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Actually, “Neoliberalism” Is Awesome – Article by Scott Sumner

Actually, “Neoliberalism” Is Awesome – Article by Scott Sumner

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The New Renaissance HatScott Sumner
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Unfortunately, What’s Best for the World Is Not Best for Every Subset of It

I am seeing more and more articles, even at respectable outlets such as the Economist and the Financial Times, suggesting that the rise of right-wing and left-wing populism shows that something is wrong with the neoliberal model.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The past two decades have been by far the best two decades in human history, and that’s what really matters.

Naysayers will sometimes acknowledge that hundreds of millions of people have recently risen out of poverty, but then claim that living standards have stagnated in America. That’s also nonsense, as I explained in this post.

The next fallback position is that while real incomes in America have risen, the gains have gone to corporations, not workers. That’s also nonsense, as I explained in this post. The share of national income going to workers today is the same as it was 50 years ago, the supposed heyday of the working class.

The next fallback position is that while wages have done fine, even in real terms, wage income is becoming less equal. Bingo! Finally we get to an accurate statement. Fifty years ago, blue-collar workers at General Motors often made more than college professors. People with short attention spans sometimes act like this period was “normal”, ignoring 10,000 years of human history. They seem to suggest that our most pressing problem is that young men who don’t study in school and just shoot rubber bands across the classroom should be able to earn an income that (in relative terms) was never possible in any period of world history before the 1950s and has never been possible in any period of world history after the 1970s. It reminds me of when farmers used to set the “parity” of farm prices with other goods prices based on the relatively high levels of 1909-14, treating that ratio as normal for purposes of farm subsidies.

Don’t get me wrong: I have nothing against blue-collar workers. I’m relatively intellectual, and even I found the public schools to be mind-numbingly boring. I could hardly stay awake. I can’t even imagine how students less interested in ideas than I am could’ve gotten through the day. Nor am I one of those conservatives that will trash low-income whites for their lifestyle choices. As far as blue-collar workers are concerned, I wish them well. But I wish everyone well (except Trump), and the unfortunate truth is that the set of economic policies that is best for the world right now is probably not optimal for a subset of American blue-collar workers.

When I point out that the most important factor in trade policy is the impact on the poor in developing countries, some of my commenters tell me that the US shouldn’t have to import from China or India because they have lots of other countries to sell to. As Marie Antoinette might’ve said “let them sell to Canada.” That’s right, progressives ease their conscience by claiming that other developed countries won’t follow the same evil trade policies that progressives like Sanders want the US to follow, so things won’t actually be that bad for poor people in Bangladesh. More often, they entirely ignore the issue.

I know that progressives like to think of themselves as the good guys, but the honest truth is that on trade they are increasingly becoming the bad ones, right along with Trump.

And here’s what else people don’t get. Not all the problems in the world are caused by neoliberal economic theories, for the simple reason that not all economic policies reflect neoliberal economic theories. Even if everything people say about inequality is true, there’s nothing wrong with the neoliberal model, which allows for the EITC, progressive consumption taxes, and sensible reforms of intellectual property rights, occupational licensing, and zoning laws.

I can’t help it if Democratic politicians oppose reforms of intellectual property rights. I can’t help it if progressives that once favored progressive consumption taxes now oppose progressive consumption taxes. I can’t help it if Democrats voted to repeal the luxury tax on yachts soon after having enacted a luxury tax on yachts. I can’t help it if progressives suddenly feel that a $15 an hour minimum wage is not a loony idea.

The simple truth is that neoliberal economic policies work, as we’ve seen in Denmark and Switzerland and Singapore, and socialism doesn’t work, as we’ve seen in Venezuela. So I’m asking all those wavering neoliberals in the respectable press (Thatcher called them “wets“) to stop your handwringing and get out there and boldly defend the neoliberal model. It’s not just the best model; in the long run it’s the only model that really works.

Scott B. Sumner is the director of the Program on Monetary Policy at the Mercatus Center and a professor at Bentley University. He blogs at the Money Illusion and Econlog.

This article was originally published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

The Myth of Primitive Communism – Article by Mike Reid

The Myth of Primitive Communism – Article by Mike Reid

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The New Renaissance HatMike Reid
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Generosity Is an Investment in Human Capital

All my students starved to death. Again.

Here’s what they learned the hard way: generosity today can be a way of saving for tomorrow.

They were survivors of a plane crash on a desert island. They knew they’d be trapped there for months and that the only food would be the large but elusive fish in the sea.

When one of my students managed to catch a fish, he ate as much as he could, then stored the rest for himself under some rocks near the beach.

Other students, less successful as fishermen, starved to death promptly.

Soon, the initially successful fisherman found himself alone on the island. With no refrigeration, the food he’d stashed rotted away. And when he ventured out fishing again, he was unlucky and got stung by a deadly jellyfish.

With no one left to take care of him, he, too, perished.

Every year, I play this game with my students. We use a big square of desks to represent our island, pennies to represent fast-decaying fish fillets, and dice to randomize the fishers’ success or failure. (If a student decides not to fish, he has no chance to catch food but also no chance of encountering the dreaded jellyfish.)

“Primitive Communists”
We play this game while studying the famous Ju/’hoansi hunter-gatherers. Until the colonial encroachments of the 20th century, most Ju/’hoansi lived in small, nomadic groups in the Kalahari desert, the men hunting with bows and arrows and the women collecting nuts, berries, and roots with digging sticks and carrier sashes.

Every year, in the discussions that follow our brief reading on this culture, my students remark with amazement that whenever a Ju/’hoan man or woman finds food, he or she shares it widely with the community.

This behavior seems to be an important part of why Richard B. Lee, the most prominent anthropologist in the study of the Ju/’hoansi, describes them as “primitive communists” in the Marxian sense. And many of my students each year seem to get the idea that the Ju/’hoansi share their food so freely with each other because they are in some way more charitable, more natural, or otherwise more moral than us.

Sometimes, a student remarks, “That’s like socialism, right?”

So I like to play this little starvation game to disabuse my students of their romantic notions about communist noble savages in the African wilderness.

