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Gennady Stolyarov II Interviews James Strole Regarding RAAD Fest 2019 and Life-Extension Advocacy

Gennady Stolyarov II Interviews James Strole Regarding RAAD Fest 2019 and Life-Extension Advocacy

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James Strole
Gennady Stolyarov II
Johannon Ben Zion

On Tuesday, July 16, 2019, U.S. Transhumanist Party Chairman Gennady Stolyarov II invited James Strole of the Coalition for Radical Life Extension and People Unlimited to discuss the upcoming RAAD Fest 2019 in Las Vegas on October 3-6, 2019 – the fourth RAAD Fest in history – https://www.raadfest.com/ – and the first in a new venue. Mr. Stolyarov and Mr. Strole discussed the importance of unity in the transhumanist and life-extensionist movements, as well as what opportunities for education and inspiration RAAD Fest will offer to those who wish to live longer and healthier. They also addressed audience questions and were briefly joined by Johannon Ben Zion, Chairman of the Arizona Transhumanist Party. Watch the interview on YouTube here.

Become a member of the U.S. Transhumanist Party / Transhuman Party for free, no matter where you reside. Apply here in less than a minute.

Watch some of the U.S. Transhumanist Party’s prior appearances at RAAD Fests in 2017 and 2018 below.

RAAD Fest 2017

The U.S. Transhumanist Party – Pursuing a Peaceful Political Revolution for Longevity – August 11, 2017

RAAD Fest 2018

The U.S. Transhumanist Party: Four Years of Advocating for the Future – Gennady Stolyarov II at RAAD Fest 2018 – September 21, 2018

Gennady Stolyarov II Interviews Ray Kurzweil at RAAD Fest 2018 – September 21, 2018

U.S. Transhumanist Party Meeting at RAAD Fest 2018 – September 22, 2018

Andrés Grases Interviews Gennady Stolyarov II on Transhumanism and the Transition to the Next Technological Era – September 23, 2018

Register for RAAD Fest 2019 here. 

Ludwig Van Beethoven’s “Egmont”: A Celebration of Liberty and Limited Government (2005) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

Ludwig Van Beethoven’s “Egmont”: A Celebration of Liberty and Limited Government (2005) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

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The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
July 26, 2014
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Note from the Author: This essay was originally written in 2005 and published on Associated Content (subsequently, Yahoo! Voices) in 2007.  The essay earned over 2,100 page views on Associated Content/Yahoo! Voices, and I seek to preserve it as a valuable resource for readers, subsequent to the imminent closure of Yahoo! Voices. Therefore, this essay is being published directly on The Rational Argumentator for the first time.  
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~ G. Stolyarov II, July 26, 2014

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Ludwig van Beethoven wrote his Egmont music in 1810 to accompany Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s play of the same name, a play about the struggle between liberty and tyranny, and a work that contains in itself expressions both of tragedy and profound triumph.

Count Egmont was a real historical figure, a Flemish nobleman who had loyally served the Spanish king Philip II in his earlier wars and who had received in return the administration of the city of Brussels and other parts of the Spanish Netherlands. Egmont, though a loyal Catholic, believed in religious toleration and, at the Council of Trent, openly expressed his disapproval of Philip’s persecution of Dutch Protestants.

In return, in 1568, Philip sent troops to the Netherlands under the cruel and tyrannical Duke of Alva, who ordered Egmont’s arrest and execution without a trial or clear evidence of any manner of treason. Egmont’s heroic final words in defense of the ideals of liberty and religious toleration, as well as the efforts of Egmont’s friend, William of Orange, in rallying the Dutch to resist the Duke of Alva, triggered a massive revolt against Spanish rule that eventually led to the independence of the Netherlands.

Goethe wrote a play in honor of Egmont between 1775 and 1787, in which he transferred much of his own philosophy and personality to the character of Egmont, in whom were especially prominent a devotion to individual freedom, a joy of life, and a hatred for arbitrary power. Goethe even made his Egmont twenty years younger than the historical one in order to bring the character even closer to the state of the young playwright.

Beethoven volunteered to write incidental music for the first public performance of Egmont in 1810, in collaboration with Goethe, with whom Beethoven shared the high ideals of individualism, toleration, and a government of liberty. Though the play features a tragic death and brutal oppression by Spanish troops, themes of the inevitable and coming triumph of freedom and justice permeate it.

Egmont’s death does not dull the power of the principles that he advocates and does not prevent the Duke of Alva’s defeat. Thus, when making instructions to Beethoven for the music to be written, Goethe emphasized that he wished Egmont to be a “Symphony of Victory,” and Beethoven delivered precisely that.

The Egmont Overture, itself a microcosm of the events of the play, features a constant conflict between two themes, a gloomy and overbearing minor that dominates in the beginning, symbolic of Spanish tyranny, and a powerful, radiant major, demonstrating the power of Egmont’s resistance to Spanish rule. Near the end of the overture, several harsh violin notes indicate Egmont’s beheading, but not the death of the principles for which he stands. The beheading is followed by the most triumphant fanfare of the entire work, and perhaps the most gloriously uplifting creation of Beethoven’s musical career. The rest of the incidental music was designed to be performed along with the actual recitation of Goethe’s play.

Egmont has a special significance due to its ability to capture in melody the ideas of individualism, toleration, freedom of conscience, and limited government. Beethoven’s music demonstrates in a most directly accessible form the dynamic, heroic, triumphant possibilities of a world built upon such principles, and a spirit of grandeur, dignity, and magnificence that today’s world urgently needs to restore in its art and general sense of life.

