 AAA-rated securities, even though only 12 companies in the world had that rating.”

Robert Stowe England, in his book Black Box Casino: How Wall Street’s Risky Shadow Banking Crashed Global Finance, says Li’s model “relied on the price history of credit default swaps against a given asset to determine the degree of correlation rather than rely on historical loan performance data.”

“People got very excited about the Gaussian copula because of its mathematical elegance,” says Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “but the thing never worked.” Taleb, the author of The Black Swan, claims any attempt to measure correlation based on past history to be “charlatanism.”

Subprime mortgages were bundled to become collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), which are a form of collateralized debt obligation(CDO). CDOs weren’t new; the first rated CDO was assembled by Michael Milken in 1987. But instead of a mixture of investment-grade and junk corporate bonds, in the housing bubble, CDOs were rated AAA based upon Li’s work.

Mr. England wryly points out, “A cynic might say that the CDO was invented to create a place to dump lower credit quality or junk bonds and hide them among better credits.”

England quotes Michael Lewis, author of The Big Short: “The CDO was, in effect, a credit laundering service for the residents of Lower Middle Class America.” For Wall Street it was a machine that “turned lead into gold.”

Wall Street’s CDO mania served to pump up investment-bank leverage. England explains that if level-3 securities were included (level-3 assets, which include CDOs, cannot be valued by using observable measures, such as market prices and models) then Bear Stearns sported leverage of 262 to 1 just before the crash. Lehman was close behind at 225, Morgan Stanley at 222, Citigroup at 212, and Goldman Sachs was levered at 200 to 1.

Leverage like that requires either perfection or eventual government bailout for survival.

The CDO market created the need for a way to bet against the CDOs and the credit-default-swap (CDS) market was born. Bundling the CDS together created synthetic CDOs. “With synthetic CDOs, Wall Street crossed over to The Matrix,” writes England, “a world where reality is simulated by computers.”

It’s England’s view that the CDO market “was the casino where the bets were placed. Wall Street became bigger and chancier than Las Vegas and Atlantic City combined — and more.” According to Richard Zabel, the total notional value of the entire CDS market was $45 trillion by the end of 2007, at the same time the bond and structured vehicle markets totaled only $25 trillion.

So the speculative portion of the CDS market was at least $20 trillion with speculators betting on the possibility of a credit event for securities not owned by either party. England does not see this as a good thing. It’s Mr. England’s view that credit default swaps concentrated risk in certain financial institutions, instead of disbursing risk.

In “Credit Default Swaps from the Viewpoint of Libertarian Property Rights and Contract Credit Default Swaps Theory,” published in Libertarian Papers, authors Thorsten Polleit and Jonathan Mariano contend, “The truth is that CDS provide investors with an efficient and effective instrument for exposing economically unsound and unsustainable fiat money regimes and the economic production structure it creates.”

Polleit and Mariano explain that credit default swaps make a borrower’s credit risk tradable. CDS is like an insurance policy written against the potential of a negative credit event. These derivatives, while being demonized by many observers, serve to increase “the disciplinary pressure on borrowers who are about to build up unsustainable debt levels to consolidate; or it makes borrowers who have become financially overstretched go into default.”

Mr. England concludes his book saying, “We need a way forward to a safer, sounder financial system where the power of sunlight on financial institutions and markets helps enable free market discipline to work its invisible hand for the good of all.”

Polleit and Mariano explain that it is the CDS market that provides that sunlight.

The panic of 2008 was the inevitable collapse of an increasingly rickety fiat-money and banking system — a system where the central bank attempts to direct and manipulate the nation’s investment and production with an eye to maximize employment. In a speech delivered to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Jim Grant told the central bankers that interest rates should convey information. “But the only information conveyed in a manipulated yield curve is what the Fed wants.”

Wall Street’s math wizards convinced the Masters of the Universe that their numbers don’t lie, believing they could model the Federal Reserve’s house-of-mirrors market. Maybe the numbers don’t lie, but the assumptions do.

Advising about mathematical economics, Rothbard wrote, “ignore the fancy welter of equations and look for the assumptions underneath. Invariably they are few in number, simple, and wrong.” The same could be said for Dr. Li’s model and Scholes’s model before him.

Until the era of unstable fiat-money regimes ends, the search for scapegoats will continue — because the crashes will never end.

Douglas French is president of the Mises Institute and author of Early Speculative Bubbles & Increases in the Money Supply and Walk Away: The Rise and Fall of the Home-Ownership Myth. He received his master’s degree in economics from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, under Murray Rothbard with Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe serving on his thesis committee. French teaches in the Mises Academy. See his tribute to Murray Rothbard. Send him mail. See Doug French’s article archives.

This article was published on Mises.org and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution United States License, which requires that credit be given to the author.