What, I ask, would happen if a bunch of greedy, selfish people like us found themselves in the same economic situation the Ju/’hoansi face?

The Economic Constraints of Foraging Life
Nomadic foragers like the Ju/’hoansi have unreliable “incomes” in terms of the food they find from day to day and week to week.

They are often masterful trackers and foragers. But, no matter how competent you are, when you pursue a giraffe on foot with a bow and arrow, sometimes the giraffe gets away.

Furthermore, it’s difficult for nomadic foragers to store food or other forms of material wealth. In fact, the Ju/’hoansi are even less inclined to store food than many other nomadic foragers. Perhaps this is because, while they can dry meat to last a couple of months, they also know a sudden rainstorm could ruin their savings. And because they travel repeatedly over the year to new water holes and food sources, as Lee says, “it would be sheer folly to amass more goods than can be carried along when the group moves.”

So if one were to ask a Ju/’hoan man in the morning what he’s going to eat that night, he could honestly respond, “I don’t know; I haven’t caught it yet.”

Cultural Heritage and Human Survival
Every year, in the game with my students, one of two things happens:

  1. Successful fishermen imitate the Ju/’hoansi. They give away their excess food freely, starting with their friends or closest neighbors at the game table.
  2. The students starve to death en masse.

My students tend to go into this game with an idealistic view of the Ju/’hoansi as selfless, altruistic people.

They tend to finish the game realizing that, even if you were the greediest, most selfish nomadic forager in the world, your best move would still be to share food with your neighbors.

Since nomadic foragers have a difficult time storing physical capital, especially food, their response all around the world, in culture after culture, is to promptly turn it into human capital by giving it to friends, relatives, and neighbors.

Like my students, Ju/’hoansi men and women are tempted to hoard their own wealth. Indeed, Ju/’hoansi elders often lament that they have given generously all their lives and would now like to keep just a little for themselves.

But the Ju/’hoansi also have a massive corpus of gift-exchange rituals, conversational habits, and even stock jokes that they use to bolster their own patience and to bring hoarders peacefully into line. These behaviors represent the heritage of thousands of years of spontaneous-order cultural development under economic conditions in which short-run greed is tantamount to stupidity.

What makes the Ju/’hoansi seem selfless, or communistic, or morally superior to us is their age-old cultural adaptation to the fact that, for each individual in their situation, the best strategy to save for the future is to share widely in the present.

Culture and Markets
In the very different economic and technological circumstances of the industrialized West, we have our own roundabout methods by which our selfish desires lead to social prosperity. In markets, each of us can still provide best for his or her own future by helping others — especially strangers — for the right price.

Would this same system work for hunter-gatherers?

If a group of 19th-century Ju/’hoansi equipped with digging sticks and bows and arrows had tried the ethics of the modern market for themselves, many might have starved to death before they recognized their error and began to recreate a culture more appropriate to their own ecology and technology.

But what works for the Ju/’hoansi would be devastating for us. If we today, in a market society made up largely of strangers, attempted to practice the ethics of profligate sharing and meek humility — or even worse, to enforce such ethics on noncompliant others through government policies — we would drive our whole society into chaos and penury.

The Ju/’hoansi’s strategy works only for people in the Ju/’hoansi’s situation.

Our own great wealth and our own social order are built on savings and investment — and on using our resources to benefit strangers through market exchange.

Mike Reid is a publishing consultant at InvisibleOrder.com and the publications impresario at Liberty.me. He also teaches anthropology at the University of Winnipeg. Mike lives in Manitoba with his wife and two children.

This article was originally published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

Bernie Sanders’ Anti-Foreign Crankery – Article by Daniel Bier

Bernie Sanders’ Anti-Foreign Crankery – Article by Daniel Bier

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The New Renaissance HatDaniel Bier
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A Vesuvius of Tribalism and Economic Illiteracy

At Sunday’s Democratic presidential debate, Bernie Sanders attacked American trade with Mexicans, Chinese, Vietnamese, and presumably all other foreigners who might try to steal our jobs. Sanders harangued Hillary Clinton,

NAFTA, supported by the Secretary, cost us 800,000 jobs nationwide, tens of thousands of jobs in the Midwest. Permanent normal trade relations with China cost us millions of jobs.

Look, I was on a picket line in early 1990’s against NAFTA because you didn’t need a PhD in economics to understand that American workers should not be forced to compete against people in Mexico making 25 cents an hour.

… And the reason that I was one of the first, not one of the last to be in opposition to the TPP is that American workers … should not be forced to compete against people in Vietnam today making a minimum wage of $0.65 an hour.

Look, what we have got to do is tell corporate America that they cannot continue to shut down. We’ve lost 60,000 factories since 2001. They’re going to start having to, if I’m president, invest in this country — not in China, not in Mexico.

First, let’s note his dodgy job numbers. As Dan Griswold noted in 2011, in response to a similar claim about jobs “lost” from the “trade deficit” with Mexico,

In the first five years after NAFTA’s passage, 1994-98, when we could have expected it to have the most impact, the U.S. economy ADDED a net 15 million new jobs, including 700,000 manufacturing jobs.

Behold, the horror unleashed on US manufacturing jobs by trade with Mexico:nafta-manufacturing

In fact, since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, total US employment has increased by 28 million jobs. Even if we buy the dubious claim that NAFTA “cost us 800,000 jobs” over the last 22 years, this amounts just 36,000 jobs a year.

As Griswold noted, even in good times, 300,000 Americans file for unemployment each week. The US economy creates and destroys more than 15 million jobs every year. This alleged displacement amounts to less than one day’s worth of job losses.

It’s true that, in the long-run, manufacturing jobs have been in decline in the United States. But this is not because manufacturing is in decline. The myth (promoted by the other nationalist blowhard in the race) that United States “doesn’t make stuff anymore” is not just wrong — it couldn’t be further from the truth.