An Analysis of Ethical Issues in the Film “The Rain Man” (2004) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

An Analysis of Ethical Issues in the Film “The Rain Man” (2004) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

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The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
July 26, 2014
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Note from the Author: This essay was originally written in 2004 and published on Associated Content (subsequently, Yahoo! Voices) in 2007.  The essay earned over 17,200 page views on Associated Content/Yahoo! Voices, and I seek to preserve it as a valuable resource for readers, subsequent to the imminent closure of Yahoo! Voices. Therefore, this essay is being published directly on The Rational Argumentator for the first time.  
***
~ G. Stolyarov II, July 26, 2014

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The central ethical dilemma of the 1988 film The Rain Man concerns the proper treatment to be afforded to Raymond, an autistic man who is capable of performing immense feats of mathematical calculation but is psychologically attached to predetermined habits and routines, thus being unable to adapt to changing situations around him. Should Raymond be given a chance to live in an open setting, where he can freely interact with the world around him, or should he be confined to an institution?

Raymond’s brother, Charlie, discovers Raymond’s existence only after the death of their father, who had willed the vast majority of his inheritance to Raymond. Charlie is at first immensely spiteful at his father’s decision and removes Raymond from the mental institution, attempting to blackmail the doctor in charge to transfer $1.5 million to Charlie. Charlie is easily frustrated by Raymond’s habits and oddities, as well as his need to always receive precisely the treatment to which he had become accustomed.

However, Charlie later discovers Raymond’s intelligent side during a trip to Las Vegas, where Raymond employs his astoundingly swift processing skills to win $86,000 while gambling. The two brothers subsequently forge an emotional bond, and Charlie is reluctant to return Raymond to the institution. He demonstrates the wish to take care of his brother and points out that Raymond has learned numerous new skills and information during the trip. However, the doctors in charge of Raymond show Charlie that Raymond’s autonomy is greatly impaired; they ask Raymond a series of mutually exclusive questions, to which Raymond merely answers, “Yes.”

Suzanne, Charlie’s girlfriend, thinks that Charlie’s initial treatment of Raymond is too harsh and intolerant. She would like to see Raymond afforded a more flexible and less dominating treatment by Charlie, and is upset that Charlie is using Raymond in order to blackmail the doctor into giving Charlie money. Eventually, however, she becomes pleased by Charlie’s increasing proximity to and genuine care for his brother.

Charlie’s initial “kidnapping” of Raymond was based on Charlie’s perception that Raymond was an easily manipulated disabled person who would comply with Charlie’s scheme to extort money from the doctor. Nevertheless, Raymond proves to have a personality of his own, which at first greatly irritates Charlie, but which Charlie eventually comes to love and refuses to relinquish. The doctor remains firm in his stance not to give the money of Charlie’s father in exchange for Raymond, and Charlie rejects a $250,000 offer in exchange for which he was to have severed all involvement with Raymond. After the doctors demonstrate Raymond’s incapacity to make significant decisions, Charlie reluctantly agrees to allow him to return to the mental institution.

Despite the fact that Charlie and Raymond must separate at the end, Charlie promises to visit frequently, and his influence on Raymond has not been in vain. Raymond and Charlie now share jokes, and Raymond’s range of comfort with respect to the products, services, and activities of daily life has been greatly amplified. Raymond, moreover, had assisted in rendering Charlie’s financial state more secure than it had been in the beginning of the film by winning $86,000 in Las Vegas. Charlie also learns to be more patient and tolerant in his relations with other human beings. He learns to discover the merits and values offered by others rather than merely lashing out at them in frustration.

The decision to return Raymond to the mental institution demonstrated first and foremost the principle of nonmaleficence. The doctors wished to ascertain that Raymond would not pose a danger to his own life by certain irrational and perhaps involuntary reactions, such as banging his head against a window as a result of hearing a smoke alarm. However, this action denied some of Charlie’s attempts at beneficence toward Raymond, as Charlie attempted to provide Raymond shelter, entertainment, and opportunity beyond what Raymond was used to or what was offered at the hospital. Though some of Charlie’s influence remained with Raymond, the doctors’ decision prevented additional improvements to Raymond’s state due to the concern that attempts at these would undermine Raymond’s already delicate condition. The principle of autonomy was also denied, as Raymond was deemed incapable of making his own choices; the doctors demonstrated that he would give contradictory answers to the questions asked of him, and thus argued that their paternalistic supervision over his decision-making would benefit him most.

An alternative decision with respect to Raymond’s fate would have been to allow Raymond to remain with Charlie, but under the supervision of various doctors and psychological counselors. In this way, the doctors could have continued to exercise precautionary measures against Raymond’s self-destructive activities, while Charlie could have continued to broaden Raymond’s comfort zone and eventually render him fit for rudimentary social interaction. This would both benefit Raymond and protect him from harm, fulfilling the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence.

Moreover, Raymond would, with an expanded worldview, gain greater autonomy in making his own decisions. A freer environment (where constraints are flexible rather than rigid) would enable Raymond to have the greatest possible degree of personal autonomy that he is capable of carrying out. Moreover, the principle of justice requires that Raymond be given the same right to the pursuit of happiness as is afforded to non-autistic persons. This means that absolute paternalism over Raymond should be off-limits to his guardians, who need not regulate every detail of Raymond’s life in order to ensure his security. This decision would be more consistent with the ethics of principlism than the one actually carried out in the film.

Ten Principles of Classical Liberalism (2009) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

Ten Principles of Classical Liberalism (2009) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

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The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
Originally Published November 8, 2009
as Part of Issue CCXVI of The Rational Argumentator
Republished July 24, 2014
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Note from the Author: This essay was originally published as part of Issue CCXVI of The Rational Argumentator on November 8, 2009, using the Yahoo! Voices publishing platform. Because of the imminent closure of Yahoo! Voices, the essay is now being made directly available on The Rational Argumentator.
~ G. Stolyarov II, July 24, 2014
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Fundamental Ideas in a Philosophy of Liberty

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I was recently asked to attempt a formulation of ten crucial principles of classical liberalism, the worldview which animated the American Revolution, the European Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and the libertarian revival of free-market thought in the mid-to-late twentieth century. Classical liberalism – even when it is not explicitly espoused – still has considerable residual influence on the political and economic institutions of the Western world and is having an increasing impact outside the West as well. I see the principles of classical liberalism as primarily forward-looking. These ideas need not only characterize aspects of humanity’s past. They can also guide and ameliorate our future.

The following ten principles are not exhaustive, and they have been formulated broadly to account for differences in opinion on particulars within classical liberal circles. Although different people may apply and interpret these principles in somewhat different ways, a general agreement on even these ideas would go a long way toward advancing liberty, prosperity, and peace in the world.

Principle 1. The life of each individual is an absolute and universal moral value. No non-aggressive individual’s life, liberty, or property may be legitimately sacrificed for any goal.

Principle 2. Every individual owns his body, his mind, and the labor thereof, including the physical objects legitimately obtained through such labor.

Principle 3. Every individual has the right to pursue activities for the betterment of his life – including its material, intellectual, and emotional aspects – by using his own body and property, as well as the property of consenting others.

Principle 4. The rights of an individual to life, liberty, and property are inherent to that individual’s nature. They are not granted by other human beings, and they cannot be taken away by any entity.

Principle 5. The initiation of physical force, the threat of such force, or fraud against any individual is never permissible – irrespective of the position and character of the initiator. However, proportionate force may be used to retaliate and defend against aggression.

Principle 6. The sole fundamental purpose of government is to protect the rights of individuals by engaging in actions specifically delegated to the government by its constituents. Government is not the same as society, nor is the government entitled to sacrifice some non-aggressive individuals to advance the well-being of others.

Principle 7. Every individual has the absolute right to think and express any ideas. Thought and speech are never equivalent to force or violence and ought never to be restricted or to be subject to coercive penalties. Specifically, coercion and censorship on the basis of religious or political ideas are not acceptable under any circumstances.

Principle 8. Commerce, technology, and science are desirable, liberating forces that are capable of alleviating historic ills, improving the quality of human life, and morally elevating human beings. The complete freedom of trade, innovation, and thought should be preserved and supported for all human beings in the world.

Principle 9. Accidents of birth, geography, or ancestry do not define an individual and should not result in manmade restrictions of that individual’s rights or opportunities. Every individual should be judged purely on his or her personal qualities, including accomplishments, character, and knowledge.

Principle 10. There are no “natural” or desirable limits to human potential for good, and there is no substantive problem that is necessarily unsolvable by present or future human knowledge, effort, and technology. It is a moral imperative for humans to expand their mastery of the universe indefinitely and in such a manner as will reinforce the survival and flourishing of all non-aggressive individuals.

Read other articles in The Rational Argumentator’s Issue CCXVI.

Putting Randomness in Its Place (2010) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

Putting Randomness in Its Place (2010) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

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The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
Originally Published February 11, 2010
as Part of Issue CCXXXV of The Rational Argumentator
Republished July 22, 2014
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Note from the Author: This essay was originally published as part of Issue CCXXXV of The Rational Argumentator on February 11, 2010, using the Yahoo! Voices publishing platform. Because of the imminent closure of Yahoo! Voices, the essay is now being made directly available on The Rational Argumentator.
~ G. Stolyarov II, July 22, 2014
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A widespread misunderstanding of the meaning of the term “randomness” often results in false generalizations made regarding reality. In particular, the view of randomness as metaphysical, rather than epistemological, is responsible for numerous commonplace fallacies.

To see randomness as metaphysical is to see it as an inherent aspect of reality as such – as embedded inextricably in “the way things are.” Typically, people holding this view will take it in one of two directions. Some of them will see randomness pejoratively – thinking that there is no way reality could be like that: chaotic, undefined, unpredictable. Such individuals will typically posit that, because reality cannot be random, it must therefore be centrally planned by a super-intelligent entity, such as a deity.

Others, however, will use the metaphysical perception of randomness to deny evident and ubiquitously observable truths about our world: the facts that all entities obey certain natural laws, that these laws are accessible to human beings, and that they can inform our decision-making and actions. These individuals typically espouse metaphysical subjectivism – the idea that the nature of reality depends on the person observing it, or that all of existence is in such a chaotic flux that we cannot ever possibly make sense of it, so we might as well “construct” our own personal or cultural “reality.”

But it is the very metaphysical perception of randomness that is in error. Randomness is, rather, epistemological – a description of our state of knowledge of external reality, and not of external reality itself. To say that a phenomenon is random simply means that we do not (yet) have adequate knowledge to be able to explain it causally. Based on past observational experience or some knowledge of aspects inherent to that phenomenon, we might be able to assign probabilities – estimates of the likelihood that a particular event will occur, in the absence of more detailed knowledge about the specifics of the circumstances that might give rise to that event. In some areas of life, this is presently as far as humans can venture. Indeed, probabilistic thinking can be conceptually quite powerful – although imprecise – in analyzing large classes of phenomena which, individually, exhibit too many specific details for any single mind to grasp. Entire industries, such as insurance and investment, are founded on this premise. But we must not mistake a conceptual tool for an external fact; the probabilities are not “out there.” They are, rather, an attempt by human beings to interpret and anticipate external phenomena.

The recognition of randomness as epistemological can be of great aid both to those who believe in biological evolution and to advocates of the free market. Neither the laws of evolution, nor the laws of economics, of course, would fit any definition of “randomness.” Rather, they are impersonal, abstract principles that definitively describe the general outcomes of particular highly complex sets of interactions. They are unable to account for every fact of those interactions, however, and they are also not always able to predict precisely how or when the general outcome they anticipate will ensue. For instance, biological evolution cannot precisely predict which complex life forms will evolve and at what times, or which animals in a current ecosystem will ultimately proliferate, although traits that might enhance an animal’s survival and reproduction and traits that might hinder them can be identified. Likewise, economics – despite the protestations of some economists to the contrary – cannot predict the movements of stock prices or prices in general, although particular directional effects on prices from known technological breakthroughs or policy decisions can be anticipated.