Real US manufacturing output is the highest it has ever been. Simply put, the US makes more stuff than ever.

manufacturing-indexHow can this be? Because manufacturing productivity — the amount of value added per hour worked — has gone up dramatically in recent decades. Manufacturing employment is declining because of automation; a US factory worker today can add a lot more value per hour than one in 1970.

manufacturing-employees-output-per-hour

It’s simply not true that trade devastated the US economy and wiped out millions of jobs. Employment has shifted within the US economy, out of industry into service jobs, and manufacturing has shifted around the globe, aligning production with the comparative advantages of each country’s labor and capital markets.

The resentment stoked by nationalists like Trump and Sanders is based on a nonsensical proposition, a mirage of high-paying blue collar jobs stolen by conniving foreigners, which we could reclaim if only we had the will to wage a trade war.

But the machines and global production chains are here to stay, and the jobs being done in Vietnam and China for fifty cents an hour are on the extreme low end of the value-added chain — which should be obvious, when you think about it, since they pay so little. (On the back of every iPhone is a short economics lesson on this point: “Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China.”)

Do we really want to “bring those jobs back”? Do we envision a future where the American middle class is sewing textiles in sweatshops for a dollar an hour? Of course not. Americans today likely wouldn’t do those jobs at any wage, but especially not at the wages paid to low-skilled workers in developing Asian and Latin American countries. Those jobs only exist at those wages; at higher wages, they are scarcer, higher-skilled, and more capital intensive.

True, we could make t-shirts and Happy Meal toys in the United States, but we’d be doing it with far, far fewer workers and a lot more capital. Instead of 30 workers at fifty cents an hour, it’d be one person with a machine for $20 an hour.

The real difference would be that everyone would be poorer as a result: consumers paying higher prices, foreigners working in worse conditions and for less money, and American resources being diverted away from where they are most productive.

This is where economic ignorance stops being morally neutral and becomes a real threat to the life and well-being of the poor, especially in the developing world.

Not content to merely keep Mexicans from working in the United States (where, thanks to US capital and infrastructure, they could earn three or four times more than they make in Mexico), Bernie Sanders now objects to the right of Mexicans to work in Mexico, if they dare to sell goods and services to Americans — or, God forbid, try to compete with American firms.

For a champion of the poor like Sanders, there’s a double irony here, in that poor Americans are already much wealthier than poor Mexicans, and that tariffs also make goods more expensive for native consumers, disproportionately hurting the poorest Americans. Not only are poor Mexicans made worse off, by losing access to the US market and thus losing jobs, but poor Americans are also made worse off by having less disposable income, which is thus not spent elsewhere in the economy to sustain other American jobs.

And this is just the first order effects of closing off trade with Mexico. When the Mexican government inevitably retaliates, US exports to Mexico (which totaled $236 billion in 2015) will also be devastated and more jobs will be lost. And of course, simply multiply this orders of magnitude for China, Vietnam, and every other country on the nationalistic hit list.

Who gains from this? In the long run, nobody, which is why (after decades of gradual reform) we finally got relatively free trade with our closest neighbors, signed into law by a liberal Democrat. But in the short run, a few US corporations and labor unions would benefit from trade tariffs — at the expense of both poor foreigners and poor Americans as a whole.

(For those keeping score, this makes it an ironic hat trick for Sanders, whose tirades against free trade and open borders are laced with fear-mongering about “corporations.”)

Finally, let us ponder Sanders’ Alice-in-Wonderland solution to the imagined ills of free trade:

Look, what we have got to do is tell corporate America that they cannot continue to shut down. We’ve lost 60,000 factories since 2001. They’re going to start having to, if I’m president, invest in this country — not in China, not in Mexico.

Did I say Alice in Wonderland? I meant Atlas Shrugged. Ayn Rand was justly accused of having unbelievable, one-dimensional stereotypes, but sadly, American politics seems to have the same problem.

It’s anyone’s guess how Sanders imagines he could force factories not to close and order companies to stay in the United States, but the “you can’t shut down” solution is almost directly lifted from “Directive 10-289,” the order that Rand’s antagonists use to try to “stabilize” the economy:

All workers, wage earners and employees of any kind whatsoever shall henceforth be attached to their jobs and shall not leave nor be dismissed nor change employment… All industrial, commercial, manufacturing and business establishments of any nature whatsoever shall henceforth remain in operation…

Faced with economic decline, the government believed that the only option was to stop the decline, rather allowing people to go where they choose, buy what they choose, and make what they choose. “What it comes down to is that we can manage to exist as and where we are, but we can’t afford to move!” archvillain Wesley Mouch exclaims. “So we’ve got to stand still… We’ve got to make those bastards stand still!”

When Rand first published this in 1957, this was hyperbole about the fear of change, the reductio ad absurdum of the argument for keeping things as they are. Now, it’s an applause line for mainstream presidential candidates.

Daniel Bier is the site editor of FEE.org He writes on issues relating to science, civil liberties, and economic freedom.

This article was published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

A Conversation with My Neighbor “Sam” – Article by Mark Brandly

A Conversation with My Neighbor “Sam” – Article by Mark Brandly

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The New Renaissance HatMark Brandly
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Lately, I’ve wondered how my neighbor, Sam, affords to buy so much stuff. He appears to have an unlimited budget. When I asked him about this, Sam asked, “Do you think I’m spending too much?”

“That depends,” I said, “How much money do you make?”

“I take home $100,000 a year.”

That surprised me. I would guess that he’s spending more than that. But I tried to be encouraging, “That sounds like plenty of income. With a little planning, you should be able to budget your spending and be financially stable.”

“But my finances are a mess,” Sam replied. “I spend more than I take home. Last year I had to borrow $12,000 just to cover my spending.”

“Well maybe things will be better this year,” I said, hoping that Sam’s spending issues was a one year problem.

“No,” Sam replied. “Actually, in the first three months of this year, I’ve already spent $19,000 more than I’ve made. It looks like my budget deficit this year will be much worse than it was last year.”

Now I was starting to worry. “Have you been borrowing money to cover your spending for a long time?”

“Oh yes. I have a lot of debt. Part of the problem is that I owe myself $150,000.”

I wondered if Sam misspoke, “Wait, wait, wait, you owe yourself $150,000? Why do you think that you’re in debt to yourself?”