Evolution is often accused of being incapable of producing intelligent life and speciation because of its “randomness.” For many advocates of “intelligent design,” it does not appear feasible that the complexity of life today could have arisen as a result of “chance” occurrences – such as genetic mutations – that nobody planned and for whose outcomes nobody vouched. However, each of these mutations – and the natural selection pressures to which they were subject – can only be described as random to the extent that we cannot precisely describe the circumstances under which they occurred. The more knowledge we have of the circumstances surrounding a particular mutation, the more it becomes perfectly sensible to us, and explicable as a product of causal, natural laws, not “sheer chance.” Such natural laws work both at the microscopic, molecular level where the proximate cause of the mutation occurred, and at the macroscopic, species-wide level, where organisms with the mutation interact with other organisms and with the inanimate environment to bring about a certain episode in the history of life.

So it is with economics; the interactions of the free market seem chaotic and unpredictable to many – who therefore disparage them as “random” and agitate for centralized power over all aspects of human life. But, in fact, the free market consists of millions of human actors in billions of situations, and each actor has definite purposes and motivations, as well as definite constraints against which he or she must make decisions. The “randomness” of behaviors on the market is only perceived because of the observer’s limited knowledge of the billions of circumstances that generate such behaviors. We can fathom our own lives and immediate environments, and it may become easier to understand the general principles behind complex economies when we recognize that each individual life has its own purposes and orders, although they may be orders which we find mistaken or purposes of which we disapprove. But the interaction of these individual microcosms is the free market; the more we understand about it, the more sensible it becomes to us, and the more valid conclusions we can draw regarding it.

The reason why evolution and economies cannot be predicted at a concrete level, although they can be understood, is the sheer complexity of the events and interactions involved – with each event or interaction possibly being of immense significance. Qualitative generalizations, analyses of attributes, and probabilistic thinking can answer some questions pertaining to these complex systems and can enable us to navigate them with some success. But these comprise our arsenal of tools for interpreting reality; they do not even begin to approach being the reality itself.

When we come to see randomness as a product of our limited knowledge, rather than of reality per se, we can begin to appreciate how much there is about reality that can be understood – rather than dismissed as impossible or inherently chaotic – and can broaden our knowledge and mastery of phenomena we might otherwise have seen as beyond our grasp.

Click here to read more articles in Issue CCXXXV of The Rational Argumentator.

An Analysis of Ethical Issues in the Film “Gattaca” (2004) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

An Analysis of Ethical Issues in the Film “Gattaca” (2004) – Article by G. Stolyarov II

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The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
July 4, 2014
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Note from the Author: This essay was originally written in 2004 and published on Associated Content (subsequently, Yahoo! Voices) in 2007. It earned over 40,000 page views since, and I seek to preserve it as a valuable resource for readers, subsequent to the imminent closure of Yahoo! Voices. Therefore, this essay is being published directly on The Rational Argumentator for the first time. 
***
~ G. Stolyarov II, July 4, 2014
***

The central ethical dilemma of the 1997 Andrew Niccol film Gattaca concerns the manner in which an individual ought to be judged. Should it be by the composition of his genome, present at birth, or by the attributes of personality and ambition that are chosen by that individual? In the futuristic society depicted in the film, genetic engineering allows for the elimination of almost all physical defects in newborns, whose bodily characteristics later render them far more favorable candidates for employment than those whose genes had not been enhanced in this manner. Eventually, interviews are conducted not to assess an applicant’s character and determination, but his genetic code. The even more fundamental question that arises from this is, “What determines the essential identity of a human being? Is it his genetic code, or is it something else?”

Vincent is a child born in the obsolete manner, and thus his genome is riddled with “errors,” from which high “probabilities” of him obtaining certain ailments later in life are inferred. Nevertheless, these are probabilities only, and Vincent is healthy, athletic, and yearns to one day explore outer space. Unfortunately, he is denied admission to Gattaca, the facility of the space program, on the basis of his genome alone. Despite his splendid knowledge of astronomy and navigation, the best test scores in the world will not admit him.

Yet Vincent is not content with the position of janitor, and “borrows” the identity of Jerome Morrow, a paralyzed individual with a superb genome. A series of complex procedures is designed to allow Vincent to pass all the substance tests and gain admission to Gattaca under the name of Jerome Morrow. Jerome may have the genetic endowment to enter Gattaca, but he lacks the will, and thus harbors no objection to Vincent taking his place. Another employee at Gattaca, Irene, had also been born in the obsolete manner, but her genome is adequate enough for her to be permitted to work on minor tasks. She suspects that Vincent may be connected with the recent murder of the mission director, who was about to uncover Vincent’s actual identity. In the process, however, she enters a relationship with Vincent, and faces the dilemma of whether or not to disclose his identity to the police.

Vincent’s brother, Anton, is the inspector heading the murder investigation. Throughout his childhood, he sought to demonstrate his superiority to Vincent by virtue of his enhanced genetic endowment. Nevertheless, Vincent had once saved Anton’s life in a game of “chicken,” where Anton’s body had failed him, while Vincent’s was able to endure. Anton wishes to maintain the image of his superiority and is immensely jealous of Vincent’s successful aspiring to the heights of outer space.

Vincent attempts to deceive the security systems at Gattaca by pretending to be Jerome Morrow and presenting samples of bodily substances prepared by Jerome for various examinations. In the meantime, he studies and works diligently, and his level of performance at Gattaca is precisely what is anticipated of a man with a privileged genetic endowment. Thus, only a few people ever come to suspect that Vincent is a “borrowed ladder,” a fabricator of his genetic identity. Vincent is set to depart on a mission into space, after which his individual merits will overrule his genome conclusively, and he will no longer be subject to genetic security tests. However, the murder of the mission director subjects Gattaca to a series of extremely intrusive investigations by police that threaten to uncover Vincent’s true identity and even arrest him for murder, even though Vincent is innocent of the crime.

Vincent’s tenacity and resolve to enter space ultimately allow him to successfully endure turbulent times. Despite a multitude of close calls, he is saved from universal detection, though he is recognized by Irene, whose personal admiration for Vincent overrides the fact that Vincent had broken the law. Anton also recognizes his brother and threatens to arrest him, still acting on his childhood jealousy. However, a final game of “chicken,” in which Vincent saves Anton once again, proves that Vincent’s defiance of the inferior expectations imposed upon him by his society has enabled him to exceed in his abilities individuals like Anton, whom societal expectations had favored. The doctor at Gattaca recognized Vincent’s individual merits and decided to fabricate a “valid” test for him on the day of the launch. To people like the doctor, Vincent has proved his worth and his genetic composition has become irrelevant.

Vincent’s course of action, though in violation of the law, was not in violation of moral principles. Vincent had harmed no one by his attempt to pursue his ambitions at Gattaca and in outer space; thus, his action exhibited the principle of nonmaleficence. His exploratory endeavors are of immense benefit to both himself and the level of knowledge available to the general society; thus, his action fulfills the principle of beneficence. His action was an exercise of his individual autonomy and right to self-determination in the face of a hierarchical culture that repressed these rights. Finally, his action attempted to allow Vincent to experience the just treatment that he deserved on the basis of his merits, and which, absent the action, would have been denied to him on the basis of his genome. Thus, the action fulfills the principle of justice.

A rational society would have resolved the ethical dilemma of the proper criterion of judging an individual by eschewing determinism altogether. Vincent should not have initially been seen solely as the product of his genes, for a man is born tabula rasa where the mind is concerned. The human genome determines only the structural mechanisms that exist in the individual organism. How the individual employs those mechanisms is a matter of pure willpower and determination. Few genes can conclusively determine an individual’s fate; a high probability of heart disease can be reduced by strenuous exercise, of the sort Vincent engaged in. A low “intelligence quotient” is no obstacle to an individual reading, comprehending, and applying immense volumes of material, so long as the interest to do so is clearly seen.

Vincent should have been admitted to Gattaca on the basis of a one-on-one interview process that tested his knowledge, physical skill, and enthusiasm for space exploration, for, without these, the finest genetic endowment can still produce a Jerome Morrow, a man who is paralyzed not only in body (by an accident) but in mind (by lack of ambition). The theory that fits this solution is principlism. Vincent is not harming anyone by pursuing his own favorite field of exploration; thus, the action is nonmaleficent. He is amply benefiting himself and others through his skilled endeavors in the realm of space exploration; thus, the action is beneficent. He is allowed to exercise his individual autonomy and pursue his goals, regardless of societal prejudices. And, finally, he is entitled to the same freedom of action and opportunity that other members of his society (the genetically engineered individuals) possess, which passes the test for comparative justice.

Rand Paul’s Endorsement of Romney versus Ayn Rand’s and Murray Rothbard’s Historical Grudging Endorsements – Post by G. Stolyarov II

Rand Paul’s Endorsement of Romney versus Ayn Rand’s and Murray Rothbard’s Historical Grudging Endorsements – Post by G. Stolyarov II

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The New Renaissance Hat
G. Stolyarov II
September 2, 2012
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A September 1 post on the Facebook page of The Capitalism Institute reads: “I fully understand the hatred of Romney by libertarians who believe he’s a liberal in sheep’s clothing. That’s perfectly understandable. What I don’t understand is the notion that Rand Paul has somehow become an enemy of the liberty movement in the eyes of many because he endorsed Romney. Murray Rothbard once endorsed George Bush, Sr. Ayn Rand once endorsed Nixon.”

Yet I see Rand Paul’s endorsement of Mitt Romney as qualitatively different from the endorsements by either Ayn Rand or Murray Rothbard in previous election cycles. I think Ayn Rand unfortunately fell into the “lesser of two evils” trap when endorsing Nixon.

In particular, the following statement of Ayn Rand’s (quoted from this article by ARI Watch) is interesting: “If there were some campaign organization called ‘Anti-Nixonites for Nixon,’ it would name my position. The worst thing said about Nixon is that he cannot be trusted, which is true: he cannot be trusted to save this country. But one thing is certain: McGovern can destroy it.”

Rothbard’s endorsement of Bush, Sr., was also grudging. Rothbard wrote this: “Yes, gulp, I’m down to the grim, realistic choice: Which of two sets of bozos is going to rule us in 1993-1997? No one has been more critical of George Bush than I, but yes, dammit, I am working my way back to the President.”

If Rand Paul had explicitly stated that he was an “Anti-Romneyite for Romney” or stated that no one has been more critical of Romney than he – then I would have had more respect for his approach to this matter. At present, though, his comments after his endorsement of Romney have not at all highlighted Romney’s weaknesses or areas where Romney and Rand Paul disagreed. If Rand Paul had merely endorsed Romney to support “the lesser evil” in his mind, then I would still not share his opinion, but his mistake would be understandable. His actual endorsement of Romney, however, was not so grudging or reserved. Furthermore, he may have seen some (as of yet unrealized) personal political advantage from it, whereas neither Ayn Rand nor Rothbard had any personal political ambitions.

Additionally, since 1972 and even 1992, the two major political parties have come far closer together, to the point where Obama and Romney are virtually indistinguishable in their policy stances, even though they try to augment minutiae through volatile (and often outright deceptive) campaign rhetoric. Therefore, the contrasts that Ayn Rand drew between Nixon and McGovern – and those that Rothbard drew between Bush, Sr., and Clinton – cannot be drawn between Romney and Obama.  Voting for either party can no longer help “save” the country from the other (if it ever could, which I also doubt), because the same perils would befall us either way.

Cleveland Passed the Test of Character and Statesmanship – Article by Lawrence W. Reed

Cleveland Passed the Test of Character and Statesmanship – Article by Lawrence W. Reed

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The New Renaissance Hat
Lawrence W. Reed
July 31, 2012
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As usual, this year’s presidential campaign will test the popularity of two men. It will also tell us a lot about each man’s character, even if we think we already know all there is to know about them both. At this writing, some pundits are predicting a photo finish, maybe even a repeat of the 2000 Bush-Gore cliffhanger. Whatever the next few months produce, every presidential contest gets me pining for my personal favorite of the 44 men who have held the office—Grover Cleveland, America’s 22nd and 24th president.