“Well you see, over the years I promised myself that I was going to use my paychecks to pay for a fund for my children’s education, but instead of spending $150,000 on colleges, I spent the money on other expenses. So I figure that I owe myself this money so that I can pay for my children’s college tuitions.”

Obviously Sam doesn’t understand the definition of the word “debt.”

I tried to be polite in my response: “That doesn’t make any sense. It’s true that you’ve made some horrible decisions regarding your spending, but it’s ridiculous to claim that you owe yourself money. A debt occurs when one person owes another person money. Just because you changed your mind about how to spend your paychecks doesn’t mean that you’ve borrowed money from yourself.

“So the first thing you need to do is to think clearly about the amount of debt you have. You don’t owe yourself any money. Now, forgetting about this ridiculous notion of self-debt, how much do you owe?”

“Alright, I think I see your point. Let’s just talk about the rest of my debt. I owe various banks about $420,000. This debt is more than four times my take-home income.”

Sam often lies about his income and spending issues, but he always understates his budget problem. If he’s lying now, then I can be sure that the problem is even greater than he says. I wanted more information.

“That a pretty high debt to income ratio. But that might be somewhat manageable, although unwise, if you’ve borrowed that money at low interest rates.”

“I have some good news and some bad news,” Sam said. “Interest rates are low. In fact, in the last fourteen years, my debt has more than quadrupled, but my interest payments have increased less than 50 percent. That’s because interest rates have collapsed during that time. Isn’t that good news?”

“I suppose, but do you know that interest rates are going to increase over the next several years?”

“Yes, that’s the bad news. In the past year, I only paid $7,000 of interest, but within ten years my debt will increase over 50 percent, and possibly much more, and with higher interest rates I expect to be paying at least four to five times that much in interest annually.”

“That’s a huge problem. So to be able to make your loan payments, I assume that you’ve taken out some long-term loans.”

“No, no, no. In order to take advantage of the low interest rates, most of my borrowing is short term. I rollover my loans quickly. In the past year my principal payments on these loans totaled $207,000.”

“Let me get this straight. Your loan payments, including principal and interest, are well over twice your take home pay?”

“Yes, I take home a little over $8,000 per month and my loan payments are over $17,000 per month. But it’s no problem. In the past year I borrowed $223,000 to cover everything.”

Shocked, I said “How can you say borrowing more than twice your income is not a problem?”

“I simply borrow all the money I need to make all of my loan payments. I never pay any of the loans down. I’ve been doing this for years, ever since I started spending more than I make.”

“Okay. Most of your borrowing goes to cover your increasingly large principal and interest payments. And as interest rates rise, interest payments will become a bigger percentage of your spending. When that happens, your total debt will increase faster than your income. What is your plan, say in the next ten years, to correct this situation?”

“Well I don’t have a plan for correcting anything, because I don’t see how I can cut my spending.”

“What if the banks stop loaning you money to make your payments on your loans? What happens then?”

“I guess I’m assuming that won’t happen.”

Sam’s Budget Situation in Real Numbers
If one of our neighbors budgeted in this manner, we would obviously conclude that the guy is crazy. No such plan could work. Eventually lenders would refuse to fund Sam’s spending.

However, Sam’s situation looks a lot like the federal government budget plan. Take a look at some recent federal budget information and some Congressional Budget Office projections:

  • In FY (fiscal year) 2015, the feds had a budget deficit, counting only debt held by the public, of $339 billion, which is about 10 percent of their tax revenues of $3,248 billion. The deficit has been declining the last few years, but that is now changing.
  • In fact, in the first three months of FY 2016, according to the Treasury Department, federal debt held by the public increased $548 billion. Admittedly, some of this debt was due to the fact that the feds were cooking the books in FY 2015 when they hit the debt ceiling limit. Nonetheless, the first quarter 2016 deficit is already 60 percent larger than the overall 2015 deficit.
  • The federal government claims to owe itself over $5 trillion (they call it intragovernmental debt here). This $5 trillion represents tax revenues that were earmarked for specific spending programs, such as Social Security, but were spent on other programs. Since the feds collected taxes to pay for Social Security, but spent the money on something else, they conclude that they owe it to themselves to collect those tax revenues again. That’s the essence of intragovernmental debt. We should not count this as debt. Give the Treasury Department credit for ignoring this type of “debt” in their Daily Treasury Statements and in their end of the year debt reports.
  • As of September 30, 2015, the feds had $13.1 trillion of debt owed to the public. FY 2015 tax revenues totaled $3.248 trillion. So just like Sam the government has a 4-to-1 debt-to-tax-revenue ratio.
  • In the past fourteen years, from September 30, 2001 (the start of George Bush’s first budget) to September 30, 2015 (the end of Barack Obama’s sixth budget), debt owed to the public increased from $3,339.3 billion to $13,123.8 billion. That’s an increase of 293 percent.
  • According to the Daily Treasury Statements, in the past fourteen years, interest on treasury securities increased from $162.5 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $233.1 billion in fiscal year 2015. That’s a 44 percent increase during the same period when federal debt owed to the public almost quadrupled.
  • In FY 2015, again according to the Daily Treasury Statements, the feds borrowed $7,251.4 billion (see the Public Debt Cash Issues for September 30, 2015), an average of almost $20 billion per day. They spent $6,740.3 billion of this borrowing rolling over their debt. So, Federal principal and interest payments are more than double federal tax revenues.
  • According to the Congressional Budget Office’s baseline projections, debt held by the public in 2025 should exceed $21 trillion and during that time interest rates are expected to increase. Interest rates have been kept artificially low for years. If interest rates return to a more normal level, say to the rates they were paying when George Bush took office fifteen years ago, then interest payments in 2025 will exceed $1.2 trillion. That’s over a 400 percent increase compared to the FY 2015 interest payments. I should note here that the baseline budget projections are optimistic. We should expect the debt situation in 2025 to be significantly worse than these projections.

The federal government’s debt has exploded under the Bush and Obama administrations. Low interest payments due to the low interest rates have masked their budget problems. As interest rates and the spending gap on entitlement programs such as Social Security both increase, the budget problem will compound.