Until 2000, the last time a close election produced a split decision in the popular vote and the Electoral College was 1888. Cleveland, the incumbent Democratic president, had been through a close one once before. In 1884 he won New York by just 1,200 votes—and with it, the presidency—but a switch of 601 votes in that one state alone would have swung the election to Republican James G. Blaine. Four years later Cleveland bested Benjamin Harrison by about 100,000 votes out of 11 million cast nationwide but he lost in the Electoral College 233–168. Because the contest was tight in a number of states, a slight shift in the popular vote plurality would have easily won it all for Cleveland.

Alyn Brodsky, in a biography entitled Grover Cleveland: A Study in Character, records that when reporters asked to what he ascribed his defeat, Cleveland smiled and said, “It was mainly because the other party had the most votes.” He did not equivocate. He did not whine and fret that he won more popular votes than Harrison. The “votes” to which he referred were the ones that really matter under the rules of the Constitution—Electoral College votes.

Cleveland handled his defeat with dignity. No recounts, no lawsuits, no spin, no acrimony. His grace in defeat was all the more remarkable considering that the loss meant he had to relinquish power he already possessed, not merely accept failure to attain it. He would not tolerate his political allies making an issue of the discrepancy between the popular and Electoral tallies. There was nary a hint of a “constitutional crisis” because the Constitution was Cleveland’s “controlling legal authority.” Cleveland retired to private life until he ran again in 1892, when he beat Harrison decisively, becoming the only American president to serve two nonconsecutive terms.

One reason the American people accepted the 1888 outcome in stride was that the federal government of that era just didn’t matter like the one of today does. Cleveland famously vetoed a bill to send federal money to drought-stricken farmers in Texas with the admonition, “Though the people support the government, it is not the duty of the government to support the people.”

In Cleveland’s day chronic budget surpluses at the federal level of government animated many a political contest, in stark contrast to the massive and endless deficits of today. While some people thought a surplus should be spent, Cleveland thought it was evidence that taxes were too high: “When more of the people’s sustenance is exacted through the form of taxation than is necessary to meet the just obligations of government, such exaction becomes ruthless extortion and a violation of the fundamental principles of a free government.”

Adjusted for inflation, the Obama administration spends more in one day than the first Cleveland administration spent in an entire year. Washington claims more than a quarter of national income now; in 1888, it managed to get by on about 3 percent. The two sides that will slug it out in the fall know that control of a gargantuan apparatus of money and power is at stake, and the temptations to pull out all the stops to win will be immense.

Even more emphatically, it was the character of Grover Cleveland that made the 1888 outcome a virtual nonevent. In so many ways he was a political oddity even for the Victorian times in which he served. Time and again he refused to do the politically expedient. For example, as a mayor, governor, and president, he rejected the spoils of victory and appointed the best people he could find—often earning the wrath of friends and party bigwigs because they didn’t get the nod. As biographer Brodsky puts it, “Here, indeed, was that rarest of political animals: one who believed his ultimate allegiance was to the nation, not to the party.”

Cleveland never lusted for public office. A prominent New York newspaper endorsed Cleveland for president in 1884 by declaring “three reasons” for voting for him: “1. He is an honest man. 2. He is an honest man. 3. He is an honest man.” He was, by all accounts, as utterly incorruptible when he left office as he was when he first assumed it. “Public office is a public trust” was an original Cleveland maxim.

Cleveland didn’t schmooze and slither his way through smoky backrooms to political power; nor did he exercise power as if he loved it for its own sake. He did the public’s business honestly and frugally and otherwise left us alone. It would not have occurred to him to so covet power as to fear private life. Trashing either the system or a good man’s character to obtain or hold on to public office was, to Grover Cleveland, unthinkable.

Every statesman is also a politician but not every politician is a statesman. Cleveland was so quintessentially statesmanlike that it hardly seems appropriate to note that he was also a politician. He certainly didn’t seek office for the thrill of it or for the power and notoriety it brings. Politics was not the meat grinder of principles for Cleveland that it is for so many others.

The Statesman

What qualities define a statesman? He or she doesn’t seek public office for personal gain or because it’s the only job he or she knows how to do. Like ancient Rome’s Cincinnatus or America’s own George Washington, the statesman takes time out from a life of accomplishment to serve the general welfare. He stands for a principled vision, not for what he thinks citizens will fall for. He is well informed about the vicissitudes of human nature, the lessons of history, the role of ideas, and the economics of the marketplace.

The statesman is a truth-seeker, which means he is more likely to do what’s right than what may be politically popular at the moment. You know where he stands because he says what he means and means what he says. He elevates public discussion because he knows what he’s talking about. He does not engage in class warfare or in other divisive or partisan tactics that pull people apart. He does not cynically buy votes with the money his taxes take from others. He may even judge his success in office as much by how many laws he repealed or vetoed as by how many he passed. (Cleveland vetoed more bills than all his predecessors combined.)

Grover Cleveland is my model candidate and model president. I’m betting that this fall’s campaign will only make me miss him all the more.

Lawrence Reed is the president of the Foundation for Economic Education.

This article was published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution United States License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

An Open Letter to John R. Phillippe, RNC Counsel, Regarding the Nevada State Republican Convention

An Open Letter to John R. Phillippe, RNC Counsel, Regarding the Nevada State Republican Convention

Comments 6 comments

May 3, 2012

Mr. John R. Phillippe Jr.
Chief Counsel
Republican National Committee
310 First Street, SE
Washington, D.C. 20003

SENT VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO jphillippe@rnchq.org

Dear Mr. Phillippe:

I am writing to you to address the erroneous interpretation of the Nevada Delegate Binding Rules for 2012, which you expressed in your May 2, 2012, letter to Nevada Republican Party Chairman Michael McDonald. Your interpretation of these rules manufactures a meaning that is not present in the rules’ plain text. I emphatically urge you to recall your letter and to issue a formal apology on behalf of the Republican National Committee for your advocacy of a course of action that would clearly contravene the rules that have been developed in a fair process, as well as the outcome at the State Convention that would result from the legitimate decisions of duly elected delegates.  Please note that the present communication is an open letter and will be available on the Internet to a broader audience.