The federal government’s plan is to borrow all of the money they need to pay all of their principal and interest payments and to also pay for the budget deficits in their spending programs. The question we should ask is: what’s going to happen when the world’s lenders refuse to bankroll DC’s spending schemes?

Mark Brandly is a professor of economics at Ferris State University and an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

This article was published on Mises.org and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution United States License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

Central Banks Should Stop Paying Interest on Reserves – Article by Brendan Brown

Central Banks Should Stop Paying Interest on Reserves – Article by Brendan Brown

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The New Renaissance Hat
Brendan Brown
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In 2008, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserve balances held on deposit at the Fed. It took more than seven decades from the US leaving the gold standard — in 1933 — for the fiat regime to do this and thus revoke a cardinal element of the old gold-based monetary system: the non-payment of any interest on base money.

The academic catalyst to this change came from Milton Friedman’s essay “The Optimum Quantity of Money” where he argued that the opportunity cost of paper money (any foregoing of interest compared to on alternative money-like instruments such as savings deposits) should be equal to its virtually-zero marginal cost of production. Opportunity cost could indeed be brought down to zero if base money (bank reserves, currency) in large part paid interest at the market rate. Under the gold standard, the opportunity cost of holding base money largely in metallic form (gold coin) was indeed typically significant. All forms of base money paid no interest. And the stream of interest income foregone in terms of present value was equal in principle to the marginal cost of gold production (this was equal to the gold price).

Interest on Reserves are Important to Controlling Markets and Imposing Negative Rates
Friedman, however, did not identify the catch-22 of his proposal. If the officials of the fiat money regime indeed take steps to close the gap between the marginal production cost and opportunity cost of base money, with both at zero, then there can be no market mechanism free of official intervention and manipulation for determining interest rates.

That is what we are now finding out in the few years since central banks in the US, Europe, and Japan started paying interest on reserves. (The ECB was authorized to do this since its launch in 1999, while the Fed and BoJ began following the 2008 financial crisis.) Central banks can now bind the invisible hand operating in the interest rate market to an extent almost unprecedented in peacetime. In some cases, central banks have even deployed a negative interest rate “tool” which would have been impossible under the prior status quo where base money paid no interest.

How We Got Here
The signing into law of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act in 2006 authorized the Federal Reserve to begin paying interest on reserves held by depository institutions beginning October 1, 2011. On the insistence of then Fed Chief Bernanke, that date was brought forward to October 1, 2008 by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. He was in the process of dispensing huge loans to troubled financial institutions but wanted nonetheless to keep interest rates at a positive level (one purpose here was to protect the money market fund industry).

Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Board amended its regulation D so that the interest rate paid on required reserves and on excess reserves would be at levels tied (according to distinct formulas at the start) to market rates. An official communiqué explained that the new procedure would eliminate the opportunity cost of holding required reserves (and thereby “deregulate”) and help to establish a lower limit for the Federal Funds rate, becoming thereby a useful tool of monetary policy.

This was useful indeed from the viewpoint of rate manipulators: by setting the rate on excess reserves the Fed could now determine the path of short-term interest rates and strongly influence longer term rates regardless of how the supply of monetary base was growing relative to trend demand. By contrast, under the gold standard and the subsequent first seven decades of the fiat money regime, interest rates in the money market were determined by forces which brought demand for base money into balance with the path of supply as set by gold mining conditions or by central bank policy decision respectively. A rise in rates meant that the public and the banks would economize on their direct or indirect holdings of base money and conversely.

Back Before the Fed Paid Interest on Reserves
Yes, under the fiat money system the central bank could effectively peg a short-term rate and supply whatever amount of base money was needed to underwrite that — but the consequential growth of supply in base money was a variable which got wide attention and remained an ostensible policy concern. Right up until the Greenspan era, the FOMC implemented policy decisions by directing the New York Fed money desk to increase or reduce the pace of reserve growth and changes in the Fed funds rate occurred ostensibly to accomplish that purpose. This old method of determining money market interest rates under a fiat regime — in which banks’ need for reserves was minute given deposit insurance, a generous lender of last resort, and too-big-to-fail — depended on the banking industry enduring what was essentially a tax on its deposit business, which was then magnified by fairly high legal reserve requirements. Thus, it is not surprising that the original impetus to paying interest on reserves, whether in the US or Europe, came from the banking lobby. There was no such burden under the gold standard even though the yellow metal earned no interest. Banks in honoring their pledge to deposit clients that their funds were convertible into gold had to visibly hold large amounts of the metal in their vaults or at hand in a reserve center. Actual and potential demand for monetary base by the public is more limited under a fiat money regime than under the gold standard as bank notes are hardly such a distinct asset as gold coin from other financial instruments.

More Problems with Friedmanite “Solutions”
Friedman, when he advocated eliminating the opportunity cost of base money under a fiat regime, hypothesized that this could occur under a long-run declining trend of prices rather than by the payment of interest. The real rate of return on base money could then be in line with the equilibrium real interest rate. This proposal for perpetually declining prices would also have been problematic, though. The interest rate would fluctuate, and in boom times be well above the rate of price decline. In any case, the rate of price decline would surely vary (sometimes into positive territory) in a well-functioning economy even when the long-run trend was constant (downward). The equilibrium real interest rate would be below the rate of price decline sometimes (for example, during business downturns), meaning that market rates even at zero would be too high. That situation did not occur often under the gold standard where prices were expected to be on a flat trend from a very long-run perspective and move pro-cyclically (falling to a low-point in the recession from which they were expected to rise in the subsequent business expansion, meaning that real interest rates would then be negative).

What Can Be Done?
So what is to be done to escape the curse? A starting point in the US would be for Congress to ban the payment of interest on bank reserves. And the US should use its financial power with respect to the IMF to argue that Japan and Europe act similarly within a spirit of G-7 coordination such as to combat monetary instability. We have seen in recent years how rate manipulation and negative rates are made possible by the payment of interest on reserves, and are potent weapons of currency warfare. Yes, the ban in the immediate would force the Federal Reserve to slim down its balance sheet so that supply and demand for base money would balance at a low positive level of interest rates. The Fed might have to swap its holdings of long-maturity debt for T-bills at the Treasury window so as to avoid any dislocation of the long-term interest rate market in consequence. That, not the Yellen-Fischer “rate lift off day and beyond,” is the road back to monetary normalcy.

Brendan Brown is an associated scholar of the Mises Institute and is author of Euro Crash: How Asset Price Inflation Destroys the Wealth of Nations and The Global Curse of the Federal Reserve: Manifesto for a Second Monetarist Revolution. See Brendan Brown’s article archives.

This article was published on Mises.org and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution United States License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

UN “Green Climate” Program Is a Slush Fund for Dictators – Article by Marian L. Tupy

UN “Green Climate” Program Is a Slush Fund for Dictators – Article by Marian L. Tupy

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The New Renaissance HatMarian L. Tupy
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The fund is planned to be $450 billion by 2020

Wherever you stand on the subject of global warming, pay close attention to one under-reported aspect of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference or Paris Agreement. I am referring to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is a financial mechanism intended “to assist developing countries in adaptation and mitigation practices to counter climate change.”

According to the current estimates, developed countries will be obliged to contribute up to $450 billion a year by 2020 to the GCF, which will then “redistribute” the money to developing countries allegedly suffering from the effects of global warming.

Lo and behold, Zimbabwe’s government-run daily “newspaper” The Herald reported that “Southern Africa is already counting the costs of climate change-linked catastrophes… In Zimbabwe, which has seen a succession of droughts since 2012, a fifth of the population is facing hunger… Feeding them will cost $1.5 billion or 11 percent of … the Gross Domestic Product.”

No doubt Robert Mugabe, the 91-year-old dictator who has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980, is salivating at the prospect of some global warming cash. Beginning in 2000, Mugabe started to expropriate privately-held agricultural land. The result of what is euphemistically called “land reform” was a monumental fall in productivity and the second highest bout of hyperinflation in recorded history.

slush1Some three million of Zimbabwe’s smartest people, including tens of thousands of doctors and lawyers, have left the country. Most of those who have remained behind are subsistence farmers with very little wealth. There is, in other words, very little loot left for the government to steal.

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Thankfully for the Zimbabwean dictator, there are plenty of gullible Westerners willing to believe that the frighteningly vile, comically incompetent government isn’t at the root of Zimbabwe’s food shortages, but that global warming is to blame.

Of course, this is pure nonsense. Botswana and Zimbabwe share a border and their climate and natural resources are exceptionally similar. Yet, since 2004, food production has increased by 29 percent in Botswana, while declining by 9 percent in Zimbabwe. It is not drought but government policies that make nations starve!

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As befits a dictatorship, Zimbabwe is one of the most corrupt places on earth. The notion that GCF funds will be will used for environmental “adaptation and mitigation” is a dangerous fantasy.

Like much foreign aid before it, most of the “green aid” money will likely end up in the pockets of some of the cruelest and most corrupt people on earth. Congress must stand firm and refuse to appropriate any money for the fund.

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This post first appeared at Human Progress.

Marian L. Tupy is the editor of HumanProgress.org and a senior policy analyst at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. 

This article was published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

This Crazy 100-Year-Old Law Makes Almost Everything More Expensive – Article by George C. Leef

This Crazy 100-Year-Old Law Makes Almost Everything More Expensive – Article by George C. Leef

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The New Renaissance HatGeorge C. Leef
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It’s time to repeal the absurd, costly “Jones Act”

The 2016 presidential campaign so far has featured almost no discussion of downsizing the federal government. Americans would benefit enormously if we could get rid of costly old laws that interfere with freedom and prosperity, and future generations would benefit even more.

I keep hoping that someone will manage to put this question squarely to the candidates in either party: “What laws would you seek to repeal if you were the president?”

There are so many laws that ought to be repealed, including countless special interest statutes that benefit a tiny group while imposing costs on a vastly greater number of Americans. But if candidates need an idea of where to start, one such law is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also called the “Jones Act.”

The Act requires that all shipments between American ports to be done exclusively on American ships. As Daniel Pearson explains,

Its stated purpose was to maintain a strong U.S. merchant marine industry. Drafters of the legislation hoped that the merchant fleet would remain healthy and robust if all shipments from one U.S. port to another were required to be carried on U.S.-built and U.S.-flagged vessels.

The theory behind the law is musty, antiquated mercantilism — the notion that the nation will be stronger if we protect “our” industries against foreign competition.

Imagine how strong we would be if there had been a Jones Act for automobile transportation. Would Americans be better off today if the Detroit automakers had remained an oligopoly by keeping out all of those Hondas, BMWs, and Hyundais? Obviously not — yet this logic has handicapped US shipping for 96 years.

A recent op-ed in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser nicely explain the absurd consequences of this law. The writer just wants to buy a cabinet, but “although the cabinet was made in Taiwan, it could not be off-loaded in Hawaii, but rather had to be shipped to the West Coast, then loaded onto an American ship for the costly backward journey to Hawaii.” Tons of time, fuel, and expense wasted, all thanks to the Jones Act.

We get a more comprehensive view of its costs from a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) last September. The report, titled “International Food Assistance: Cargo Preference Increases Food Aid Shipping Costs,” shows the heavy cost of the law. The GAO, known for its non-partisan, straight-shooting approach, found that the Jones Act increased the cost of shipping food aid by 23 percent.

What does that mean? Between 2011 and 2014, the taxpayers had to fork over an extra $45 million to ship food for USAID. With Washington’s prodigious spending, we’ve gotten used to the idea that amounts under a billion are too small to bother with, but that is the wrong way to look at things. Even if we didn’t have a constantly increasing national debt, we ought to root out every needless federal expenditure.

Treading very delicately, the GAO states that, because the Jones Act “serves statutory policy goals,” Congress should merely tweak it so that aid agencies can find less costly shipping. But the federal government has no constitutional authority to be in the business of international aid, and carving out a special exemption for this would simply help the government avoid the consequences that it is inflicting on everyone else. Congress should simply repeal the protectionist law entirely.