Your letter suggests that the delegates that are allocated in proportion to the final results of the February 4, 2012, Nevada Presidential Preference Poll must “actually support” the candidate for whom they would be pledged to vote on the first ballot at the Republican National Convention. You go beyond this to suggest that a delegate pledged to a particular candidate must be “approved by an authorized representative of the candidate he or she professes to support” and that, if this does not turn out to be the case, “grounds for a contest may exist.” Your letter continues in stating that you “believe it is highly likely that any committee with jurisdiction over the matter would find improper any change to the election, selection, allocation, or binding of delegates, thus jeopardizing the seating of Nevada’s entire delegation to the National Convention.” In short, you explicitly state that the Republican National Committee would consider overturning the results of a procedurally fair delegate election at the Nevada State Republican Convention, if the election does not produce the hoped-for outcome of a majority slate of Romney supporters. This is unacceptable and entirely contrary to a system that is supposed to produce a representative government in accordance with general rules developed in a fair process and agreed upon in advance.

Before I demonstrate the specific errors of your position, allow me to be forthright regarding my motivations. I am a duly elected delegate to the Nevada State Republican Convention. Furthermore, I write this letter while having no ambition to be nominated as a delegate to the Republican National Convention in Tampa. I do, however, intend to attend the State Convention and cast my votes for the prospective national delegates whom I consider to be the most worthy and principled among the options available. Since I will not personally become a national delegate, I do not have any ulterior motives in this communication. I only desire fair adherence to the legitimate delegate-selection process.

I proudly acknowledge that I am a supporter of Ron Paul and a person committed to procedural fairness and adherence to the rules as actually written. Following a set of rules agreed upon in advance through an equitable procedure is key to a system that avoids arbitrary decision-making and arbitrary power concentrated in the hands of a connected oligarchy. To be non-arbitrary, a process must be adhered to, irrespective of the particular outcome it generates. To only adhere to a process when it generates one’s favored or expected outcome is to turn the process into a mere veneer for a particular agenda.

I think I can speak for other supporters of Ron Paul when I say that there is no intention among any who wish to become delegates to the National Convention to do so in a manner that violates the rules of the Nevada State Republican Convention. Any insinuation that anything other than complete fair play may be the intent of a sizable portion of the delegates to the State Republican Convention is deeply offensive to these men and women of conviction and integrity – who have followed all of the rules of the process up to now and do not intend to suddenly stray from that course.

It is instructive to examine what the actual rules – rather than your deeply erroneous interpretation thereof – state. In your letter, you cite Sections 1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 of the Delegate Binding Rules for 2012, without actually reproducing the text of these sections. A detailed analysis of the text will show that it is incompatible with your viewpoint.

Section 1 Text: “Pursuant to § 15(b) of the Rules of the National Republican Committee, in Presidential election years, National Delegates and Alternates shall be allocated proportionally based  on the final results of the Nevada Presidential Preference Poll, rounded to the nearest  whole number. National delegates shall be chosen at the Nevada Republican Convention by election. Any candidate who receives less than the percentage required for one Delegate will receive no Delegates.”

Comments: This section only discusses how and in what proportions National Delegates and Alternates shall be allocated to a candidate, not whether such Delegates and Alternates must “actually support” the candidate to whom they were allocated. Nothing in the language of this section would suggest that a test of a Delegate’s thoughts or beliefs would be required as a precondition for a Delegate’s selection or allocation to a particular candidate. There is already a rigorous test for selecting a National Delegate. It is voting by the other delegates at the State Convention.

Section 4.2 Text: “The NRP Secretary shall allocate National Delegates to the candidate of their choice by first allocating the three automatic delegates (Nevada Republican Party Chair, National Committeeman and National Committeewoman) to their preferred candidate.”

Comments: The interpretation of this section should not be controversial. There are to be three automatic delegates, who will each be allocated to the candidate of his or her choice. Please note that there is also no test stated in the section regarding what must be done to verify that a particular candidate is these delegates’ “preferred candidate.” Your interpretation states that “The three RNC members, who are automatic delegates, should each be allocated and bound to their preferred presidential candidate.” I would like to clarify that the words “bound to” only apply to the first round of voting at the Republican National Convention. There is no requirement in any set of rules for any National Delegate to be bound to any candidate on a subsequent round of voting. This distinction is critical.

Section 4.3 Text: “The NRP Secretary will next allocate the three prospective delegates from each congressional district receiving the highest number of votes to their preferred candidate to comply with RNC Rule 13 (a) (3).”

RNC Rule 13(a)(3) Text (pp. 14-15 of the linked document): “Subject to the provisions of Rule No. 16, the membership of the next national convention shall consist of:

(a) Delegates. […]

(3) Three (3) district delegates for each Representative in the United States House of Representatives from each state.”

Comments: Section 4.3 and RNC Rule 13(a)(3) say nothing about delegates being subjected to a loyalty test for a particular candidate. They simply state that three delegates shall be allocated for each district in such a manner that there would be three delegates for every Representative in the US House of Representatives.

Furthermore, the text of Section 4.3 states that “The NRP Secretary will next allocate the three prospective delegates from each congressional district receiving the highest number of votes to their preferred candidate” [Emphasis added]. Note that this applies to delegates “receiving the highest number of votes” in an absolute sense – not “receiving the highest number of votes among the delegates who support a particular candidate”.

To repeat: It is clear from the text that the delegates that must be allocated are those delegates that receive the highest number of votes in total, not the highest number of votes among those who support a particular candidate.

For instance, suppose delegates who support Mitt Romney were to receive the 2nd, 4th, and 5th-highest vote totals, while delegates who support Ron Paul were to receive the 1st, 3rd, and 6th-highest vote totals for a particular Congressional District. Furthermore, suppose that the allocation of delegates were required to be such that two delegates would be bound to vote for Romney, and one delegate would be bound to vote for Paul at the first ballot of the National Convention. It is clear that the highest total vote-getters would need to be selected as National Delegates – i.e., the 1st and 3rd-place finishers who support Ron Paul and the 2nd-place finisher who supports Mitt Romney. The 1st-place finisher would have the choice to be allocated to Ron Paul, the 2nd-place finisher would presumably choose to be allocated to Mitt Romney, while the 3rd-place finisher would be bound to vote for Mitt Romney in the first ballot of the National Convention, despite his or her support for Ron Paul. It would emphatically not be the case that the NRP Secretary would be permitted to bypass the duly elected 3rd-place finisher, simply because of that finisher’s sympathies for Ron Paul, and select the 4th-place finisher who is sympathetic to Romney to attend the National Convention as a Delegate.