The Jones Act also distorts our energy market and leads to higher prices than otherwise. Writing at The Federalist, trade attorney Scott Lincicome points out that, due to the law’s restrictions, only thirteen ships can legally move crude oil between US ports, and those ships are “booked solid.” As a result, shipping American crude from Texas to Philadelphia costs more than three times as much as it would cost to send it all the way to Canada on a foreign vessel.

One of the Act’s few congressional opponents is Arizona Senator John McCain, who pointed out in this testimony that Hawaiian cattlemen who want to sell livestock on the mainland “have actually resorted to flying the cattle on 747 jumbo jets to work around the restrictions of the Jones Act. Their only alternative is to ship the cattle to Canada because all livestock carriers in the world are foreign-owned.”

Hawaii is especially hard hit by the Jones Act, but other states and territories that depend heavily on water-borne shipping also suffer. Consider Puerto Rico: a 2012 study by the New York Fed found that it cost about $3,063 to ship a 20-foot container from an east coast US port to Puerto Rico, but shipping the same container to a foreign destination, such as Jamaica, would cost only about $1,687. Because it is an American territory, the poor island pays almost twice as much to import American products.

For nearly a century, we’ve paid more at the pump, more for goods, more in taxes, and even more to do charitable aid, all because of this ancient special interest law.

All that the Jones Act accomplishes is to guarantee a market for costly, unionized American shipping. It is similar in purpose to the Davis-Bacon Act, which guarantees a market for high-cost unionized construction (as I explain here).

Such special interest laws are never good for the country as a whole, but they are passed and maintained because their lobbyists are crafty, knowledgeable, and highly motivated, while the voting public is mostly ignorant.

It takes a spotlight and presidential leadership to get rid of them. Will any of this year’s crop take up the challenge?

George Leef is the former book review editor of The Freeman. He is director of research at the John W. Pope Center for Higher Education Policy.

This article was published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

Venezuela Is Facing Runaway Financial Catastrophe – Article by Emily Skarbek

Venezuela Is Facing Runaway Financial Catastrophe – Article by Emily Skarbek

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The New Renaissance HatEmily Skarbek
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Debt, capital flight, food shortages, and hyperinflation take hold

Often, economists want to isolate questions of public debt and analyse these issues as if public choice considerations weren’t at play. Perhaps less studied are the ways in which debt practices can systematically exert pressure on formal political institutions.

But if you want to understand what is going on in Venezuela today, you can’t do so without looking at this political-economy nexus.

For regular people living in Venezuela, the situation is bleak. As the Economist reports, food queues start at 3 am, with the real possibility there won’t be anything for those at the end of the line. And the queues are growing longer and violent.

Real wages fell by 35% last year, 76% of Venezuelans are now poor, supplies of medicines have fallen to 1/5 of their normal level.

The government has admitted that in the 12 months to September 2015 the economy contracted by 7.1% and inflation was 141.5%. Even Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s hapless heir and successor, called these numbers “catastrophic”.

The IMF thinks worse is in store: it reckons inflation will surge to 720% this year and that the economy will shrink by 8%, after contracting by 10% in 2015. The Central Bank is printing money to cover much of a fiscal deficit of around 20% of GDP.

In a case study of Venezuela from 1984 to 2013, Reinhart and Santos examine the relationship among domestic debt, financial repression, and external vulnerability. The paper begins with a narrative of the evolution of domestic and external debt in Venezuela over the period.

Despite soaring oil prices from 2006 to 2013, net consolidated external debt of Venezuela rose from US $26.9 to US $104.3 billion. The central government, however, only accounted for roughly a fifth of that increment.

The difference, US $60.9 billion (78%), owed to standard practices of the Bolivarian revolution, and was issued by state owned enterprises and the relatively new Fondo Comun China-Venezuela (FCCV). The FCCV is a special-purpose vehicle that allows Venezuela to withdraw from a rolling line of credit at the Chinese Development Bank in exchange for future shipments of oil.

Domestic debt in local currency also climbed, rising from 36.298 million bolivares (VEF) in 2006 to 420.502 million in 2013. The nominal increase of 1,060% (an average annual rate of 42%) was partially offset by an accumulated price increase of 528% (or an average annual rate of 30%), reducing the cumulative increase in real domestic debt to about 85% (or 9% per annum).

During much of this period, the combination of exchange controls and interest ceilings created a captive domestic audience for domestic government debt despite markedly negative real ex post interest rates. The significant losses imposed on domestic bondholders escalated over time, owing to accelerating inflation.

Unlike foreign currency-denominated debt, debt in domestic currency may be reduced through financial repression (i.e., taxes on bondholders and savers producing negative real interest rates). Reinhart and Santos find the financial repression “tax rate” is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and legislated interest rate ceilings. In Venezuela, the “haircut” on depositors and bondholders via negative ex post real interest has exceeded 30% per annum on several occasions.

Confiscating the wealth of those responsible for capital savings can partially ameliorate the existing stock of domestic debt in the short run, but at the expense of encouraging capital flight and undermining any semblance of trust in crucial economic institutions.

The paper documents that capital flight has been a chronic feature in the Venezuelan economy, “representing on average of 4.7% of GDP at the official exchange rate and 7.1% of GDP at the parallel market exchange rate, while siphoning away 17.2% of total exports.”

By all measures, exchange controls proved ineffective at reducing capital flight. In fact, “when measured as percent of GDP at the average parallel market, rate capital flight turned out to be significantly higher in years of controls (8.0% vs 5.2%).

Hayek would not be surprised. Over his professional career he argued disastrous monetary policy commits the state to taking measures that weaken the proper functioning of the market. In order to combat inflation, states will attempt to impose further controls that “would not only make the price mechanism wholly ineffective, but also make inevitable an ever-increasing central direction of all economic activity.”

In Venezuela, Chávez turned the would-be checks and balances of the state — the Supreme Court and the electoral authority — into extensions of executive power. He packed the court and they then threw out those legislators necessary for the opposition to get the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution.

President Nicolás Maduro seems prepared to continue the repression and price controls, calling the owner of Venezuela’s largest privately-held company a thief and publicly blaming him for the country’s dire economic condition.