Your letter is thoroughly mistaken in stating that “A nomination to fill a Congressional district delegate slot shall only be in order if the person’s preferred candidate has available delegate slots to fill. The preferred means to ensure that no presidential candidate receives more than his allocated slots is to conduct the congressional district delegate selections sequentially, and if a candidate has reached his allocation, no further nominations for delegate candidates who support said presidential candidate shall be in order.”

Your statement is contrary on its face to the plain text of Section 4.3 and would have the effect of disenfranchising the delegates at the State Convention in casting ballots for the National Delegates of their choice. The application of your interpretation would have the effect of ignoring delegates who obtain higher absolute vote counts, in favor of some who obtain lower absolute vote counts, simply on account of the ideological positions expressed by such delegates. This ideological particularism is contrary to the principles procedural fairness which underlie any meaningful electoral system and which are essential to the American system of representative government.

Section 4.4 Text: “The Secretary will then allocate the remaining delegates for each candidate, beginning with the prospective national delegate for a given candidate receiving the most votes, followed by the prospective national delegate for said candidate receiving the second highest number of votes and continuing in descending order of votes received until the number of delegates and alternates earned by each candidate in the Presidential Preference Poll has been allocated. The delegate slots for each candidate will be filled by the prospective national delegates receiving the highest number of votes, and the alternate slots will be filled by the prospective delegates receiving the next highest number of votes after the delegate slots are filled.”

Comments: Section 4.4 addresses the allocation of National Delegates, other than the automatic delegates and the delegates for each Congressional District. The text clearly states that “The delegate slots for each candidate will be filled by the prospective national delegates receiving the highest number of votes, and the alternate slots will be filled by the prospective delegates receiving the next highest number of votes after the delegate slots are filled.” This again refers to the highest number of total votes cast, not the highest number of votes cast for delegates who personally support a particular candidate. There is again no mention of any kind of loyalty test in order to become a “national delegate for a given candidate”. Rather, this section would allow delegates who receive the highest number of votes to have the first preference regarding which candidate they will be allocated to. If the Ron Paul delegate slots are exhausted by many of the highest vote-getters, then the next-highest vote-getters would need to agree to be bound to vote for Mitt Romney on the first ballot of the National Convention, irrespective of their personal views regarding the candidates. The personal views of these vote-getters should not determine their eligibility if they have been duly elected by the delegates at the State Convention.

Your interpretation is thoroughly in error in stating that “At-large (statewide) prospective delegates should be elected by determining how many delegate slots each presidential candidate has available after processes 1 and 2 above have been completed, and allocating to each available slot the highest vote-receiving prospective delegate that supports the candidate with an available slot. So, for example, if Ron Paul has 2 slots available after processes 1 and 2 above, the two highest vote-getters that support Ron Paul should be allocated to him. And if Mitt Romney has 4 slots available after processes 1 and 2 above have been completed, the 4 highest vote-getters that support Mitt Romney should be allocated to him.”

Your statement above is directly contrary to Section 4.4, which clearly requires that the delegates allocated to all candidates be the absolute highest vote-getters. Contrary to your example, if Ron Paul has 2 slots available after the automatic and District delegates have been selected, and Mitt Romney has 4 slots available, then the top six absolute vote-getters must become the National Delegates, such that two of them are bound to vote for Ron Paul in the first ballot of the National Convention, while the remaining four are bound to vote for Mitt Romney in the first ballot. The highest absolute vote-getter would have the option to select to be bound to either Paul or Romney – and then a similar option would be offered to the second-highest vote-getter. Once any two of the highest six vote-getters have selected to be bound to Paul, the delegates in the remaining slots among the top six vote-getters would be automatically bound to Romney on the first ballot.

Section 5 Text: “All National Delegates and Alternates, ex officio, At Large and Congressional District, shall be required to vote for the Presidential Candidate to whom they are bound. This requirement applies only to the first candidate vote at the Republican National Convention.

Comments: While your letter inexplicably omits mention of Section 5, this section is indispensable to understanding the context of the other provisions cited above. If the requirement of voting for a particular candidate only applies to the first vote at the Republican National Convention, then a loyalty test for that candidate cannot make sense and cannot be countenanced. The rules explicitly permit the delegates to vote their consciences after the first round of the National Convention, if subsequent rounds are necessary. Requiring a loyalty test would effectively bind the delegates on the subsequent rounds, contrary to the letter and intent of Section 5. The duty to vote for a candidate on the first round must not extend to the duty to think a certain way or to an inexhaustible claim on the delegates’ future decisions, actions, and beliefs.

Conclusion

I again urge you to acquiesce to the principles of objectivity, fairness, and a literal reading of the rules – and, accordingly, to withdraw your letter of May 2, 2012, and to publicly apologize on behalf of the Republican National Committee for urging and lending an official air to the clear contravention of a fair process and of rules developed pursuant to such a process. If you do not withdraw your letter, then it will be legitimate to perceive your and the RNC’s actions as an attempt to interfere with a neutral and impartial process, simply because the outcome of that process may not be to the liking of the Mitt Romney campaign. To only respect the rules when they are in one’s favor is deeply contrary to every principle on which the American system of representative government stands. Such a double-standard would nullify the will of duly elected delegates and replace it with the imposed preferences of a self-appointed oligarchy of kingmakers. I hope that you will find the strength of conviction to step back from this dangerous precipice.

Sincerely,

Gennady Stolyarov II, CPCU, ARe, ARC, AIS, AIE

Editor-in-Chief, The Rational Argumentator