It is perhaps fitting that it was at a Mont Pèlerin Conference in Caracas where Hayek famously quipped:

We now have a tiger by the tail: how long can this inflation continue? If the tiger (of inflation) is freed he will eat us up; yet if he runs faster and faster while we desperately hold on, we are still finished!

I’m glad I won’t be here to see the final outcome…

Emily Skarbek is Lecturer in Political Economy at King’s College London and guest blogs on EconLog. Her website is EmilySkarbek.com. Follow her on Twitter @EmilySkarbek.​

This article was published by The Foundation for Economic Education and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which requires that credit be given to the author.

Mises on Protectionism and Immigration – Article by Matt McCaffrey

Mises on Protectionism and Immigration – Article by Matt McCaffrey

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The New Renaissance HatMatt McCaffrey
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The economic causes and consequences of immigration are among the most important issues facing the world today. Both pro- and anti-immigration advocates are digging in their heels, and both sides look increasingly unlikely to relent. Despite the bleak outlook, however, there is still hope for a peaceful and charitable discussion of the economics of immigration.

With that in mind, I want to consider Mises’s thoughts on the topic. For Mises, emigration and immigration are motivated by a simple economic fact: the conditions of production are not the same in all places. Natural and human conditions change constantly, and as a result, the productivity of land, labor, and capital do so as well. Therefore in order to take advantage of changing conditions and produce in the most productive ways possible, people must constantly migrate to those places where their contributions are most valuable (1919, pp. 84–85).

The desire to move from low-productivity to high-productivity regions is for Mises the fundamental explanation for the migration of peoples, and limits overpopulation (1919, p. 85). We can say a country is relatively overpopulated when the same amount of capital and labor is less productive there than in another nation. Reducing overpopulation means reducing this “disproportion” by allowing for the mobility of persons and goods (1919, p. 86). In Mises’s view, mobility was an achievement of liberalism:

The principles of freedom, which have gradually been gaining ground everywhere since the eighteenth century, gave people freedom of movement. … Now, however — as a result of a historical process of the past — the earth is divided up among nations. Each nation possesses definite territories that are inhabited exclusively or predominantly by its own members. Only a part of these territories has just that population which … it would also have under complete freedom of movement, so that neither an inflow or an outflow of people would take place. The remaining territories are settled in such a way that under complete freedom of movement they would have either to give up or to gain population. Migrations thus bring members of some nations into the territories of other nations. That gives rise to particularly characteristic conflicts between peoples. (1919, pp. 86–87)

Mises has two types of conflict in mind: economic and social. Economic conflict occurs because domestic workers resent that fact that immigration bids down their wages:

[I]n territories of immigration, immigration depresses the wage rate. That is a necessary side effect of migration of workers and not, say, as Social Democratic doctrine wants to have believed, an accidental consequence of the fact that the emigrants stem from territories of low culture and low wages. (1919, p. 87)

Social conflict can also arise. Mises emphasized, however, that in most cases immigrants are obliged to give up their national identity and adapt themselves to the culture of their new home. Only in relatively extreme cases, such as European imperialism, was it historically possible for immigrants to replace original inhabitants and their cultures (1919, p. 89). In fact, according to Mises, strong cultures need not resort to government in order to protect themselves:

A nation that believes in itself and its future, a nation that means to stress the sure feeling that its members are bound to one another not merely by accident of birth but also by the common possession of a culture that is valuable above all to each of them, would necessarily be able to remain unperturbed when it saw individual persons shift to other nations. A people conscious of its own worth would refrain from forcibly detaining those who wanted to move away and from forcibly incorporating into the national community those who were not joining it of their own free will. To let the attractive force of its own culture prove itself in free competition with other peoples — that alone is worthy of a proud nation, that alone would be true national and cultural policy. The means of power and of political rule were in no way necessary for that. (1919, pp. 103–04)

However, for Mises, cultural considerations are mainly an aside. In general, he saw conflicts over immigration as being driven mostly by protectionism rather than insurmountable differences in human beings or cultures (1935). In particular, domestic unions support government policies to restrict immigration and thus keep low-wage competition out of the labor market:

Public opinion has been led astray by the smoke-screen laid down by Marxist ideology which would have people believe that the union-organized “proletariat of all lands” have the same interests and that only entrepreneurs and capitalists are nationalistic. The hard fact of the matter — namely that the unions in all those countries which have more favorable conditions of production, relatively fewer workers and thus higher wages, seek to prevent an influx of workers from less favored lands—has been passed over in silence. (1935)

As Per Bylund notes, this is precisely what is happening in Sweden, where unions prevent the integration of immigrants so as to keep wages high. Protectionism at home also breeds protectionism abroad, as foreign nations try to cope with lower productivity through their own regulations designed to counter “unfair” competition on the world market. As economic conditions worsen in those countries where migration is prevented by the state, conflict becomes inevitable:

[People in these countries] will certainly still have just as much cause to complain as before — not over the unequal distribution of raw materials, but over the erection of migration barriers around the lands with more favorable conditions of production. And it may be that one day they will reach the conclusion that only weapons can change this unsatisfactory situation. Thus, we may face a great coalition of the lands of would-be emigrants standing in opposition to the lands that erect barricades to shut out would-be immigrants. … Without the reestablishment of freedom of migration throughout the world, there can be no lasting peace. (1935)

In this way, protectionist policies inevitably lead to conflict and the destruction of human life and welfare. In fact, Mises even hints that government policies aiming to control the movement and employment of individuals suffer from the same problems socialist central planning does (1919, p. 85). At the same time, entrepreneurship and the division of labor are the foundations of a rational social order, and neither is possible without free labor markets.

The main threat facing society then is illiberal ideology, and the only solution to this “principle of violence” is to develop a consistent liberal philosophy to serve as the basis for a peaceful society (1951, p. 49).

Mises believed that any society that rejected the values of liberalism was doomed. In an age of nationalism, protectionism, and war, it’s easy to see what he meant.

Matt McCaffrey is assistant professor of enterprise at the University of Manchester.

This article was published on Mises.org and may be freely distributed, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution United States License, which requires that credit be given to the author.